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
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The Struggle for the Anti-Imperialist United Front and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of China

By WANG MING

I. THE NEW POLICY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

THE manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese People's Soviet Republic and of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China addressed "To the whole people of China on resistance to Japan and the salvation of the fatherland",* represents the beginning of the application by the Communist Party of China of a new policy. This policy aims at the crystallization of the widest anti-imperialist united front on the basis of common struggle against Japanese imperialism, for the salvation of the fatherland.

The manifesto definitely outlines the content and the forms of the anti-imperialist united front in the following way:

The formation of a united people's government of national defense and the organization of a united anti-Japanese army for the whole of China.

It would be wrong, however, to draw the conclusion therefrom that the Communist Party and the Soviets in China insist that a united anti-imperialist front must begin only with these forms of struggle, and that they underestimate the various incipient forms of this united front which arise out of the most elementary anti-imperialist demands. In putting forward their proposals regarding the basic content and the highest forms of the anti-imperialist united front, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Soviet government of China make it obligatory upon the whole Party and upon all the Soviets to increase their attention ten-fold to the organization of the mass anti-imperialist movement, if only on the basis of primitive forms and around the most elementary demands.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Soviet government of China regard the formation of a Chinese people's government of national defense and of a Chinese united anti-Japanese army as the final outcome of a systematic, persistent and flexible struggle by all heroic fighters, Party and non-Party, to establish, consolidate and extend the widest anti-imperialist united front of the Chinese people on the basis of a general fighting program of resistance to Japan and a struggle to save the fatherland.

The basic and most important of all the factors which determined the new policy of the Communist Party of China is the rise of the national struggle against Japanese imperialism, for the salvation of the country,

* See page 218 in this issue.

and the need for organizing this struggle. Today great changes are taking place in China from the point of view of the alignment of class forces. Not only the working class, the peasantry and the toilers in general are more and more realizing the need for a determined struggle for their national and social liberation; not only are broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie fighting against the imperialist yoke, unemployment and death from starvation; but a considerable section of the national bourgeoisie as well is ever more energetically striving to find a way to resist Japanese imperialism. The historic slogan thrown out by the Communist Party of China after the events of September 18, 1931, i.e., "a national-revolutionary war of the armed people against Japanese imperialism, in defense of the national independence of China and of its territorial integrity and unification as a state", has now become not only the slogan of the Communist Party; it is finding more and more support in many other parties, groups, and among the vast masses. A significant change is also to be observed in the attitude of the military units of the different generals to the question of national defense. It is a fact that not only numerous soldiers, including a considerable section of the junior and middle officers, but also individual representatives of the high command are hostile towards Japanese imperialism and its agents, as a result of which there have been several cases of whole army corps and units of the Kuomintang armies turning their arms against the enemies of the people.

Numerous facts could be cited which testify to these changes taking place among different strata of the population and different political parties and groupings, as well as among the military forces of the Chinese generals, in the direction of the struggle against Japanese imperialism.*

What is the explanation of the national character of the struggle to resist Japan and save the fatherland?

Above all, the unceasing onslaught of Japanese imperialism upon the whole of China and its openly rapacious colonial policy in Manchukuo. About half the territory of China has already been either directly occupied by Japanese imperialism or is in fact under the heel of the Japanese militarists. And the other half of the territory of China is in danger of further occupation by the Japanese imperialist robbers. Japanese imperialism has utilized the situation in Europe, which is becoming more and more complicated in connection with the Italo-Ethiopian war, to make an open declaration about forming a "Hua Pei Kuo", and has advanced new demands which imply a complete protectorate by Japan over the whole of China. The frankly rapacious policy of oppression pursued by the Japanese imperialist invaders on the territory of Manchukuo has caused unprecedented alarm among the population of the whole of China. The "civilizing" efforts of Japanese imperialism and its Kwantung army on the territory of Manchukuo have been manifested in mass murder of peaceful citizens, mass burning of towns and villages, rape of Chinese women and girls, unexampled insults and outrages directed against the elementary human dignity of the Chinese, the

* See Comrade Wang Ming's speech at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in *The Communist International*, No. 17-18, 1935, p. 1323.

destruction and disarming of Chinese armed forces of all types and the confiscation of all types of arms from the population, plunder and devastation, and the famous "reorganization" of all political institutions accompanied by wage reductions and increase in unemployment, the growth of unbearable taxation and extortions, the seizure of the horses and cattle of the peasants, the order prohibiting peasants sowing maize within a distance of 20 kilometers from the railway lines, mass compulsory labor on construction jobs of strategic importance, the seizure of all resources of raw materials (mines, pits, forests, etc.), and transport (railways, steamship companies, automobile companies), the seizure or forcible purchase of Chinese industrial enterprises for a mere song, the elimination of Chinese traders and Chinese banks, the appropriation of the fertile lands of the Chinese peasants and landlords and their transfer to Japanese and Korean settlers, the confiscation of big stretches of land for the requirements of war construction, the burning of all Chinese literature, not only of the progressive kind, but of all Chinese books on literature, history, geography, etc., the prohibition of the teaching of these subjects in schools, the compulsory teaching of the Japanese language and the history of Japan to Chinese school children, the mass sale of opium, morphine and other narcotics, and the encouragement of mass prostitution among Japanese and Korean women, gambling, etc. All this has unequivocally shown the entire Chinese people that under Japanese occupation, not only are the toiling masses of China subjected to unheard-of colonial exploitation and oppression, but that the propertied class of China as well are at the mercy of the Japanese brigands. All this is clearly convincing the Chinese people that side by side with the open policy of colonial enslavement, Japanese imperialism is pursuing in Manchuria a policy aimed at the physical annihilation and demoralization of the Chinese people.

This rapacious policy pursued by Japanese imperialism on the territory of Manchukuo, and its unceasing encroachment on new territory, have awakened among all Chinese the realization of the fact that what has befallen forty million of their brothers in Manchuria and Jehol may strike ninety-five million of their countrymen in the five northern provinces (Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar and Szechwan) tomorrow, and may befall the four hundred million who constitute the great people of China the day after, unless they unite their forces for serious, determined armed resistance against Japanese aggression.

The struggle against Japanese imperialism and for the salvation of the fatherland is assuming a more and more national character for the additional reason that China, during recent years, has been experiencing a serious, and ever intensifying, economic crisis. The following are phenomena which are characteristic of China today: the unexampled degradation of agriculture, the unbearable poverty of the peasants, the mass unemployment and the death by starvation of millions, the passage of Chinese industrial enterprises into the hands of the imperialists, first and foremost to the Japanese, the bankruptcy and closing down of Chinese banks, and the restrictions upon Chinese trade and collapse of numerous Chinese commercial enterprises. Besides this there are the constantly recurring national disasters, such as floods, droughts, pests of

locusts, etc., which doom to poverty and starvation not only the toilers but also considerable sections of the petty bourgeoisie and middle class property holders in the villages and towns.

The responsibility for all this misery and suffering lies at the door of all the imperialists and militarists; but the prime responsibility for the misery of the Chinese people lies with the Japanese imperialists and the Nanking Kuomintang government, led by Chang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei. Consequently, all those who are against the exploiters and oppressors of the Chinese people cannot but aim their arms first and foremost against Japanese imperialism and the Nanking government.

Finally, the national character of the struggle against Japanese imperialism for the salvation of the fatherland is the result of the fact that while the foreign and home policy of the Kuomintang has broken down entirely, a new government is growing up, a government of the people themselves, the government of the Soviets, which is pursuing a new national policy the very reverse of that of the Kuomintang. Previously, not only a large section of the national bourgeoisie, but considerable circles of the petty bourgeoisie as well, were inspired with confidence towards the Kuomintang, and counted on it being in a position in the long run to put through some sort of national and social reforms in their interests. Now, however, in view of the unceasing capitulation of the Nanking government to Japanese imperialism and the hopeless economic and political situation of the country under the Kuomintang regime, not only the petty bourgeoisie but a considerable section of the national bourgeoisie as well are freeing themselves more and more from the illusions they held concerning the Kuomintang, and are turning for a way out to the toiling masses who are carrying on the struggle against Japanese imperialism and its agents. The victorious development of the Soviet revolution and the success of the policy of the Soviets are inspiring the broad masses of the people with confidence that if they will take the power into their own hands, then, despite all sacrifices, difficulties and mistakes, everything will work out much better than under the Kuomintang regime.

The Chinese people are directly confronted with the following alternatives: *either they will rise up and defeat the onslaught of Japanese imperialism and save the fatherland—which will mean life; or they will follow the Nanking government and renounce the national-liberation struggle—which will mean death!* This is the explanation of the rise of the national struggle against Japanese imperialism for the salvation of the fatherland.

If success is to be assured for this national struggle, it must be organized. It was for just this purpose that the C.P. of China adopted its new policy of establishing the broadest anti-imperialist united front.

The second factor which determined the new policy of the C.P. of China is the basic characteristic features of the development of the Chinese revolution. What are these characteristic features? The first feature is that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China is passing through the Soviet stage of its development at which two torrents of revolution—the anti-imperialist and the agrarian revolutions—merge.

As far back as August, 1927, in his speech delivered at the joint

Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U., Comrade Stalin, touching upon the question of the stages of the Chinese revolution and of its chief tasks at each of these stages, pointed out that,

"... while the first stage was characterized by the fact that the sharp edge of the revolution was directed chiefly against foreign imperialism, the characteristic feature of the second stage is the fact that the revolution directs its sharp edge chiefly against the enemies inside the country, and, first and foremost, against the feudal lords, against the feudal regime. Did the first stage solve its task of overthrowing foreign imperialism? No, it did not. It passed on the completion of this task as a legacy to the second stage of the Chinese revolution. It only gave the first impetus to the revolutionary masses against imperialism, so as to finish its run and pass on this task to the future. It is most likely that the second stage of the revolution, too, will not be able to effect the complete solution of the task of driving out the imperialists. It will give a further impetus to the broad masses of the Chinese peasants and workers against imperialism, but only to leave the completion of this task to the next stage of the Chinese revolution, the Soviet stage.

"There is nothing surprising in this. Is it not well known that analogous facts have occurred in the history of our revolution, although in a different situation and under different circumstances? Is it not well known that the first stage of our revolution did not fully solve its task of completing the agrarian revolution, but passed this task on to the next stage of the revolution, to the October revolution, which wholly and completely solved the task of uprooting the feudal survivals? We need therefore not be surprised if the second stage of the Chinese revolution should fail to complete the agrarian revolution, if the second stage of the revolution, while setting millions of peasants into motion and rousing them against feudal survivals, should leave the completion of this task to the next stage of the revolution, the Soviet stage. And this would only be a favorable factor for the future Soviet revolution in China."*

The fact that the main content of the Soviet stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China is not only the agrarian revolution but also the anti-imperialist revolution is, as Comrade Stalin indicated, only a circumstance favoring the Chinese revolution, since it is just this circumstance that endows the Chinese Soviet revolution today with *invincible strength and very wide scope*. The task facing the Communist Party of China is not only to correctly understand and appraise the inter-relations between these two revolutionary torrents, but also by its correct policy to combine the solution of the tasks facing both the revolutionary torrents in a manner which would give the greatest scope and strength to the development of the revolutionary struggle.

In connection with the broad extent of the development of the agrarian revolution in the Soviet districts and in the tremendous upsurge of the anti-imperialist revolution throughout the country under the slogan of armed resistance to Japanese imperialism, it is *the task*

* Stalin, *On the Opposition*, Russian edition.

of the Party of Bolsheviks to pursue a bold, flexible and correct policy in order to combine these two great torrents of the Soviet revolution, so as to endow the development of the Chinese revolution with as great forces and scope as possible by drawing into the national and social liberation struggle the widest possible circles not only of truly revolutionary, class-conscious and honest elements, but also of allies and temporary supporters from among different strata and classes of Chinese society, even those that are temporarily wavering. Our new policy above all aims at establishing a broad anti-imperialist front on these lines.

The second characteristic of the development of the Chinese Soviet revolution is that its enemies are all imperialist powers. It is this that is the main difficulty facing the Chinese Soviet revolution but at the same time it is partly a favorable factor for its development, since the sharpening of the contradictions and of the internecine warfare between the rival imperialists and their henchmen in China cannot fail to lead to a weakening of their positions and of their common front. And thus objective possibilities are created for their being utilized by the revolution in its own interests. The correct and skilful policy to be pursued by the Bolshevik Party in this case *is to appraise properly the role and importance of these indirect reserves of the Chinese revolution, to utilize them flexibly, skilfully, correctly and opportunely in the interests of revolution—to concentrate the forces of the revolution everywhere and at all times against that enemy which at each given moment is the most dangerous, the most hated by all the people and the most isolated from support both at home and abroad.*

Today, when on the one hand, the further onslaught of Japanese imperialism in North, Central and South China is sharpening the contradictions not only between Japan and the United States but also between Japan and Britain, throughout the Far East, and on the other hand the tense atmosphere throughout the whole of Europe in general and the Italo-Ethiopian war in particular are still further complicating the struggle among the imperialists—the question of the role and importance of the indirect reserves of the revolution is of especially great importance. Our new policy aims to utilize all the indirect reserves of the revolution.

The third characteristic of the development of the Chinese Soviet revolution is that the armed struggle between the revolution and the counter-revolution is *of quite a long drawn-out character.* This being so, the task of the Party of Bolsheviks is to undertake a skilful and flexible mobilization of all the extensive and inexhaustible forces of the masses of the people, and to use all possible forms and methods of revolutionary struggle. Only if this is done shall we gain a victory over the enemy, and this, too, is the aim of our new policy.

Finally, the fourth fundamental characteristic of the development of the Chinese Soviet revolution is that up to now it has been developing unevenly as regards territory, and owing to this it has only led, after a number of years, *to the first victory over a considerable part of its territory.* The point indicated by the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of China to the effect that “the stability of the powers of

reaction in different regions is uneven and therefore a general revolutionary upsurge may at first result in victory in one or a number of important provinces", has, in the main, been justified in practice. *Initial victory has been achieved by the Soviet revolution on the territory of a number of provinces*, but in consequence of a number of specific peculiarities, and first and foremost because of the weakness of the revolutionary movement, *it has not yet spread to a single important city (capital) in these provinces*. This is, of course, a negative feature, a weakness of the revolution. At the same time, however, at a certain stage of the development of events this is also in part a favorable factor for the revolution, since it provides it with greater opportunities and more time to prepare and to collect its forces, and first and foremost its armed forces, and at the same time provides better opportunities for avoiding such collisions with the superior forces of powerful opponents as may be premature, unprepared, and disadvantageous as far as the revolution is concerned.

The task and the essence of our new policy consist in just this: that it is based upon a correct appraisal of the role and significance of the uneven development of the revolutionary movement in the country, that it is calculated upon the correct utilization of the initial victory of the revolution as a base and starting point from which to prepare for and gain complete success, and that it puts forward the Soviets as the unifying center of the whole Chinese people in their struggle for emancipation.

The *third* factor which determined the new policy of the Communist Party of China is, not only the *growing strength of the Red Army and the Soviets*, but also the fact that they have a *certain aspect of weakness*. With their policy of developing the anti-imperialist and agrarian revolution, and especially the glorious struggle against the rapacious onslaught of Japanese imperialism and the national treachery of the Nanking government, the Soviets have won enormous sympathy and authority for themselves among the masses of the people. More than this, all the units of the Red Army are growing and gathering strength in the protracted and difficult but successful struggle, defeating one after another the military campaigns of Chiang Kai-shek who has the support of the imperialists. The last great march of the main forces of the Red Army from Kiangsi to Fukien; in particular, the fact that they broke through the strategic cordon of the million-strong army of the enemy; their advance over a distance of 5,000 kilometers of territory intersected by high mountain ranges and great rivers; and the fact that the plan drawn up in advance by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Chinese Soviet Republic, namely, to link up with the other big units of the Fourth Army and organize new territorial bases, was fulfilled—all these heroic feats of the Red Army of China have revealed in practice the infinite support and sympathy which the masses of the people extend to the Soviets. By its fighting power, by its legendary military skill in these heroic feats, the Red Army of China has roused admiration in the hearts of all friends, caused alarm among all enemies, and inspired all skeptics with the conviction of its invincibility. Owing

to this, all the enemies of Japanese imperialism and its agents—whatever the motives that guide them, whether truly national-liberation sentiments and patriotic feelings or simply militarist and imperialist antagonisms—have to reckon with the Chinese Red Army and the Soviets, not only as a big political force, but also as a big military factor. This circumstance without a doubt provides the Red Army and the Soviets with still further opportunities of fulfilling their glorious role as the unifying center for the entire Chinese people in organizing resistance to Japan and the struggle to save their fatherland.

However, we must say quite frankly that what dictates the need for establishing a broad anti-imperialist united front is not only the growing might of the Red Army and the Soviets, but also the fact that they have certain weak sides. The point is that, viewing the situation from the angle of actual military strength, the Red Army alone is not formidable enough to defeat Japanese imperialism and its agents, while from the point of view of the political outlook, there are still considerable sections of the population that are not yet free from the influence of other governmental authorities, other parties and groupings, and are not yet adherents of the Soviets today. At the same time the national crisis of the Chinese people is so serious that—unless means are quickly found of organizing the broadest masses of the people and of uniting the various armed forces, irrespective of their political convictions and party membership, for the common cause of offering resistance to Japan and saving the fatherland—the oldest country in the world, with a history and culture 5,000 years old, will soon be completely converted into a colony under the heel of foreign robbers, and the greatest people in the world numbering four hundred millions will be subjected once and for all to colonial slavery. Our new policy is the only means by which the whole of the Chinese people can unite with the Red Army and the Soviets for the sacred national-liberation struggle.

Finally, the fourth factor which determined the new policy of our Party is *the necessity of correcting the mistakes which have manifested themselves in the theory and practice of our work in the Soviet and non-Soviet regions*. There are quite a number of mistakes and shortcomings in our work, primarily of a "Left"-sectarian nature. They prevent our Party from acting as leader of the whole people, as a national factor, and this is precisely what is necessary in the new situation today. The cause of the Chinese revolution cannot be advanced unless these mistakes and shortcomings are overcome.

II. CONCERNING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND A PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND BE- TWEEN THE RED ARMY AND A UNITED ANTI- JAPANESE ARMY

The Chinese Soviet government is fundamentally a people's government, since it is the power of the people themselves engaged in defending their own interests. At the same time it is actually also a government of national defense, since it is fighting for the organization of a national liberation war of the armed people against Japanese imperialism in defense of the national independence, territorial integrity and the unifica-

tion of China as a state, since it is fighting for complete national freedom for the entire Chinese people. However, the Soviet government of China today is still not a *government covering the whole of China*, since for the time being it controls only one section of Chinese territory. And at the same time, in view of the growing offensive of Japanese imperialism against the whole of China and the need for rallying the whole Chinese people for armed struggle against Japanese aggression and to save the fatherland, the question of the unification of China into one state is of primary importance. In China today, the consequences of the fact that as a state the country is split up are to be felt more strongly than ever before. And it is just for this reason that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic are taking upon themselves the initiative for the formation of an all-China people's government of national defense, in which there shall participate representatives not only of the Soviet government and the Manchurian anti-Japanese organs of local people's government, but also of all parties, groups, political and military authorities, mass organizations and social groupings that are really striving for the national defense of China against the Japanese imperialists.

How concretely will such an all-China government of national defense be formed? At present it is difficult to say. The Communist Party of China and the Soviet government of China are sincerely desirous of forming such a government as quickly as possible. In their manifesto already mentioned, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic have openly declared that

"... the Soviet government is prepared to undertake the initiative in forming an all-China government of national defense. It is prepared immediately to open negotiations for the organization of a government of national defense in which all political parties and groups in China will participate, as well as all prominent political and social figures, all mass organizations, all local military and political authorities, who desire to participate in the struggle to repel Japan and save the fatherland."

And further the Communist Party and the Soviet government of China declared:

"The government of national defense which will be organized as a result of these negotiations should be regarded as a provisional central organ of the struggle to save China, and must take measures to call together a body truly representative of the whole Chinese people, elected on the basis of democratic liberties, which will decide in which direction the struggle for the integrity and independence of China should develop. The Soviet government and the Communist Party of China will support to the utmost the convocation of such a representative body and any decisions it takes, since the Soviet government has a sincere and warm respect for the opinion and desires of the people."

What should be the nature of such a Chinese government of national

defense? The manifesto deals with this point in the following way:

"The basic task of such a people's government is the organization of resistance to Japanese imperialism and the salvation of the fatherland. Consequently, the following are the chief points in its program:

"1. Armed resistance to Japanese expansion and the return of all occupied territories.

"2. Relief to the starving; amelioration work on rivers and dams, to prevent inundations and droughts.

"3. Confiscation of all the property of Japanese imperialism in China and its transfer to a fund to cover military expenditures incurred in connection with the struggle against Japan.

"4. Confiscation of the land, rice, grain, and other property of all national traitors and Japanese agents, and their transfer to a fund to help the unemployed, the poor, and those who take part in the anti-Japanese struggle.

"5. The abolition of all heavy taxation and levies; the regulation of the financial policy, of the monetary system and of the whole of national economy.

"6. Increases in wages and salaries, and improvements in the material conditions of workers, peasants, soldiers and intellectuals.

"7. Democratic liberties for all; the release of all political prisoners.

"8. Universal free education; young people upon completing their school education to be provided with work.

"9. Equal rights for all nationalities inhabiting China; protection of the personal freedom, property rights, right of domicile and occupation of inhabitants of China itself and of Chinese emigrants abroad.

"10. The establishment of contacts with all the masses of people who are hostile to Japanese imperialism (with the Japanese toilers, with the Koreans and inhabitants of Formosa, etc.) for the purpose of waging a joint struggle against the common enemy. The establishment of an alliance with all nations and states which support and sympathize with the national-liberation struggle of the Chinese people, and of friendly relations with all powers and all nations who adopt a position of friendly neutrality towards the military struggle between Japanese imperialism and the Chinese people."

From the contents of this program it is clear that such an all-China government of national defense is a government of the anti-imperialist united front. At the same time its program not only does not conflict with the tasks of the Soviet government but, on the contrary, the Soviet government is fighting and must fight for its consistent enforcement.

Therefore, the Chinese Soviet government can and must pursue this program in all localities which are subject to its authority, setting an example to all those who consider themselves to be supporters of the government of national defense.

But, at the same time, we must clearly point to the fact that the

Soviet government, whose main task is to obtain the complete, final, national and social emancipation of the whole of the Chinese people, cannot limit its actions to the framework of the program of the government of national defense. Thus, for example, on the question of launching the agrarian revolution, the Soviet government is already putting into practice the program demands of the government of national defense concerning the confiscation in favor of the people of the lands of traitors to the people, as a component part, and the starting point, of the agrarian revolution; but at the same time, it not only cannot reject its line of principle aiming at the final elimination of ownership of land by feudal landlords in China but is fighting to put this principle into effect in accordance with the given objective and subjective conditions of struggle. For, from the point of view of the Communist Party and the Soviet government of China, the complete abolition of the ownership of land by feudal landlords and the transfer of the land to the peasants, not only do not conflict with the tasks of the anti-imperialist struggle, but are an indissoluble part of these tasks and a guarantee that they will really be fulfilled. By abolishing the ownership of land by feudal landlords, and by transferring these lands to the peasantry, the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, hundreds of millions of peasants can be aroused to a decisive struggle against Japanese imperialism. Only by abolishing private ownership of the land by the landlords can we save the overwhelming majority of our people—the peasantry—from starvation. Only by freeing the peasantry from the yoke of the feudal landlords can we lay down the economic foundation for the development of the whole of the economy of China. And only by clearing all the medieval feudal survivals out of China can we lead our backward and uncultured country onto the road of development as a modern cultural state. It was no accident that the national revolutionary Sun Yat-sen advanced the idea of "the land to the tillers", and now even such a reactionary militarist as Yen Hsi-shan has been forced to admit that "it is necessary to revise land relations" in China.

As regards the inter-relations between the united anti-Japanese army and the Red Army, the manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic declares:

"The united anti-Japanese army must include all the troops and armed detachments desirous of fighting against Japanese imperialism and its agents. A general staff for this united army must be formed under the guidance of the government of national defense. This general staff will be formed either by means of electing representatives from among the commanders and rank and file soldiers in all the anti-Japanese military forces, or by some other democratic method. This question must also be decided so as to correspond to the opinion of the majority of the representatives of all sides, and the will of the people. The Red Army is ready to be the first to be fused in this united anti-Japanese army, so as to fulfil its sacred duty of saving the fatherland."

It is difficult as yet to determine how the concrete establishment of

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...the ...

Our policy in the Soviet regions is a practical demonstration of the New Deal, an example which attracts the attention of the whole of the world and which, above all else, demonstrates the attitude towards us of various strata of Chinese society and of the whole world. Consequently, the success or failure of our struggle to establish an anti-imperialist united front depends to a considerable degree upon our policy in the Soviet regions.

This space does not permit dwelling in detail on this question, let us confine ourselves to pointing out just a few of the essential changes in our policy in the Soviet regions which changes the leaders of the Communist Party of China are discussing today and intend to introduce.

A In the sphere of economic policy.

First, our agrarian policy. While in the main adhering to our course of elimination of feudal survivals, we must introduce the following changes on the basis of the slogan for the sake of rallying the broadest national anti-Japanese front. First, we must not confiscate the land of handicraftsmen, artisans, and small traders, and certain workers, who although they do not dispossess themselves, have originally acquired their land with the fruit of their own labor. They must either be allowed to lease or to work it under conditions of exploitation of no more than the state must compensate them to the extent of the value of their land if it is returned to the common land fund at the demand of the peasant movement. Second, we must discontinue the process of confiscating the land of so-called surplus agricultural proprietors of the kulaks. In the place of this, we must insist on the equal distribution of the land as the demands of the peasant movement, that owned by the kulaks should go into the common land fund. Third, the kulaks should receive an allowance on the same basis as the other strata of the population. Fourth, we must not confiscate the land of landowners who serve the Japanese imperialists and who are today really working part in the armed struggle against the Japanese imperialists and to save the fatherland. Fifth, in relation to merchants who are at the same time big landowners, we should insist on ourselves to confiscating their land without touching their commercial enterprises;

B The policy as regards trade and industry.

In order to ensure regular supplies to the Red Army, and to improve the material position of the masses of the people, it is essential, first, not only to develop mass co-operatives and state undertakings to the utmost, but to encourage the development of private trade and industry in every way. Second, the Soviets must revise all rules which hinder and restrict free trade and the growth of industry. Third, to change the attitude adopted towards chambers of commerce, i.e., not to discontinue them but to use them in the interests of developing trade and industry in the Soviet regions, as well as of trade relations between the Soviet and non-Soviet regions. Fourth, to revise our taxation policy with the aim of allowing greater freedom for the development of private trade and industry, etc., etc.

C The policy on questions of labor.

Continuing the line of improving the material, legal and cultural conditions of workers and agricultural laborers to the utmost, it is essential, first, to reject all extreme demands which are either in-

capable of fulfilment in the circumstances which exist today in the Soviet regions or which lead to further economic disorganization and unemployment; second, it is essential for the time being to refrain from organizing so-called "workers' control of industry", the necessary conditions for which do not exist as yet.

D. In the sphere of political administration.

The Constitution must be altered by definitely extending democratic liberties to correspond to the present relation of class forces in the struggle against Japanese imperialism, and to correspond to the requirements of the new policy. Concretely, the following changes must be introduced. First, civil rights must be granted not only to workers, peasants, Red army men and all toilers, but also to all the urban petty bourgeoisie and to all who really participate in the armed struggle against Japanese imperialism and to save the fatherland; of course, in the electoral system, we must now as previously safeguard a superior position for the workers. Second, we must draw into the work of the respective Soviet organs not only bourgeois specialists but other bourgeois elements as well, in order to make use of their experience, connections, and resources in the interests of the revolution (for example, the participation of individual traders and industrialists in the work of the trading and industrial sections of the Soviets, etc.). Third, democratic rights and liberties must be extended to all the non-Communist parties, groups, social and mass organizations which engage in struggle, not against the Soviet government, but against the imperialists and their lackeys. Fourth, we must not exclude the possibility of the participation in the Soviet organs of representatives of truly national-revolutionary parties and groups which are honestly fighting side by side with the Soviets and the Communist Party against Japan and to save the fatherland. Fifth, while on the whole maintaining the present workers' and peasants' composition of the Red Army, and keeping control, both military and political, in our own hands, we must make it possible for the petty-bourgeois youth (primarily revolutionary intellectuals, students, clerks, etc.) to join the ranks of the Red Army, in order to conduct a joint armed struggle against Japanese imperialism and to save the fatherland; etc., etc.

E. In the sphere of foreign policy.

First, we must relinquish our undifferentiated and uniform approach to all imperialist powers without exception. The main blow must be directed against Japanese imperialism. As for the other imperialist powers, the Soviets should not only strive to attain more or less normal relations with them, but should not exclude the possibility, under certain conditions, of fighting together with them against the common enemy. Second, we must put an end to the old guerilla traditions in relation to foreign diplomatic, commercial, cultural and religious institutions and people, i.e., to eliminate such incidents as have occurred of their being arrested and of demands for ransom being made without any special need. They must be allowed to pursue their occupations, provided they observe the Soviet law and do not engage in counter-revolutionary struggle against the Soviets, and on the basis of new treaties concluded between them and the Soviets on terms of equality. Third, the Soviets

should also seriously pursue a policy of differentiation as regards the various governments and groupings inside China. The Soviets must, at each given moment, direct their main blows *against the most fundamental enemy of the Red Army and of the people*, and first and foremost against the lackeys of Japanese imperialism. The Soviets must not only do their utmost to ensure friendly relations with all who really want to fight against Japanese imperialism and its lackeys, but must, in addition, establish normal relations with all those who, for one reason or another, are not conducting a fight against the Red Army.

Obviously, now as previously, the whole of our policy in general and our activities in the Soviet regions, in particular, must be subordinated primarily to the interests of the national revolutionary struggle of the armed people, and must ensure its success.

IV. THE NEW POLICY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA WILL TRIUMPH OVER THE NEW POLICY OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

Japanese imperialism, taking account of the—as far as it is concerned—extremely favorable international situation which has arisen in connection with the Italo-Ethiopian war, recently announced a “new” policy in relation to China. The essence of this “new” policy amounts to accelerating the pace of the seizure of Northern China and preparations to swallow up the whole of China. The immediate measures which have been adopted during the last few months in connection with the “new” policy of Japanese imperialism in China are as follows: a frank declaration by Japan of its intention to establish a so-called “Hua Pei Kuo” as quickly as possible on the territory of the five North Chinese provinces (Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar and Szechwan); the despatch of large Japanese land and sea forces into China: the disembarkation of Japanese troops in Swatow, Amoy, Fuchow and Hankow; the military demonstrations of Japanese troops in Shanghai; and the perpetual presentation of new demands to the Nanking government with a view to finally establishing a Japanese protectorate over the whole of China. It is clear that the “new” policy of Japanese imperialism in China is the continuation of her old line directed towards completely destroying the independence of China as a state, and once and for all enslaving the Chinese people and depriving them of their existence as a nation.

In the face of this new menacing offensive on the part of Japanese imperialism, the northern militarists, like Sung Cheh-yuan and others, have openly capitulated. They have thrown out their foul slogan: “Why let the Nanking government have a monopoly on the sale of China, rather let us get our share by ourselves making a deal with Japan!”—and are now ready, at the command of Japanese imperialism, to begin military operations against their own, Chinese, troops and their own people. The Nanking Kuomintang government as heretofore perseveres in its policy of “non-resistance”, despite the serious internal differences which exist on the question of the further encroachments on the part of Japanese imperialism on the whole of China.

Only the Communist Party of China comes forward firmly and

confidently upon the Chinese arena of political struggle, pursuing in a really new fashion its policy of organizing the whole of the Chinese people and all the Chinese troops *for united action against Japanese imperialism and to save the fatherland.*

In his historic report at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, Comrade Dimitroff pointed out that:

"In connection with the changed international and internal situation, exceptional importance attaches, in all colonial and semi-colonial countries, to the question of the anti-imperialist front."

And when speaking about China, Comrade Dimitroff said:

"In China, where the people's movement has already led to the formation of Soviet districts over a considerable territory of the country and to the organization of a powerful Red Army, the predatory attack of Japanese imperialism and the treason of the Nanking government have brought into jeopardy the national existence of the great Chinese people. Only the Chinese Soviets can act as a unifying center in the struggle against the enslavement and partition of China by the imperialists, as a unifying center which will rally all anti-imperialist forces for the national defense of the Chinese people.

"We therefore approve the initiative taken by our courageous brother Party of China in the creation of a most extensive anti-imperialist united front throughout the whole country. This movement must be conducted under the slogan of the national-revolutionary struggle of the armed people against Japanese imperialism and their Chinese henchmen. The Soviets must become centers around which the whole of the Chinese people will center in the struggle for emancipation."

Only the Communist Party of China, which includes all the best sons and daughters of our fatherland, a party equipped with the doctrine of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, the party which today relies upon the Soviet government, the mighty Red Army and the direct support of many millions of the people, which has trained such famous national leaders as Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh and such legendary, immortal national heroes as Fang Chi-min, Chu Chin-po and others, the party which is a Section of the Leninist Communist International to which the great Party of Bolsheviks belongs, that is victoriously building a socialist society upon one-sixth part of the earth—the Communist Party of China alone, which organically links up its struggle with the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the people of Japan, of the whole East, of the whole world, and enjoys their support and sympathy, only a party of this kind, which fears no difficulties, which is confident of the road it has to take and the goal for which it is fighting, can set itself such a mighty, historic task, and be firmly convinced that its cause is right and that victory is assured!

The new policy of the Communist Party of China is one that is mobilizing and uniting the 400,000,000 of the great Chinese nation and leading them into the sacred, undaunted struggle against the gendarmerie of world imperialism in the Far East, not only in defense of the national

independence, territorial integrity, the union of China as a state, and the human rights of the Chinese people, but, in addition, in the interests of the liberation of the toilers of Japan, of the entire East, and of the whole world. It is not a simple task to realize this policy; it is a task that is complicated and very important. In order to do so, we must exert all our efforts, use all the energies not only of the whole of our Party and all our Party cadres, but of all fighters for the national-revolutionary movement, all honest patriots and our entire nation of 400,000,000 inhabitants.

But it is not difficult for all who are really acquainted with the situation in China and the position of Japanese imperialism to realize that this new policy of the Communist Party of China, the policy which aims at organizing the whole of the Chinese people for a struggle against Japan and to save the Chinese fatherland, will inevitably triumph over the "new" policy of Japanese imperialism in China—the policy of imperialist plunder and the colonial enslavement of the Chinese people. The manifesto of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic to the whole nation has good grounds for saying that:

"The Soviet government and the Communist Party are firmly convinced that if the 400,000,000 of the Chinese people are given united political leadership in the shape of an all-China people's government of national defense, and its united military vanguard in the shape of an all-China united anti-Japanese army, then, with the mass forces of the armed people at its disposal, and with the support of the proletariat and peoples of the whole of the East and of the entire world, it will inevitably be victorious over Japanese imperialism, which is hated by the Japanese people themselves, and isolated on an international scale!"

A Heroic Trek

By SHEE PIN

OUR GOAL ACHIEVED

THE Red Army carried through its heroic trek from Kiangsi province into Western China under the most difficult conditions. Over what kind of roads did we travel? Not over asphalt or concrete roads, of course. Mostly our trek took us into impenetrable places, over narrow footpaths. We crossed the highest mountain ranges of China, which, between Szechwan and Sinkiang, reach a height of over 5,000 meters. In May, when the most terrible heat blazes over China, the mountains are covered with a thick layer of snow.

We crossed over twenty well-known rivers, including the Yangtse, the Yukiang, the Tianshan, the Chinshachiang, and the Tatwho. What means did we have at our disposal for crossing the rivers? None at all.

Eight and a half months went by from the moment when our forces left the former central Soviet region, in Kiangsi province, until they joined forces with the Fourth Army. We covered 11,000 to 12,000 *li*—over 3,000 miles. We crossed the boundaries of twelve provinces: Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwantung, Honan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechwan, Yunnan, Sinkiang, Kiangsu, Tsinhai and Shensi. We passed through twelve of the eighteen provinces of China proper.

What was our aim, why did we undertake this heroic trek?

The question of establishing a territorial base for the Soviet Revolution has been one of the most important questions confronting our Party in recent years. We realized that the Red Army needed a stable and permanent territorial base, that the absence of such a base was giving rise to tremendous difficulties hindering the further conduct of the civil war. Ever since 1930, the Communist Party had been exerting every effort to carry out this primary and most important task, which today still remains one of the most important tasks. And when, in 1934, the enemy surrounded our former central Soviet region, and drove us into a comparatively small stretch of territory, our Party, to preserve the Red Army as a vital force, evacuated our main forces from the former central Soviet region, in order to set up a new territorial base on the vast stretches of Western China. It was for this purpose that the Chinese Communist Party organized the famous heroic trek of the Red Army from Kiangsi province to Western China.

All our plans in preparation for the trek were to be fulfilled within three months, but in view of the serious situation which had arisen, our commanders were forced to reduce the time limit to two months. In spite of this, the preparation work was performed excellently.

How did we prepare for our trek? First, before our main columns moved out of the central Soviet region to Western China, the Party sent part of our military forces beyond the confines of the Soviet region,

into the rear of the enemy. In particular, the Party organized the march of the Seventh Army Corps, the vanguard of the anti-Japanese army, in the direction of Fukien and to the border-line between Kiangsi and Fukien. In this way our forces were placed in the rear of the enemy, in the northeast.

The second operation was that forces were dispatched from the eastern region of Honan, far into the interior of the province. This was done by the Sixth Army Corps under Sao Keh, which joined forces with Ho Lun under the command of the Red Army, so that our forces were situated in the rear of the enemy, to the northwest as well.

In addition, we performed still other preparatory work for the further advance of the main forces of the Red Army, *viz.*, we reinforced the main units of the Red Army with new young recruits. Over 30,000 volunteers were recruited.

Second, our main cadres, the backbone of the army, were put through an accelerated course of training and drilling. They passed through three military schools: infantry school, the Kun Lo school and a special military school where the men were trained in anti-aircraft and anti-gas defense, etc. The majority of the regulars in our army passed through these three schools.

Third, 600,000 *piculs* * of foodstuffs were set aside to supply the Red Army during the first part of the campaign. The production of ammunition, bullets, shells, etc., was increased from six to thirty times the former output. Special uniforms were provided for the men, etc.

What was the position as regards food?

In the main, we lived on supplies provided by the population voluntarily. Then we confiscated food for the Red Army from the enemy, the landlords, the gentry.

Today we can record that the aims of our trek have been achieved. We have really preserved the Red Army as a vital force. We have joined forces with the Fourth Red Army. After joining the forces of the two armies, we have established a big, new, Soviet territorial base which is stronger and wealthier than the former one.

HOW WE FOUGHT

The first stage of our trek was from the province of Kiangsi to the frontier of Kweichow. This stage must be considered a triumphant one, because we fought our way through four lines of the enemy, though they were covered by concrete defenses, and protected by nests of machine-guns. In general this territory was held to be impenetrable, but we broke through all the four lines of defense, swept aside all obstacles in our path, routed the enemy troops out of their concrete defenses, and broke through their chain.

The enemy's first line of defense followed the banks of the River Kwanchiang, in Kiangsi province. The second passed between Chenchua in the north of Kwantung province and the south of the Kiangsi province. The third—along the Chenchu-Canton railway (this railway is not yet finished, but there is a paved road alongside where concrete defense works have been built). The fourth line followed the southern part of the Honan province to the north of Kwangsi.

* A picul equals 133 1/3 pounds.

Along these lines the enemy had their nests of machine-guns, which raised a complete fire screen. Despite the fact that we had a powerful enemy pressing upon us from both flanks, we very rapidly broke through the first three lines. We crossed the River Kweikiang and occupied Chenkow, *i.e.*, forced the second line. We then took possession of the town of Yichuan, *i.e.*, forced the third line. Between the third and fourth lines lay a huge chain of mountains, and it was here that Chiang Kai-shek intended to destroy us.

We immediately occupied six districts: Linyu, Kiaho, Lanshan, Kianhua, Taochow, Yunmin. Thus we rapidly forced a way through the fourth line as well, which actually meant the failure of Chiang Kai-shek's plan, the complete breakdown of his attempt to surround and destroy us. We escaped from this locality, contrary to all the expectations of the enemy.

However, we must mention a number of our mistakes and shortcomings.

The first mistake was that the requisite explanatory work had not been carried on in the Party, in the army, and among the masses, on the eve of the troops departing on their trek. Preparations for the trek were seriously hampered by the fact that work had not been done in the Soviet regions to explain the position. And this fact also led to some of the younger fighters, who were unaware of the aim and prospects of our trek, as well as a number of other elements, not being fully steadfast during our march. This was especially noticeable in the southern part of the Honan province.

Why did we make this mistake? Because we had a mechanical conception of the question of military secrets. We thought that members of the Party, the army men, and the masses, etc., must not be told about the tasks of the trek.

The second mistake was that we took too much transport with us, too many heavy machines and heavy loads. We dragged with us machines from the arsenal, printing machines, machinery for the mint, etc. Of the total, 5,000 men were occupied exclusively with the transport of this load.

Experience has taught us that the horses, mules and donkeys were a hindrance to us, especially when crossing the rivers. This heavy transport seriously impeded our military operations. In a number of cases the rear guard lagged ten days' march behind the vanguard.

How difficult was our advance can be seen from such a fact as that there were times when during a twelve-hour march in torrents of rain, and thick mud, we only moved over a distance of four kilometers.

In the main, we advanced in three columns: the right flank and the left flank, and in the middle our main military forces. But we had, in addition, a vanguard and a rear guard.

This, in the main, was the order in which we advanced. But of course the roads did not always permit us to adhere to this scheme. We were sometimes compelled to advance in two columns. But we never advanced in one column.

Having occupied Yichuan, we should have immediately occupied Kwangchow as well, so as to force the river at that point, which was

GROWTH OF SOVIET AND PARTISAN DISTRICTS AFTER CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S 5TH AND 6TH CAMPAIGNS.

OLD DISTRICTS

SOVIET
PARTISAN
TERRITORY IN THE PROCESS OF OCCUPATION
BY JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

NEW DISTRICTS

SOVIET
PARTISAN

MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC



a very important one. But our cumbersome transport hung like a mill-stone round our necks, and so we were unable to occupy Kwangchow in time. The enemy outstripped us and occupied Kwangchow before we could. Had it not been for the transport, our rear guard would have moved more rapidly and we would not have been forced to engage in so many battles. On the frontier of Honan and Kweichow, we lost about 100 days in overcoming the resistance offered by the enemy.

As a result of the mistakes we made, our main forces became transformed into guards for the transport, and we had not enough forces with which to maneuver freely. The vanguard marched ahead and the rear guard lagged behind at a distance of 200-300 *li* (i.e., 60 to 90 miles). All this weakened our fighting strength, and not infrequently made it possible for the enemy to attack us in the flank.

Why did we drag such heavy transport with us? This was the result of an idea we had which was naive and politically incorrect, namely, that the establishment of a new Soviet base is simply a matter of removing from one place to another, and that it does not require big efforts and a new and severe struggle.

The third mistake of the first period of our trek was of a purely military character. We advanced all the time along a straight line, that might have been drawn by a pencil across the country. As a result the enemy lay in wait for us everywhere, for they knew in advance where we would be and in what direction we were marching. This meant that we became an object of attack instead of ourselves taking the initiative and the offensive. We should have marched forward more rapidly and occupied the different places more quickly. Instead, we had to take these points in battle, under conditions where the enemy was in possession of automobiles and other means of transport. And we moved forward in a straight line, stubbornly refusing to change our direction, and as the places were often indicated incorrectly in our topographical maps, we frequently found ourselves in impasses from which we had to make our way back. Once we had to fight for three days over a distance of four kilometers. For three days on end our comrades on the staff and the commanders of the corps neither slept nor ate. We wasted time trying to find the right road. And the Commissar in charge of the rear units whose work it was to hurry along the rear guard did not sleep for six days on end.

What did we do with the wounded in cases like this?

If we were unable to take them along with us, we billeted them among the population. Sometimes we formed partisan detachments to keep them safely in hiding. And we must say that the population adopted a very good attitude towards our wounded and despatched them on to us when they recovered.

In Lipin we corrected the mistakes we had made. On the frontier of Hunan and Kweichow, the enemy lay in wait for us with five to six times as many troops as we had, expecting that we would follow the old route taken by the Sixth Army corps. The Kwangsi troops attacked our rear guard from the south, while a big enemy army was following us up.

The whole of the Red Army was of the opinion that the weak link should be broken, i.e., that we should advance in the direction where

the enemy's line was weakest and where we could get new reinforcements. A decision was made to change our direction. And here ended the first stage of our trek, which lasted approximately one hundred days. When we reached Kweichow province, the Red Army had ceased to be a shifting object of attack, and had in turn become an active force, capable of attacking the enemy.

* * *

The second stage of our trek lasted from the time we left the boundaries of Kweichow to the time we occupied the town of Tsunyi.

The Red Army men by now knew the immediate prospects and the goal of the march. We had explained to them that we were going to Kweichow, in order to "take General Wang Chia-lei alive". This was the immediate aim, which our fighters were pursuing.

Instead of the former method of marching "in a straight line", we began to resort more to maneuvers in our march. The change of tactics enabled us to advance successfully, to enter the province of Kweichow and take the town of Tsunyi. Here we routed two divisions under the command of General Kuei Tse-tan. We performed this operation comparatively easily. We occupied nine districts to the south of the River Yukien, and forced our way across this river which is a most difficult obstacle in the strategic sense. Comrade Liu Po-chen, a graduate of our military academy, was in charge of this operation. He had one division and one regiment at his disposal. By continuously pushing ahead, he occupied the enemy foreposts at the bridge extremely rapidly. He transferred his units across the river so rapidly that the enemy had no time to blow up the bridge. On the opposite bank he occupied the town of Tsunyi, which is a very big center, and also the town of Meitan.

Our second big victory was that we reinforced our ranks with fresh local forces. In Tsunyi the Red Army men rested for 12 days, while our chief political workers recruited new fighters there. We were successful in recruiting 3,000 new young fighters. Now we no longer dragged heavy transport after us. The Red Army men bathed, and, their clothes refreshed, set forth again proudly.

Here we organized a revolutionary committee from the local forces, and established armed forces and a partisan detachment under the leadership of the revolutionary committee. We mobilized the masses to confiscate the property of the landlords, the gentry and the militarists, and distributed the confiscated property among the population. Our actions called forth the enthusiasm of the population.

* * *

The third stage of our trek was from the time we occupied the town of Tsunyi right up to the time we came out at the river Yangtse. Here, too, we met with a number of big successes. During this period we, and not the enemy, took the initiative in attacking. Here we crossed the river Chinsha, a tributary of the Yangtse.

We decided to move towards Szechwan, first retreating northward

and then turning to the west. We did not know how strong the forces of the enemy were, but on reaching the borders of Szechwan we found that the enemy forces were many times superior to our own. We then occupied the town of Huankiang, concentrated our military forces there and altered our line of advance. The enemy discovered that we intended to cross the river, and began therefore to concentrate their forces on the border between Kweichow and Szechwan. If we had gone straight to the West, from the position we occupied, we should have met with very serious resistance, as the enemy had prepared their defense there. We therefore turned to the East. And only when the Red Army approached the town of Tungchi, did the enemy discover that we were marching eastward, and not westward. But by that time we were far away. That was a fine maneuver.

The second extremely important point about this stage was that we occupied the gates to Kweichow province, which are of great military and strategic importance, thirty kilometers away from Tungchi. Two divisions commanded by General Wang Chia-lei attacked us on the way to these gates. But we defended the gates by strengthening especially our flanks on both sides of the gates. And when General Wang Chia-lei troops came closer, we surrounded them, and routed his principal units; only a small number of his people succeeded in getting away. That evening we again occupied the town of Tsunyi.

The second day General Lung Chi-wei once again made an attack upon the town of Tsunyi from the other side. But after the victory over Wang Chia-lei, our army had had time to make preparations. Having camouflaged our flank, we waited for the enemy to attack. At 8 o'clock in the morning the battle began, and by 12 o'clock General Lung was already surrounded. The majority of the general's soldiers were disarmed, and only a small section retreated to Hueian on lorries.

Thus, between Tungchi and Tsunyi, we were successful in completely demolishing four of the enemy's divisions. This victory still further strengthened the fighting spirit of the whole of the Red Army. The authority of the Red Army among the population of four provinces (Hunan, Szechwan, Yunnan and Kweichow) rose high. The population felt that we represented a strong force. Moreover, this victory eased the position of the Second Army led by Ho Lun and of the Sixth Army led by Hsiao Keh, which had first been attacked by these four divisions of the enemy. The enemy were forced to cease their offensive against these armies, and to turn their forces against us.

Having weakened the forces of the enemy, our second corps rapidly destroyed a whole enemy brigade, which gave the Second and Sixth Corps an opportunity to fortify themselves in the district. This was at the end of April and the beginning of May, 1935. The following was our third success during this period: in the course of the fighting we seized many uniforms and much ammunition, machine-gun bullets, pack animals, etc. We must say that our men don't very much like fighting the local generals but rather prefer to fight against the Nanking generals, for after we have demolished one of the Nanking generals we usually obtain a large quantity of foodstuffs, uniforms and ammunition. The local generals are considerably poorer.

The other positive side of this stage of our trek was that we executed flexible maneuver, and it was difficult for the enemy to discover the direction we intended to take: they lay in wait for us, say, in the west, and we were in the east, and vice versa.

Why did we do this? Because war at home—in the Soviet regions—against an enemy attack, the war in the White regions, are two different things. If the enemy attacks us in the Soviet regions, we sometimes retreat in order the better to concentrate our forces and prepare a very heavy blow, but the enemy does not know where our main forces are situated. We continually force them to give up their plans and to relinquish their original intentions. In the Soviet regions, it is impossible for the enemy to find out the exact disposition of the main forces of the Red Army, for the population in the Soviet regions would not inform the enemy. But conditions are quite different in the White regions, where the enemy moves freely against us in several columns and from different directions, and if any column is weakened it can obtain reinforcements the same day.

Therefore, since we had not the necessary forces to demolish four or five columns at a time, we could not engage in long battles with the enemy. If the enemy attacks us from different sides and we have not sufficient forces to engage in battle, *i.e.*, if we are unable to make a counter-attack, then we resort to some maneuver to get out of the encirclement. That is why we had to advance and retreat in the districts of North Kweichow four times. We were convinced that it was difficult to force the Yangtse at that point, and so we decided to find another point at which to cross.

Our second crossing of the River Yuchiang was the most difficult undertaking in the history of our trek. Had we approached the river directly, according to our original line of march, we would never have been able to cross it. When we occupied the town of Tsunyi for the last time, the enemy was preparing to attack in the northeast of Kweichow, being of the impression that we were marching to join the Second and Sixth Armies. We actually did send part of our troops in that direction in order to create the impression that we were marching to join the Second and Sixth Armies. But our main forces took the opposite direction. In the course of one night we built three bridges and dispatched all the forces of the Red Army across them. It should be said that Yuchiang is a very rapid-flowing river, with very strong currents and big cataracts. It flows at the rate of three meters a second. There was not a single boat to be found there, neither had we the military-technical knowledge to build pontoon bridges. And yet we crossed the river: we made floats of bamboo and transported the whole of the Red Army across the river on them.

We have worked out a special method of building bridges: we take ordinary wire, twist it into thick cables the ends of which we attach to both banks of the river, lay boards across and thus arrange the crossing.

By despatching a section of our forces to the East, we misled the enemy. The Hunan generals received orders to go in the direction of Kweichow, *i.e.*, to concentrate all their forces against us in the East.

But we moved our main forces to the South, and avoiding Kuyang, rapidly turned to the West, along the southern part of Kweichow. Thus, all the enemy's troops from Hunan, Szechwan and Nanking remained behind us.

From experience we knew that there is nothing to fear from an army which is behind, because there are extremely few roads, the enemy cannot hurl large forces into the attack at once, and it is difficult for it to develop a broad front.

We occupied Tingfang, Kuanshun, Kueihua, Chanchai, Chenfu.

At the same time, in order to extend our front, we dispatched another column parallel to this direction. This column demolished five regiments of the Yunnan enemy, and seized a tremendous amount of ammunition. We entered the territory occupied by the Yao tribe, where we recruited over 10,000 young fighters. In the same region we confiscated the property and money of the local landlords, loading over forty mules with silver coins.

Then we occupied Kweikiang, and to the west of the town crossed the River Kiansha. Having occupied a position on the boundary between Yunnan and Kweichow, we wanted to turn in the direction of the river in order to cross it. But if we had gone there directly, the enemy would very quickly have overtaken us. Consequently we turned off at first into the heart of Yunnan, to the South, and occupied a number of points near Kunming, the capital of the Yunnan province. Thus we cut the enemy off the river. And even then we were not confident that we would be able to cross the river.

We were fortunate in seizing the topographical maps of the enemy, but they were only a little better than ours, which did not excel in accuracy. But still, the places where the river could be crossed, of which there were three, were marked on these maps, and it was indicated that there was a ferry at one point.

It should be mentioned that General Lung Yun involuntarily did us a great service in Yunnan. He had intended despatching topographical maps and a large quantity of medical supplies to one of the Szechwan generals by airplane. But the pilot fell ill, and the general decided to despatch everything by motor-car. A chauffeur was found to do the work. After we had occupied one of the towns, a group of our comrades from headquarters went out to the highway. They saw an automobile speeding towards them. They succeeded in getting possession of the car, and in it found dozens of copies of topographical maps and the finest medical supplies. We were in great need of all these things.

We found indicated on these topographical maps nine points where the river could be crossed; we also discovered that at some points there was one ferry, at others—three ferries each. This inspired us with confidence in the success of the operation which faced us of crossing the river.

We must say that the stupidity of the Yunnan generals got us out of difficulties on more than one occasion. Once our division was approaching a town in Kweichow. Our men were all in Red Army uniforms. With a proud front, we approached the wall of the town. The district chief popped his head out of the window and looked at us in surprise. He

decided that since these people were so well-dressed, they could not be the Reds. In their minds the Red Army are so many bandits. They took us for the central Nanking troops, for the uniforms of the Yunnan and Szechwan troops were worse than those of the Nanking troops and worse than ours.

When we entered the town mentioned we were in good shape. We had steel helmets, shirts with four pockets, good belts, leggings and breeches. Each of us had a leather dispatch case, seized from Chiang Kai-shek's troops. Every commander, from battalion commander downwards, had field-glasses. We had light and heavy machine guns, whereas neither the Yunnan nor the Kweichow army had as many of these.

Seeing that he was not dealing with bandits, the district chief opened the gates of the town to us, and greeted us politely. They entertained us well and we rested. After that we asked: "Have you prepared food and money for our army?" He replied: "Yes, we have it." We asked for a dozen guides. All the city authorities came out to us, each of them hastening to introduce himself: "I am the chief of the garrison guards", "I am the chief of police", "I am the district sheriff", etc. After they had themselves told us who they were, we knew how to deal with them.

Indeed, it was not for nothing that Mao Tse-tung once said that if all our enemies were as stupid as the Yunnan generals, the Chinese revolution would have been victorious long ago.

After the event with the topographical maps, our commanding officers indicated definite points where we were to cross the river. In order to cover up the fact that we were crossing, we dispatched one unit in another direction. After we had occupied the town, the enemy burnt the rafts at one crossing. In order to distract the attention of the enemy, we especially started building a bridge at that spot. It was one-third built. Chiang Kai-shek's air forces immediately concentrated their attention upon this district. They discovered that we were building a bridge, and all the troops which were following us up advanced in this false direction. By this time all our other units had made the crossing in other places.

It should be mentioned that the enemy had four, six, and even eight airplanes flying overhead at the same time.

We rapidly turned to the real crossing place. We found six rafts at the river. The main forces had crossed over by means of these six rafts, and this was no easy matter. The reader should know what the River Chensa is like. It is not particularly wide, but the current is much stronger than that of other rivers. On both banks the cliffs rise to a height of 300 meters. It is not such an easy thing to build a bridge here. On both banks of this river, for a stretch of land of about ten kilometers, there is no plant life whatsoever. Chinese history tells us, it was just at this spot that the fabulous hero of the epoch of wars of the three kingdoms suffered defeat. The air currents on the banks of this river are so strong that they can lift a man off his feet. All the six rafts at this point of the river were broken. They had to be patched up if they were to be used at all.

The crossing lasted nine days, night and day. We did not lose a single man or horse. The horses were tied to the rafts and made to

swim across. We were forced to make haste, otherwise the enemy would overtake us. The work required excellent organization.

For the better execution of this task, the Central Committee of the Party and the Revolutionary Military Council organized an authoritative committee to guide all operations connected with the crossing. All the units without exception were subordinated to this committee. The units were to cross the river in definite order. A watch had to be kept that the men did not jump on to the floats, otherwise they might overturn. We required skilled boatmen because the current was so strong there was danger of the floats capsizing. We paid the local skilled workers and boatmen very well. The local population adopted a very good attitude towards us. The workers voluntarily came to assist us, and many of the boatmen left the district together with the Red Army.

This river crossing once more confirmed the degree of discipline, organization, and consciousness possessed by our fighters.

After crossing the river we occupied the town of Kuili. The enemy discovered this, but the river had been crossed by then. We took nine days to cross, while the enemy arrived only on the eleventh day. Chiang Kai-shek was too late to catch us.

In this connection, our fighters composed a play in which they mocked at Chiang Kai-shek, who gallops from one province to another in pursuit of us, and arrives at the River Chensa, only to find a pair of worn-out straw shoes on an empty float.

When Chiang Kai-shek tried to cross the river, we arranged to meet him with machine-guns. He was forced to turn to the North and find a place at which to cross there. His divisions starved, and consequently demoralization was rife among his troops, and the soldiers deserted in large numbers.

* * *

After we had crossed the River Chensa, we became masters of the situation. We were able to prevent the enemy from crossing the river. Our position had changed for the better, and from that moment the fourth stage of our great trek began.

We rested five days in the town of Kuili.

It was decided to move in a northerly direction at a more rapid pace, so as to join the Fourth Red Army.

We succeeded in reinforcing the Red Army with 5,000 young fighters, and in addition organized a large number of partisan detachments in these districts. Here also we drew up a plan for securing the necessary supplies and foodstuffs. All the plans were fully carried out.

Five days later, having rested in the town, we moved northwards to the River Tatumhe. Traveling at the rate of 30 kilometers a day this would have taken twenty-nine days, but we still had to reckon with the enemy on our way. In many parts the bridges were burned to hinder our crossing. We moved extremely rapidly without attempting to occupy towns on the way. Still, we successfully organized partisan detachments in the different localities. Here we found isolated Party organizations, which had been out of contact with the provincial committee of the Communist Party for three years. In one of the district centers we found a

local committee leading the movement. The next day over a thousand men were mobilized there, and an army to boycott taxes was organized. This committee is now continuing its work and has strengthened its ranks.

From this spot two roads ran to Tatuho: a highway and a narrow road. We estimated that we would probably meet the enemy on the big road, and that they would endeavor to destroy our food supplies. We therefore dispatched part of our troops along that road, in order to distract the attention of the enemy, while we moved our main forces along the other road.

We arrived at a mountainous district where the native tribe of the Mantsi lived. This is a tribe of Turkish origin, which particularly has suffered from the oppression of the Chinese landlords and militarists, and is consequently hostile towards the Chinese. A short time before our arrival, a Chinese anti-Red chief was killed by the natives while trying to cross their territory, and his detachment was annihilated.

When our units came up, they were surrounded on all sides. Comrade Liu Po-chen, the chief of the Red Army staff, was in personal command of our units. He proved that he was not only capable of fighting well, but that he could set up a united front. He made use of the contradictions within the tribe, and before the eyes of the assembled tribe, tore apart a chicken and drank its blood. This was to signify that henceforth he was a blood relation of theirs. After this, one section of the tribe observed strict neutrality, but the other half still wanted to fight against us. We began to agitate, persuading them that we wanted to help them, etc. Our attitude towards them created a profound impression upon them, and their friendliness increased. They gave us horses, cows, sheep, and brought us different presents, while we in return gave them money and presents.

After this we arrived at the banks of the River Tatuho. This is a somewhat historical spot. It has been famous since the time of the Taiping uprising. It was at this spot that Shih Ta-kai (the general in command of the Taiping army) perished while retreating from Nanking into Szechwan. We met an old man of ninety who had been an eye-witness of these events and who had personally seen Shih Ta-kai and the Taiping army. The old man told us that the Taiping army and Shih Ta-kai perished because there were differences of opinion in the army, because the Taiping army was not a band of "long-haired men". Somebody asked him: "Grandfather, what do you think? Is our attitude to the population better than that of the Taipings?" He replied that the Taipings behaved well towards the population, but that our attitude was much better.

We found only two ferries on the banks of the river. On the opposite bank there was a battalion of the enemy. The Commander of this battalion, fearing our advance, gave orders for the two ferry-boats to be tied to the opposite bank. That same night our army reached the river bank. In the morning, at dawn, we realized that the river was very wide and difficult to cross. The River Tatuho is somewhat bigger than the Chensi, but its current is still stronger. It takes no less than fifty minutes to cross and re-cross the river, at this spot. At that rate, it

would have taken one and a half months to transfer all our main forces to the other side of the river on two ferry-boats. Of course such delay was out of the question. We could not find any local ferrymen. So we selected nineteen brave stalwarts from our Party members and young Communists, equipped them with bombs, rifles, and light machine guns. On our part, we stood prepared in machine-gun emplacements on our side of the river, opened fire from our bomb-throwers, and utilized our experienced snipers. Under cover of our fire, our nineteen comrades landed safely on the other bank. The enemy opened machine-gun fire against them. They paid no heed at all, but moved forward and landed at last on the other bank, and disarmed one of the enemy units. The fire from our bomb-throwers compelled the enemy constantly to change the position of their machine-guns, and while this was being done our comrades climbed higher and higher up the mountain. Then covered by these nineteen stalwarts, we began to cross the river. In two and a half days we had landed our whole division on the other bank.

During this attack only five of this group of nineteen courageous comrades were wounded. The political department gave high awards to these stalwarts. They were given the title of Heroes of the Red Army.

But the fact that one division had crossed did not decide the question, because the main forces of the Red Army still remained on the other bank. So we turned westwards, in order to cross the river by the only existing suspension bridge. The division which was on the opposite bank also turned westwards. Our main forces moved along the near bank. The enemy retreating on the opposite side stubbornly clung to the place, defending line after line. In spite of this, our units on the opposite side safely arrived at the appointed place.

We attacked from three sides, and although the enemy obtained strong reinforcements, they could not withstand our pressure. There were many new soldiers among the troops of the enemy who knew that the Red Army had no desire to kill them. These men threw down their rifles and waited for us. We took them with us and reinforced our own forces with them.

When we approached the suspension bridge, we found that it was partly destroyed. The boards had already been removed from the chains. The bridge was over 300 meters long. It consisted of thirteen spans, of link chains. Above there are four chains like bannisters, and nine chains covered with boards. The chains of the bridge are anchored to high cliffs. To approach the bridge, a rock tunnel had to be passed through first.

Chiank Kai-shek's air forces bombarded the bridge for three days. However, they failed to destroy a single chain, since both banks are very high and from such a height the airplane could not aim accurately.

From the other side of the river, however, the enemy kept us under constant fire. We sent out one company, the best, to go in advance. Holding on to the chains, the Red Army men moved across the river, hand over hand, like acrobats. Finally we managed to find the boards. Covered by the advance company, we crossed the bridge on hands and knees.

The most courageous and heroic men in the history of Chinese wars

inevitably perished at this river. Chiang Kai-shek expected the same fate to await us. He told his troops that the Reds would inevitably perish at this spot. But contrary to the expectations and calculations of Chiang Kai-shek we surmounted this bridge. There can be no doubt that this was a very great victory in the history of our trek.

A good road runs from the place where we crossed the river to the town of Yachow. But the enemy had set up strong fortifications and it was of no advantage to continue along this road. We decided not to use this big road, but to advance by narrow footpaths. We had to surmount a most difficult mountain pass, but we succeeded in doing so, and when we descended to the inhabited parts the people were thoroughly astounded. They could not understand where we had come from, for although the stories of their forefathers told of passes existing up in the mountains nobody had crossed these heights for centuries. It was as though we had dropped from the skies. We crossed this pass on hands and knees, often up to our knees in mud and clay.

In making the descent into the valley, we came up against the enemy's entrenched position which we attacked for a whole day but could not drive the enemy out. It was only after we had successfully crossed the next mountain range, 16,000 feet high, that we occupied the town of Tangwang.

To unite with the Fourth Red Army, we had the choice of two roads. On one of them we would have met with strong fortifications and large forces of the enemy. On the narrow road difficulties awaited us as regards food supplies. Nevertheless we decided to take the narrow road.

By this time the Fourth Red Army had occupied the town of Lifan. We gradually moved northwards, and the Fourth Army was moving towards us—from the North towards the South. Thus it was that the historic meeting of two big forces took place, namely, between the Fourth Red Army and the Red Army from the Kiangsi province.

* * *

What was the political significance of this historic meeting?

First, Chiang Kai-shek's plans were to surround the central Soviet region, to set up blockhouses, and to capture our main forces. The fact that we broke through their ring and transferred the main units of the Red Army to fresh territory meant that the plans of Chiang Kai-shek to clear the Red Army out of China had failed. The Chinese Red Army became still more steeled in these battles, and its fighting capacity enhanced. Every rank-and-file fighter who took part in that trek passed through an excellent school. The army that performed the march is an army of trained forces. Every Red Army man is not an ordinary fighter, but a trained army man of high qualifications.

The Red Army has successfully preserved its vitality, and that is one of the greatest victories of our trek.

Second, the Red Army was formerly scattered, diffused over different territories. After the Fourth Red Army had joined the main forces of the Red Army, we established a mighty base of the Red Army,

creating a force hitherto unknown in the history of the development of the Chinese Red Army. Thanks to this, it has become possible for us to carry on still greater struggles against the enemy.

Third, a very great victory achieved by our trek is the fact that from a military and strategic point of view the Red Army is now situated in more favorable conditions than before. In Kiangsi the enemy could surround us on all sides, but now that is impossible. Today the Red Army is situated in the region of North Szechwan, Shensi, Kiangsu and Tsinhai. Thus, the enemy cannot get at us from the northwest.

Chiang Kai-shek can attack us only from the East in a westerly direction and from the South in a northerly direction. But he cannot surround us on all sides. This advantageous strategic position is one of the most essential conditions for the further victorious conduct of the civil war.

Finding ourselves in such conditions, favorable from a military and strategic point of view, we were able to achieve two important measures.

First, the main forces of the Red Army, together with the Fourth Army, were dispatched to the North, to Kiangsu and Shensi. After uniting, they had two months in which to rest, reinforce their ranks and consolidate their forces.

Why could they rest and consolidate there? Because Chiang Kai-shek had first to bring up reinforcements from Central China in order to advance against us. What is more, his troops had to undergo certain military training, and this also took some time.

After such a tremendous trek, the Red Army was of course tired and needed a respite. The fact must be emphasized once more that this was not merely a breathing-space, for this rest gave us the opportunity of reinforcing our ranks with fresh forces, and of fortifying ourselves. In Kueili we were able to recruit 5,000 young fighters in the course of only five days. Hence it is easy to imagine the extent to which the Red Army increased in the course of two months. We had wide opportunities here of really reinforcing our ranks.

Second—and this is of great importance—after our armies had united, we occupied the town of Sunpan and wiped out twelve regiments of the model divisions under general Hu Tsun-nan. These were Chiang Kai-shek's best military detachments. After we had demolished Hu Tsun-nan's divisions, we were able to press forward to the Northwest.

WHY WERE WE VICTORIOUS?

Why was our Red Army able to achieve its aim in spite of all such difficult conditions?

First, because we have truly heroic, self-sacrificing Red Army fighters. We have already mentioned a few episodes to illustrate this fact. We could give a host of facts which testify to the heroism of our army.

Our Red Army has been educated and grown up in the fire of the civil war. It knows how to attack and how to make an offensive. It can undertake big marches. Our ranks are very solid, so that it is impossible to smash us.

When, in Tsunyi we attacked the two divisions of General Wang

Chia-lei; the latter's army retreated along the high road. We, however, took to the footpaths, and advanced on foot, by night, without any opportunity even of lighting our way with torches. We covered fifty kilometers in eight hours. When we reached the River Yutsian, the last remnants of the enemy had not yet managed to cross. We first began to destroy the bridge, and then demolished the remaining remnants of the enemy. Is not this evidence of the extremely great mobility of our Red Army and its ability to attack the enemy?

On the borders of Szechwan and Kweichow, the enemy threw up three-tier fortifications and concentrated their guns there. The enemy had their guns placed on the slopes of the mountain ranges, the upper tier being at a height of 1,000 meters. In the course of ten minutes we had occupied the first two tiers of fortifications and were rapidly moving forward. That day we began our offensive not from the foot of the mountains, but from a starting point which we arrived at after marching thirty kilometers. We marched into battle with songs on our lips. This is an illustration of the tremendous enthusiasm which inspires the Red Army.

But the Red Army knows not only how to attack, but when necessary, how to retreat in an organized fashion.

For example, near Chishui, where we had been fighting all day long, we learned at 10 o'clock in the evening that the enemy had received reinforcements. We decided to retreat. A bridge was prepared. We built it overnight, and at dawn, the main forces of the Red Army were already fifteen kilometers away from the river. It should be mentioned that during this retreat there was not a sign of discontent or bad humor displayed by a single Red Army man. The enemy always retreated in panic, in disorder; but the Red Army knows how to retreat in good order and in an organized fashion.

During the eight months of our march, we kept up a daily average of 100-120 li, i.e., 50-60 kilometers, in mountainous country and frequently by night. On an average our army covered a distance of three and a half kilometers an hour. If any unit or group found itself cut off, it retreated in an organized fashion, and later linked up again with the Red Army.

There was one occasion when a boy of thirteen, secretary of the Young Pioneers' Bureau, working among the local population, found himself cut off from the main forces of the Red Army. For three days he crawled over the mountains. He was exhausted for want of food, suffered from thirst, and with no opportunity of quenching it, he drank his own urine. Finally he found his comrades and his detachment.

These individual facts illustrate the solidarity in our Red Army, the tremendous heroism of our fighters, their ability to act in an organized fashion, whatever the conditions in which they find themselves.

The knowledge of military technique has increased. Seven groups have graduated our various military schools of commanders. We have a special military-technical school. There is a special school which trains leaders for guerilla detachments.

We have succeeded in accumulating tremendous practical *military* experience during the many years of the civil war, and it is on the basis

of that experience that we train our fighters, enhancing the fighting capacity of the entire Red Army.

The technical units of the Red Army have also considerably raised their level. For example, although we have no good means of crossing rivers, we have to some degree mastered the technical side of this job, and know how to arrange crossings.

Never for a single moment during our trek did we neglect the political and educational work among the Red Army men. In the mornings, before we set out on the march, and when we had performed our physical exercises, or later in the evenings, we held little talks with the men. We use every opportunity for training our Red Army men. We teach the young fighters how to use the rifle, read topographical maps, etc. We carry on this work first and foremost with the help of the comrades who have been trained in military schools. These comrades play a big role in the army.

The heroism of the Red Army is great because our fighters possess a high degree of political consciousness. Our Red Army in Kiangsi knew that it was called upon to defend the agrarian revolution. Today it knows in addition that its task is to struggle for national liberation, and for the Soviet revolution throughout the whole of China. And the Red Army is trained not only in the spirit of struggle for the victory of the Soviet revolution in China, but also in the spirit of struggle for the international revolution.

The Red Army fighters are very much interested in international events and in the struggles of the international proletariat. The Party press, the Soviet newspapers and the Red Army newspaper, the *Red Star*, constantly carry information on the struggles of the international proletariat for the world revolution.

We have organized a fund in aid of political prisoners, and have carried on a campaign in defense of Thaelmann, just as we organized a fund to help release Dimitroff, and carried on a campaign for his release. We organized the collection of funds to help the insurgent proletariat of Spain. This was all of tremendous educational importance, especially in connection with the training of cadres for the national-liberation movement in the Eastern countries. It should be mentioned that Koreans, natives of Formosa, Annamites, and other peoples of the East, are trained in our Soviet schools.

The Red Army is distinguished for its heroism because workers constitute a large percentage of it, amounting to as much as 20 per cent. We have swelled the ranks of the Red Army with fresh forces, and we must say that our young fighters display the same heroism as their older comrades. Why? Because every fighter in the Red Army is class-conscious.

The Red Army possesses such heroism because it has good, strong cadres. The main cadres of the Red Army grew up in the fire of civil war, springing from the heart of the anti-imperialist and agrarian revolution. They enjoy tremendous authority among the rank-and-file Red Army men and are truly loyal fighters for Communism. Many of our commanders are very young. For instance, Comrade Lin Piao, commander of the First Army Corps, is only 28 years old; the commander

of the Second Division is 24 years old; while Chen Chang-hao, the commander of the Fourth Army Corps is 25 years old.

All these cadres have grown up in the years of civil war. Our cadres are not only military specialists of a higher order, but are splendid politicians who put into effect the line of our Party. They display initiative, raise questions before the Party leadership about future plans, about the tasks facing our Red Army, and about the prospects for our development. They always bear in mind the state of our forces. They are very versatile, and know how to apply flexible tactics. When the Party entrusts them with a task, they are capable of fulfilling it independently. They use their own initiative in adopting various maneuvers, but they fulfill the task to perfection. It is just because we have such leading cadres that we achieved such tremendous victories during our great trek.

The second guarantee of our success in this trek was the fact that our Party has grown ideologically and organizationally, and this is particularly true of our Party leadership. It has become steeled in the fire of the civil war, and has really proved itself capable of standing at the head of such a mighty undertaking as our glorious trek.

The success of our trek was also assured because there are many Party members in our Red Army. In some of our units as many as 60 per cent of the men are Party members and Young Communists. All commanders of higher rank than company commanders are exclusively Communist, while the majority of platoon commanders are also either Party members or Young Communists. The Communists in the army, both among the commanders and among the rank and file, set examples of courage and loyalty to the Party and the cause of the working class.

We are also proud of our non-Party Bolsheviks, our commanders and rank-and-file fighters who compete with the Party men in the army in heroism and loyalty to the revolution.

On the eve of every battle, the Party members of the companies select from their midst four or five men as reserve commanders.

If the company commander is killed or wounded at the front, the detachment does not disperse, but the first reserve commander immediately takes his place, and in case of need, his place is taken by the second, etc. Wounded Party men try not to upset their comrades but encourage them by saying, "It's nothing, go ahead". It must be said that the Communists in the Red Army are the best members of our Party.

Our Communists, whether they work in the trade unions or in the Young Communist League or in other mass work, always pay attention to training cadres to swell the ranks of the Red Army. The Party sends its best comrades into the Red Army units. Thus, our best Party forces are actually concentrated in the army.

Our Communists set examples of excellent work, not only in the Red Army units, but also in the rear—in ensuring supplies for the army, in swelling its ranks, collecting foodstuffs, etc.

We advance the following slogans: "For the victory of the Chinese people over Japanese imperialism!" "All for the struggle for the agrarian revolution and freedom!" "For the victory of the Chinese Revolution!" "Join the Red Army!" We have Red Army reserves which include the

youth organized in the Young Guard, the Red Guard, and other auxiliary forces. All these youths are gradually transferred into the ranks of the Red Army.

Through the network of mass organizations under our guidance, we can mobilize the masses. The population willingly give us food. During the trek, we had no difficulties as regards supplies. It was only in the mountains, where the population is sparse, that there were one or two days when food was scarce. In spite of the economic blockade, we were able to supply our fighters with new uniforms and other essentials.

The Party has always guided the army, its plans and tactics. We have been conducting a civil war against the Kuomintang for many years now, but if we had not received really correct leadership from the Party we would not have achieved such success. Of course, there have been individual mistakes and failures in leadership, but our strength lies just in this, that we can discover and correct our shortcomings in time. The success of our great trek into Western China was achieved first and foremost because of the correct and strong Party leadership we had.

The third guarantee of our victory was that we met with support from the masses on all sides. Whenever we occupied new regions we rallied the masses to confiscate the property and food supplies of the local generals, landlords and gentry. This property and food was distributed among the poorest of the population. Wherever it was possible to do so, we set up local revolutionary authorities, revolutionary committees. Part of the ammunition taken was set aside for organization of partisan detachments in the locality. We organized a boycott of taxes, etc.

When General Kung Chui from Szechwan passed through villages where the population were starving he engaged in incendiarism for the express provocative purpose of spreading rumors to the effect that the Red Army burns everything on its way. Actually our troops helped to put out the fires, and in general did everything within their power to help the population. We formed mass organizations to struggle against the payment of land-rent, etc. This was the reason why we met with so much support among the population.

During our trek we also acquired experience in connection with work among the national minorities, as, for instance, the Yao Tsi in Kwangsi, the Maotsi in Kweichow, and the Mantsi in Sikiang and Szechwan. In our leaflets and slogans we raised the question of national emancipation for these small peoples, and we supplied them with weapons to organize partisan defense detachments. In the Red Army there are not a few representatives of these tribes as well as of the Moslems.

It was just because we had close ties with the masses that we gained their support and successfully recruited volunteers into the Red Army. The workers helped us everywhere with our transport, and we found it possible everywhere to billet the Red Army men among the population.

It is worth while dwelling briefly on the methods of work which the Red Army carried on among the population. We could not stay for a long time in any one place, we had to push forward all the time. In the

Evening we arrived at a village, the next morning we were on our way again. Nevertheless we did much work among the population.

Every Red Army fighter knows three rules regarding discipline, and eight rules regarding behavior as a fighter. Very fine traditions are included in these rules, and we demand that each fighter should observe them. Every Red Army man billeted with a family is expected to arrange a meeting of the family together with the family head. He has to explain the nature of the Red Army, the aims for which it is fighting, and strive to make his agitation penetrate to the widest strata of the population. Every Red Army fighter carries a piece of chalk with him, and is obliged to write no less than three slogans a day in the places through which he passes.

The Political Department of the Red Army, and the political departments in the divisions and units, as well as every company, have special departments for work among the population. All the best local forces of the Party, the Young Communist League, the trade unions, and the mass organizations are responsible for work among the population along the route taken by the Red Army. And yet we still do not do enough of this work. But it is a fact that every Red Army man carries on work among the population, and this work brings its results.

A few words about our shortcomings. Have we made any mistakes? Of course we have. If we had not, our successes would have been greater.

We did not have a correct political line as regards the establishment of the anti-imperialist people's front. Had we adopted the new line of tactics during our trek westwards we should have gained greater successes. But even now it is not too late to do so. Today the united front is absolutely essential, and is the only correct line.

The offensive of Japanese imperialism against North China is calling forth more and more indignation and discontent among the broad masses of the Chinese population. Serious antagonisms exist between the different militarist cliques. We must make use of these antagonisms among the militarists. On the other hand—and this is undoubtedly much more important—a mighty anti-imperialist wave is mounting among the broad masses of the people. This is an extremely favorable moment for organizing the national anti-imperialist united front.

After completing so brilliantly the great trek, we must give an appraisal of our army and of our Party. After so many years of civil war, the Red Army has become an efficient fighting body, and has really grown considerably. Of course, in the course of our trek we had to overcome a multitude of difficulties and obstacles. We suffered certain losses in the ranks of the Red Army, and in the former Soviet regions and northeast region of Kiangsi. On the other hand, the Second and Sixth Armies met with no small successes. We can record big successes in northwest China—in Shansi, Szechwan and Kiangsu.

In spite of its losses, the total numerical composition of the Red Army today has not decreased but, on the contrary, has increased. During the trek northwards, the Red Army organized local partisan detachments all along the line of march, and we established armed detachments in various regions.

In the regions which we have now occupied, we are trying to carry

out the slogan of building up a Red Army one million strong. We shall carry out this slogan.

What should be the appraisal of the work of our Party? After the Fourth Plenum of our Central Committee our Party really gained big successes. The authority of the Communist Party in the Soviet regions is high. The Party is defending scores of millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet regions. Of course our Party has made a number of mistakes, but these have been rectified by the Party's own forces. There has been no repetition of the position which arose after the treachery of Chen Tu-hsiu, or when the mistakes of Li Li-san and Tu Chin-po were current. In the new situation, our Party knows how to raise new tasks itself.

Our Party is capable of leading the civil war, and does so correctly and flexibly. We have developed such political and military leaders as Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh—these talented military and Party leaders of ours, tried in hundreds of battles. We have really heroic Communist cadres who are fighting self-sacrificingly for the fundamental interests of the Chinese people.

Our Party must carry out the new tactics. It must in the new situation and on the basis of the positions we have already won build up a real anti-imperialist people's front, and through this people's front gain victory over the enemies of the Chinese people, and first and foremost over Japanese imperialism.

The Anti-Imperialist Struggle in the Kuomintang Regions of China

By HSIAO HEI

THE Kuomintang regions are the most important centers of the economic and political life of China. The basic masses of the Chinese proletariat are concentrated there. Today these regions are the object of Japanese imperialist aggression, and are of decisive importance for the victory of the Soviet revolution in China. The most important task facing the Communist Party is, therefore, on the basis of the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, to achieve a further turn in the tactics and daily work of the Communist Party in the Kuomintang regions, with a view to setting up an anti-imperialist united people's front and, first and foremost, the anti-Japanese united people's front. It is a serious mistake to underestimate our work in the Kuomintang regions or to ignore it under the pretext that sooner or later these regions will be occupied by the Chinese Red Army. It is precisely in order to fulfil the new policy that the anti-imperialist movement in the non-Soviet regions must be linked up in the closest possible fashion with the agrarian revolution in the Soviet regions. Moreover, in determining the policy of the Soviet regions, our starting point should be not only the internal situation, but account must be taken of the general situation throughout China, and even of the international situation.

In dealing with the question of the anti-imperialist struggle and the anti-imperialist united people's front, we must first and foremost bear in mind the concrete situation prevailing in the Kuomintang regions, i.e., take into account the relations between the objective possibilities and our own forces. Only if we correctly appraise the actual situation will it be possible for us to correctly determine the tactics, slogans, and organizational forms and methods of our work. In his speech at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, when dealing with the anti-imperialist united people's front, Comrade Dimitroff stressed above all that:

"In forming a wide anti-imperialist united front of struggle in the colonies and semi-colonies, it is necessary above all to recognize the variety of conditions in which the anti-imperialist struggle of the masses is proceeding, the varying degree of maturity of the national liberation movement, the role of the proletariat within it and the influence of the Communist Party over the broad masses."*

What is the general situation in the Kuomintang regions? In the main, as follows:

1. The broad masses of the Chinese people, including not only

* See *Communist International*, Nos. 17-18, p. 1211.

the toilers but also broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie, and even a section of the national bourgeoisie with their political groupings, and a certain part of the military officers—are fully aware of the fact that Japanese imperialist aggression will not stop with the rapacious seizure of Manchuria and North China, but threatens the direct seizure of the remaining part of China, and is a menace to the life of every Chinese citizen.

2. The indignation of these broad masses is growing stronger and stronger in connection with the further aggression of Japanese imperialism and the treacherous policy pursued by the Nanking government. The struggle against Japanese imperialism and its agents is assuming various forms.

3. The absence of civil rights among the people, the riot of the White terror and the demagogy of the Kuomintang leaders have reached unheard-of dimensions, while the forces of revolution in these regions are for the time being still very poorly organized.

4. The political influence which the Soviets, the Chinese Red Army and the Communist Party of China have among broad masses of the Chinese people is spreading and assuming more definite forms.

I. FURTHER AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

The Japanese imperialists today are staging incidents in a number of cities in the Kuomintang regions of China which are intended to serve as a pretext for the armed seizure of the provinces situated along the Yangtse and the Chwukieng rivers. For example, recently the Japanese lodged a protest with the municipal authorities of Shanghai concerning an alleged attack of Chinese upon a Japanese truck, and used this as a pretext for demanding that a new Japanese concession should be established in Shanghai, hoping to give rise to a new conflict on the lines of the Shanghai events in 1932.*

In Amoy, Fukien province, the Japanese suddenly demanded that the Fukien government pay the debts on loans obtained by the Fukien authorities from Japanese banks and Formosa business men before the Northern Expedition in 1926. These extremely dubious loans amount to over five million Chinese dollars. In this connection the Japanese have concentrated nine warships on the Amoy river.

In Hankow, Hupeh province, the Japanese Consul-General lodged a serious protest against the commander of the Wuhan guards, concerning the appearance recently of posters with anti-Japanese slogans in the barracks of the Wuhan garrison. This was the pretext for increasing the number of Japanese warships on the river Yangtse.

The Japanese are openly and energetically striving to establish a so-called "independent state" of the five provinces of Northern China, to include Hopei, Shansi, Shantung, Suiyuan and Chahar, and of an "autonomous government of Inner Mongolia"; in other words they want to establish a second and third "Manchukuo".

Japanese imperialism is increasing its economic aggression against China. Recently the Nanking government concluded a secret agreement

* The invasion of Shanghai by imperialist Japan and the devastation of one of its largest districts, namely Chapei.

with Japan for "Sino-Japanese economic collaboration", according to which all economic measures taken in China must be by agreement with Japan, must actually come under the complete control of Japan. The agreement also provides for representatives of states which, in the racial and cultural sense, are connected with Japan and China, i.e., Manchukuo, participating in this economic collaboration. The agreement aims at obtaining complete control of the key positions of Chinese economy. Actually in Northern China, economic life is already under the complete control of Japan. Now Japanese imperialism is striving to gain possession of sources of raw materials and the railways in the North of China, to develop cotton-growing there so as to become independent of American and Indian cotton, and to secure control over the cattle-rearing regions in the Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, with a view to freeing itself of Australian woolen imports. Japan is also pushing ahead its plan to seize the salt regions of North China, in order to cover the present lack of salt hitherto imported from Ethiopia. By peaceful or violent means, the Japanese imperialists are trying to obtain possession of the mines in North China which are at present under the control of the Chinese banks. For example, a short time ago the Japanese seized the Luchiang coal mines and the railway branch line which lies close proximity, dismissed all the workers and office staff, and arbitrarily sold up all the coal reserves from these mines amounting to 60,000 tons. The Japanese imperialists intend to hand over the main railway lines of North China to the management of the South Manchurian Railway, and thus establish complete Japanese control of all lines of communication in North China. The Japanese are forcing the Chinese textile owners to sell the five largest textile factories in North China at very low prices, having in mind the building up of a big textile center in Shantung to counterpose the one in Shanghai. This, at bottom, is the essence of the Japanese plan of the economic development in North China.

The Japanese have forced the Nanking government to introduce new reductions in the import duty upon Japanese goods, and have obtained permission to organize an exhibition of Japanese machinery in China and to import these machines free of duty. The Japanese are pursuing a policy of increased dumping in China, and are protesting against the high import duty law passed in July of this year by the Nanking government which extended to include Japanese citizens. An increase in capital invested in Japanese enterprises is to be observed in Shanghai, Tsingtao and other towns. The Chinese textile exchange, which ceased operations with Japanese textiles ten years ago (in connection with the events which took place on May 30, 1925*), has now renewed such operations. This means a daily loss to the Chinese textile industry of 30,000 Chinese dollars. Similar operations have been renewed on the wheat exchange in Shanghai. In consequence of the Italo-Ethiopian war, the Japanese have monopolized the artificial silk market in Shanghai, which was previously in the hands of Italy and Japan.

At the same time, in a number of towns of China, Japanese agents

* On May 30, 1925, a mass demonstration was held in Shanghai which ended in the demonstrators being shot, and which served as the starting point for the rise in the tide of revolution in China.

are buying up silver for export to Japan. From Tientsin alone the Japanese have exported over \$5,000,000 of silver in the last three months. This is leading to a decline of the silver reserve in China, a depreciation of paper money and ever more frequent cases of bankruptcy among the Chinese banks. In Shanghai alone eighty-five banks have gone bankrupt during the last eight months.

All this testifies to the further breakdown of the whole of Chinese national economy. The resumption of work in thirty-one silk-spinning factories in Shanghai, the increase in the price of rice, the export of silk cocoons from China during August of this year to the amount of three million Chinese dollars, *i.e.*, over a million dollars more than in August of the preceding year, or the fact that the passive balance in foreign trade for July, 1935, amounted to \$18,000,000 while for the first seven months of 1935 there was a passive balance of over \$300,000,000—these facts by no means point to an improvement of the situation but only represent the efforts of the Chinese employers to find a way out of the deadlock in which the economic situation is placed today, with the aid of foreign capital and by increasing the exploitation of the working class. The journey to Japan undertaken by a group of textile manufacturers led by Yun Tsun-tsin, the king of the Chinese textile industry, and Yun Tsun-tsin's agreement to participate in Sino-Japanese economic collaboration, is just such a desperate attempt. Actually, however, this only makes Chinese industry even more dependent upon foreign capital, and is leading to a further shrinking of the home market and the further breakdown of Chinese national economy.

The conference organized by the Japanese in Shanghai, Dairen and Tientsin to formulate Japan's "new policy" towards China adopted the decision that all anti-Japanese movements in China must be suppressed, that Japan and China must collaborate in the fight against communism in China and first and foremost in the Northwest provinces, that the Nanking government must recognize the need for adopting measures against the anti-Japanese movement and communism in China, and that assistance must be afforded for the carrying out of these measures. Not satisfied with the struggle of the Kuomintang butchers against the anti-Japanese movement and the drives against the Chinese Red Army, the Japanese robbers intend to begin open military intervention with their own forces, in order to wipe out the Chinese Red Army and suppress the anti-Japanese movement. Having gained the approval of the Nanking government for their measures, the Japanese are using the "struggle against communism" as a pretext for seizing the remaining part of Chinese territory, and are using the slogan of the "struggle against the Communists" to draw certain sections of the population away from the anti-Japanese struggle and to seize Chinese territory under the guise of helping China to "destroy communism".

There are favorable grounds for the realization of the Japanese plan for seizing the whole of China in the information concerning the proposed Sino-Japanese "collaboration in combating the bandits along the Great Wall", in the public refutation in the press of rumors concerning the resumption of normal relations between Chiang Kai-shek and Nanking, on the one hand, and the Communist Party of China, on

the other, in the public declaration made by General Yen Hsi-shan to the effect that "first, communism must be liquidated, and then measures undertaken to save the country", and in his "plan of struggle against communism".

These decisions are only the beginning of the "new policy" which Japan intends to pursue.

All these facts lead us to the following conclusions concerning the next steps which Japan will take in pursuance of her "new policy":

First, "henceforth Japan will not have any dealings with a Chinese government created by 'one party', but will try to establish direct connections with the actual authorities in the different localities". This means that Japan is not only striving to establish a second "Manchukuo" in the North of China, but has the intention of establishing direct contact with the actual authorities in the different localities, in order to set up new states in the valley of the Yangtse and the Chuchiang (Pearl River) on the lines of Manchukuo.

Second, through her so-called "Sino-Japanese collaboration", Japan intends not only to obtain complete economic control of North China but, in addition, to gain possession of the key positions of the whole of Chinese economy.

Third, Japan is endeavoring to bring about "Sino-Japanese collaboration in the struggle against communism", so as to begin open, direct military intervention against the Chinese revolution.

Fourth, Japan is seeking to subject China completely to her own influence in consequence of China's abandoning all connection whatsoever with the United States and the European powers. Thereby Japan intends to bring her plan for a "Pan-Asia" to its culmination.

Actually, there is nothing new in the so-called "new policy" of Japan. It is merely a continuation of the policy which Japanese imperialism has been consistently pursuing in China, especially since the occupation of Manchukuo. The "new policy" is merely a component part of Tanaka's long-standing plan.

As a result of all this, China is today passing through an even more acute national crisis than in 1931, when the Manchurian events began. The social crisis in China (economic ruin, mass unemployment, poverty, starvation, death, etc.), has reached unheard-of dimensions.

The indignation of the whole of the Chinese people has considerably increased in connection with the bestial acts of the imperialists and the treachery of the national traitors. This has led to a still further extension of the social base of the Chinese revolution, and has created favorable conditions for establishing the anti-imperialist and, first and foremost, the anti-Japanese united people's front.

II. THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE OF THE MASSES AND THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST UNITED PEOPLE'S FRONT

The anti-imperialist struggle of the Chinese people is becoming broader and deeper in consequence of the further offensive of the Japanese aggressors, the further capitulation of the treacherous Nanking government and the growing influence of the Soviets and the Chinese

Red Army among the masses of the people. This is also illustrated by the acute ideological struggle which is taking place in the press of the Kuomintang regions in China around the question of the anti-imperialist front. The discussion is taking place mainly around the following questions: Shall we resist Japan or capitulate? What methods should be used to save the nation? What should be the attitude towards the Chinese Soviet Government and the Red Army? What position should China adopt in the event of a second imperialist war? In this connection the question of the attitude towards the U.S.S.R. is also touched upon. The overwhelming majority of authors, except a few Japanophiles in the camp of the Nanking government, are not only in favor of resisting Japan, but unanimously appeal for action, and propose concrete measures of fighting against Japan.

An article by Dr. V. K. Ting (Ting Wen-chiang) entitled "The History of the Revolutionary Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia and Its Lessons", published in a Tientsin newspaper, the *Takung Pao*, on July 21, 1935, resulted in a heated discussion in the entire press, which is going on to this day. Dr. Ting refers to Lenin who, he says, even agreed to pay contributions and grant annexations in order to obtain peace with Germany during the Brest negotiations and allegedly agreed to retreat to Kamchatka; from which the author draws the conclusion that the Chinese people should capitulate before Japan and retreat to Chinese Kamchatka, namely to Yunnan and Kweichow.

This call for capitulation to Japanese imperialism called forth different responses. Articles by Hu Shih, Teng Chi, Hsu Kung-ta and others were published in reply to Ting's article, taking a line against Ting and calling for resistance to the offensive of Japanese imperialism. For instance, Hsu Kung-ta writes:

"The situation in which we find ourselves today is objectively and subjectively quite different from the situation in Russia before the Brest Peace."

Teng Chi refers to Dr. Ting's article, where he declares that "North China is our Ukraine, the provinces of Honan, Kiangsi and Szechwan are our Urals and Kuznetsk, while Yunnan and Kweichow provinces are our Kamchatka", and writes:

"The territorial losses we have sustained in the last three years alone very considerably exceed the territories of Esthonia and Latvia, and we have not fired a single shot in resistance. Today 'our Ukraine' is ours only formally, and there is no guarantee whatsoever that our 'Urals and Kuznetsk' will not be seized. 'Our Kamchatka' is also liable to be seized. I am not saying this to cause a sensation, but because this is the actual state of affairs."

Hsu Kung-ta stresses the following point in his article:

"We have now a great opportunity of offering resistance to Japan, and it is absolutely essential that a struggle be waged against Japan. . . . If the Kuomintang decides questions of national importance against the will of public opinion, then public opinion will make the government answer for it."

In their article entitled, "How to Interpret the Lessons of the Brest Peace", written at the request of the editors of the newspaper *Chiu Kuo Pao*, published in Paris, Comrades Wang Ming and Kang Sin drew attention to the following:

"Mr. Ting Wen-chiang's viewpoint is wrong. . . . His theory can only be of assistance to those who betray our people, and weaken the vigilance of the people and their desire to fight, which will in turn let loose arbitrary acts on the part of Japanese imperialism in China and give freedom of action to the traitors. And then the Chinese Republic will perish."

Further on in their article they write the following:

"Although the line taken by Hu Shih, Hsu Kung-ta and Teng Chi is in the main correct, it nevertheless contains many shortcomings. It does not, on the basis of the contrast between two viewpoints, show what measures should be adopted to fight against Japanese imperialism. . . ."

The Italo-Ethiopian war, which coincided with the fourth anniversary of the Manchurian events*; and the twenty-fourth anniversary of the 1911 revolution**, has called forth a new wave of lively discussion in the press in connection with the Sino-Japanese problem.

In an article entitled "An Appeal to the Chinese People on the Occasion of the Fourth Anniversary of the Manchurian Events" in the evening newspaper *Ta Mei*, Mr. Chang Nai-chi, famous in the banking world and financial circles of China, writes:

"It is with profound sincerity that I stress the following three points (1) there must be no hesitation; (2) there must be no cowardice; (3) there must be no pessimism. . . . A number of revolutionary wars in history have shown that the power of the masses can force the strongest opponent to lay down his arms. We must recognize the importance of material forces. We must deprive our opponent of these material forces, and in addition we must obtain them for ourselves in some other way. Only in this way can we bring the revolution to its culmination and free China from its position as a colony. Young men! Have more faith in victory, develop your forces, resist the enemy without, and uproot the traitors within the country!"

And the *Ming Kuo Jeh Pao*, the daily organ of the Kuomintang group wrote the following in a leading article entitled, "Bravo, Ethiopians":

"At a moment which was critical for their state, in the face of an invasion by a foreign enemy, the Ethiopians rallied their forces, unanimously prepared to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their country. They will not surrender in spite of the advance of an enemy armed to the teeth. They will not surrender, despite the weakness of their country. . . . They are stubbornly fighting to the bitter end. There is a great difference

* The occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese troops on September 18, 1931.

** In 1911 a revolution broke out in China, as a result of which under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen the monarchy was overthrown and China officially declared a republic.

between what is taking place in Ethiopia and what is going on in China, which resigns itself submissively like a lamb and has given up a number of provinces without a fight. It is the difference between courage and cowardice. The difference is as great as the distance from earth to sky. If we make a comparison between Ethiopia and China, where traitors make their appearance one after another, and serve the enemy and betray the nation's interests, what a tremendous distance lies between the national feeling in China and in Ethiopia! . . . How courageous are the Ethiopians, how cowardly are we! I respect the Ethiopians and am ashamed of the Chinese."

In another leading article headed, "Cries of a Wounded Heart", we find:

"A tremendous country like China, with a culture of its own four thousand years old, with a population of over four hundred million, can fight even though it possesses worse armaments than the enemy, as the experiences of the Shanghai fighting have shown."

We find more concrete proposals for organizing the struggle against Japanese imperialism and for saving the fatherland, in the following appeal published by Wu Kang, Professor in the Sun Yat-sen University in Kwantung:

"Unite all the armed forces of China, form them into an army of national defense. . . . Immediately cease the offensive against the Red Army, and unite all the forces of China to fight against Japanese expansion. Organize all the generals in China into one general staff occupied exclusively with the task of defending the country against Japan. If China is compelled to declare war on Japan, then a government of national defense must be organized which shall be solely and fully responsible for the external and internal military actions of the country and the defense of the nation."

Many people share the view expressed by Professor Wu Kang to the effect that the internecine internal war must stop, and that a united front must be formed for joint struggle against Japan.

The feeling of the Chinese people in relation to the struggle against Japan is well depicted in General Wong Chao-yuan's "Reminiscences of the Shanghai Battle":

"I was at one time staying in a hotel," he writes. "I was in army uniform but nobody knew who I was. One of the waiters asked me: 'Why have you not gone to fight against Japan?' And I could not answer the question. In the train I met with a similar experience. The guard said to me: 'The Chinese troops are no good at all, they fight desperately against each other, but as soon as they encounter the Japanese they behave like mice in front of a cat. They are absolutely no good at all.' Then he asked me: 'Why haven't you gone to fight against the Japanese?' After that I seldom ventured to walk the streets in army uniform. My colleagues frequently met with similar experiences and were very much embarrassed. When soldiers go to market to buy food the people often jeer at them. And this

makes the soldiers want more and more to fight against the Japanese army. This explains why the Chinese soldiers displayed unprecedented courage during the fighting against the Japanese invaders in Shanghai."

Now that the national crisis in China is much more serious than the 1932 crisis, this feeling is still more widespread among the masses of the people.

As a result of the growth of revolutionary feeling, the activity of the masses of the people and the sharpening of imperialist contradictions, the movement in favor of resisting Japan and the struggle against the capitulation of the Nanking government have now spread even to the Kuomintang organizations, and partly to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and to a certain section of the Blueshirts. In connection with the Hupeh events, the Southwest grouping of the Kuomintang published a protest in the summer of 1935 against the capitulation policy of the Nanking government, wherein it declared that the Chinese territory has its bounds but that the demands of Japan are boundless. Even the Hupeh organization of the Kuomintang made the following declaration in its manifesto against Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-Wei:

"Japan considers itself the leader of Asia, and China a country under its protectorate. It insults our people and puts them in a degrading position. The so-called Sino-Japanese rapprochement is actually only so much treachery on the part of a few representatives of the Nanking government. The Chinese people will protest determinedly against any agreements which are not based on the principle of equality and which do not observe the principle of respect for mutual interests."

In connection with the Hupeh events, twenty members of the Chamber of Control* accused Huang Fu, Chen Yi, Tao Shan-ming, Yin Ju-keng and Yuan Liang of betraying the interests of the people, and demanded that they be punished; they also accused Wang Ching-wei, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and, indirectly, Chiang Kai-shek himself. In their appeal to the Second Plenum of the Kuomintang, Chao Ping-chin described the Kuomintang as a "filthy swamp, a bloc of feudal groupings. . . ." Many similar facts could be cited.

There is no need to refer to the existence of anti-Japanese feeling among the broad masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers who are directly engaged in the practical struggle for the national existence, for the independence and integrity of their country, and for human rights and freedom. This unanimous demand for a struggle against Japan is of serious political importance today.

Firstly, it signifies a protest against the treacherous policy of the Nanking government, and smashes to bits its demagogic assertion that "there are no forces in China to resist Japan", that "China must first become strong and then take revenge", that "China must wait for a second imperialist war", or that "first the population inside the country must be pacified, and then resistance offered to Japan", etc.

* One of five chambers which constitute the Kuomintang government.

Secondly, it inspires the whole of the people to fight against Japanese aggression and imbues them with confidence in victory. If this potential power of the masses of the people were crystallized into action, it is difficult to imagine the tremendous scope which the anti-Japanese movement would acquire.

Thirdly, it increases the authority of our Party, of the Soviet government and the Red Army among the population throughout China, and provides our Party with the chief conditions necessary for organizing the anti-imperialist people's front, for conducting a mighty national-revolutionary struggle.

Despite the fierce White terror, the masses of the Chinese people have displayed innumerable examples of heroic struggle against the Japanese robbers, for the salvation of the fatherland.

During the three months which have passed since the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, the struggle of the masses of the people to save their fatherland has developed tempestuously in the Kuomintang regions. The Chinese proletariat has always occupied the front ranks in this anti-imperialist struggle. Here are a few examples:

A short time ago the Nanking government accepted all the oppressive conditions put before it by Japan, concerning North China. The Shanghai sailors were the first to protest. At a meeting of the yellow Seamen's union, "led" by Yang Hu,* a Kuomintang official, the sailors beat up the traitors and threw them out, destroyed counter-revolutionary Kuomintang posters and banners, tore up the portrait of Chiang Kai-shek, and marched in organized fashion to the building of the Kuomintang committee where a meeting was in progress. The sailors demanded that the question of the struggle against the Japanese imperialists be discussed and that punishment be meted out to the treacherous leaders of the Kuomintang. The demonstration was surrounded by a large force of gendarmes and police armed with machine guns. Sixty people including eight women were arrested. This caused such tremendous indignation among the whole population that the Shanghai municipal authorities found it necessary to declare martial law.

A short time previously, a strike broke out among the rickshaw men on the territory of the French concession in Shanghai, which spread to 100,000 men. The rickshaw men were protesting against the newly introduced insulting regulations that all rickshaw men should be registered (18 fingerprints on different documents, and all kinds of malicious provocation during registration). The rickshaw men organized a demonstration and beat up the scabs. Committees to help the strikers were formed in many factories in China. The French imperialists fired on a demonstration of rickshaw men, severely wounding twelve men, and arrested over 100. Although this strike was defeated owing to the treachery of Du Yue-shen, who led it, and of the scabs, it increased the determination of the Shanghai rickshaw men and workers to carry on the anti-imperialist struggle. The refusal of the dockers in Chapei to load Japanese goods also met with profound sympathy among the rest of the population of Shanghai. The Chapei dockers who had taken part

* Yang Hu is a well-known Japanese agent, executioner of the Chinese toilers, who led the shooting during the events of April 12, 1927.

in the defense of Shanghai in 1932 conducted a persistent struggle against the dissolution of the workers' cooperative organizations by the Kuomintang authorities.

We can judge of the broad scope of the anti-imperialist movement among the peasantry from the measures adopted by Sino-Japanese collaboration alone, and directed towards uprooting the "bandits" in the demilitarized zone*.

Let us mention in particular one of the outstanding episodes of the struggle of the peasants—the armed uprising of peasants in the Hopei province. The uprising took place in connection with the collection of funds, organized by the authorities, for deepening the bed of the river, and the subsequent embezzlement of 60,000 Chinese dollars by the District Chief. Over 30,000 peasants marched to the town and besieged it for three days. The insurgents disarmed the guards on duty and smashed up the police station. The uprising was suppressed, but it had a strong effect upon the development of the peasant movement in the so-called "demilitarized zone". In the districts of Yuitien and Luan-hsien, the peasants frequently organized raids upon detachments of the police guards, organized by the Japanese from among Chinese traitors. It is specially necessary to mention the heroic fight carried on against the Japanese by a volunteer detachment commanded by Sun Yung-chin. Of all the peasant activities, the one most clearly anti-imperialist in character was the recent uprising under Chao Te-huai in the district of Taming (Hopei province). The uprising took place under the following slogans: "Keep the land for the peasants", "Save the state", "Down with the foul traitors", etc. The insurgents organized an autonomous people's army of 4,000 to 5,000 men to defend the peasant lands. For over twenty days they besieged the county town of Taming and isolated it from all communications with the outer world by cutting the telegraph and telephone wires. The District Chief and his garrison were confined to the town and dared not offer resistance to the insurgents. Chao Te-huai rejected the proposal of the District Chief to settle the conflict "by peaceful means", and disarmed several hundred *mintuan** from the Weisan district. In connection with the establishment of Sino-Japanese collaboration "for combatting the bandits", the autonomous people's army has organized itself officially of late, and its fighters are conducting guerilla warfare, having established connections with the insurgent peasants of the Shantung province.

Similar action by the peasantry has been taking place in other districts on Kuomintang territory, especially in North China, in the districts of Chen hua, Tsanyang, Yunchen, Chanping, Yuitien, Luan-hsien, Susyang, Pasien, Chuan-hsien, Hsiun-hsien, etc. Some detachments have established connections with the partisan movement in Manchuria, Jehol and other parts.

Besides the openly anti-Japanese activities of the peasantry, demonstrations have been taking place in connection with the refusal of the peasants to pay taxes and other contributions, and in connection with starvation, etc.

* *Mintuan* are hired bands in the service of the landlords who carry on the struggle against the revolutionary movement in the village, and fulfil police functions in extracting arrears from the peasants.

The peasant masses who take part in these activities represent a mighty army on the anti-imperialist fighting front. Now as never before the words of Comrade Stalin are especially appropriate:

"The anti-imperialist front in China will become all the stronger and mightier to the extent that the Chinese peasantry are drawn more rapidly and fundamentally into the revolution."
(Stalin, *On the Opposition*, p. 431, Russian 1928 ed.)

Ever since the Hopei events, the anti-imperialist movement has begun to gather strength in the Chinese army. There is an ever louder demand for a cessation of the internecine internal warfare and for all forces to be united for the struggle against the external enemy. There are ever more frequent demands made by the Kuomintang army units that the struggle against the Red Army be stopped; and more and more open sympathy is being expressed towards the Red Army. In Hankow, in the Wuhan headquarters of the defense units, posters bearing sharply anti-Japanese slogans have frequently appeared, and during the shooting-practice in Hankow targets were set up with the inscriptions: "Let us revenge ourselves on the enemy" and "Japanese Imperialism". There have been reports in the press of a number of cases of army units refusing to fight against the Red Army, for example: units of the 25th corps of the Kweichow army, with other units of the same army numbering in all 20,000 men, refused to obey Chiang Kai-shek's orders to march into the province of Szechwan to fight against the Red Army; or the case of General Ho Chu-Kuo's regiment (former troops of the Northeast Army), situated on the Shensi border, which refused to go into action against the Red Army. There have been cases of suicide as an expression of protest against the aggression of Japan and the treacherous policy of Nanking. The Chief of the Shaonin district (Kansu province), Ning Hung-min, committed suicide, leaving a letter in which he said:

"Our country is on the brink of ruin. I do not want to see our great people enslaved. I have therefore decided to sacrifice myself so as to arouse the spirit of the people to enter the struggle against the enemy and save the fatherland."

In September 1935, the entire 85th division of General Hsi Ping, part of General Sun Lien-chung's troops, went over en-bloc to the side of the Reds. This division, whose commander perished in battle, occupied the districts of Chang-te, Hsiming and Tzeli, thus forcing General Ho Chien (president of the Hunan provincial government) to appeal immediately for assistance to Chiang Kai-shek. The latter, seeing the instability of his own armies, and taking account of the fact that the appeal of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Soviets for the formation of an anti-imperialist united front was meeting with warm support among the people, was forced to spread rumors to the effect that, while it spoke of a united anti-imperialist front and joint struggle, the Red Army was prepared to come to agreement with anybody but not with Chiang Kai-shek. It is in this way that Chiang Kai-shek is trying to stop the army from wavering. Our Party declares

only that it is prepared to enter into agreement with any army units which cease the offensive against the Soviet regions and agree to fight against Japan. If the united front tactics are correctly applied, it is inevitable that there will be further cases of Kuomintang military units passing to the side of the revolution.

In the recent period, the anti-imperialist movement among the intellectuals has also been acquiring more and more scope, taking on different forms. The incident with the magazine *Hsin Sun* is characteristic. On the pretext that a certain article published in the anti-Japanese *Hsin Sun* contained an "insult" to the Japanese Emperor, the Japanese imperialists lodged a protest with the Chinese authorities and put forward a number of demands which were wholly accepted by the Kuomintang. The Central Committee of the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang government issued an order that *Hsin Sun* should be closed down and its editor Tu Chung-yuan arrested, giving as their motive the excuse that the magazine "sharpens" the Sino-Japanese relations. At first the editor of the magazine was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, but in view of the protests of the population the Kuomintang authorities were forced to reduce the term of imprisonment to 14 months, denying the right of appeal to the prisoner, contrary to existing regulations. Tu Chung-yuan made the following firm declaration at the trial:

"The aim of my magazine is to fight against imperialism, against policies of aggression. I was born in the Northeast provinces, now seized by the Japanese. How can I fail to protest and fight against the aggressors?"

His declaration secured the warm support of all those present in court, who displayed their indignation with cries of: "Down with Japanese imperialism!", "Down with the Chinese traitors!" Anti-imperialist leaflets were distributed in the court-room, and as a result, the judge and the representative of the Japanese consulate were forced to leave the courtroom.

This incident called forth a mighty movement, in China as well as abroad, for the release of Tu Chung-yuan and for personal immunity. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines sent 2,000 dollars to Tu Chung-yuan's wife to cover the cost of the appeal, and Chinese emigrants in America, Holland, and other countries sent telegrams of protest to Nanking against the scandalous sentence. Not only the toiling masses but organizations like the Shanghai association of lawyers, chamber of commerce and prominent industrialists like Mo No-chu and others—were drawn into the movement.

The incident with *Hsin Sun* strengthened the movement against the new press law published by the Nanking government, which severely restricts freedom of the press, especially in relation to anti-imperialist literature. As a result of the new law, only 54 different periodicals are allowed to be published instead of over 200 which were published previously. The publication of over 100 different books was prohibited, and they were burned. The first to utter a protest against the new law was the Shanghai Union of Journalists. The press workers of Tientsin,

Peiping, Nanking, Canton, and other towns, followed their example. The protest against the closing of *Hsin Sun* developed into a movement against the new press law, and now, in addition, into a protest against the severe measures adopted against journalists who violate the press law and are consequently prosecuted. Under the pressure of mass protest, however, in connection with the verdict against Tu Chung-yuan, the Kuomintang government was forced to declare through the supreme court, that "the former sentence is wrong and is therefore rescinded", and Tu Chung-yuan was released.

A big movement arose in connection with the sudden death of Ni Er, a young revolutionary composer and fighter for the emancipation of China. He was the first to compose extremely popular anti-imperialist songs in a new form which expressed with great force all the exploitation and national oppression of the toilers of China, and aroused millions of people to fight for the salvation of their fatherland and for a new personal existence. He was the author of a number of revolutionary songs, including the *March of the Volunteer Army*, the *Miners' Song*, the *Song of the Bullet*, *Want, Arise, Slaves!*, the *Twelve-Hour Working Day*, *The Dockers*, *The Wounded Soldier*, and others. In the form of gramophone records, these songs, full of national feeling, have become most popular among broad masses of the Chinese people. Naturally they could not fail to bring down all the hatred of the Nanking government and the Japanese imperialists upon the head of Ni Er. According to the official version, Ni Er was drowned while bathing in the sea, in Japan. But among the masses of the people it is said that the Japanese are involved in his death. One of the biggest Shanghai theatres, where the funeral meeting devoted to the memory of Ni Er was held, was not large enough to hold all those who wished to be present. The newspaper *Chunhua jipao* reported:

"The speakers at this meeting noted the importance of Ni Er's songs and made appeals that the work begun by Ni Er of composing militant anti-imperialist songs, should be continued. Those who participated in the meeting shouted anti-imperialist slogans, and all present loudly expressed their sympathy, as a result of which the president decided to close the meeting."

The tremendous popularity which Ni Er's songs enjoy among all strata of the population, the crowded funeral meetings in connection with his death, the fact that all the people recognize Ni Er as the first Chinese revolutionary composer, is no accident at all, for the voice of Ni Er is the voice of the four hundred million people of China, and the songs of Ni Er are an expression of the feelings and desires of the whole of the Chinese people.

In Shanghai, Tientsin, Peiping, Canton, Hankow and other towns, meetings took place on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Manchurian events, despite the prohibition of the authorities. A meeting of the students of Shantung University ended in sanguinary collisions with the Japanese. The Canton students organized propagandist "save

the fatherland" groups and conducted a competition for the best article on how to save the fatherland.

The anti-Japanese feeling among the school children is illustrated, for example, by the following fact:

"The school-children in one of the Shanghai schools", a paper reports, "refused to use maps distributed among them which had the name 'Manchukuo' on them. The teachers thereupon cut out the word 'kuo' (state), leaving only, 'Manchu' (Manchuria), and though the maps were thus spoiled, the scholars were then satisfied."

On October 10, a Chinese sports festival took place in Shanghai attended by hundreds of thousands of visitors. The newspaper *Takung Pao* describes the opening of the festival in the following words:

"During the parade, representatives of the five North-eastern provinces were dressed in mourning and carried flags of mourning in their hands. In this way they desired to express that their fatherland was dear to them, that they have not forgotten it. The spectators were deeply touched; many even wept. In his speech, the captain of the sports group from the Five Northeast provinces declared: The representatives of the territory which has been seized by the Japanese are taking part in the sports, not in order to break records, but to remind the Chinese people once more of the lost five North-eastern provinces and that a fight must be conducted to win them back."

Besides the anti-imperialist movement, a struggle is being launched against Chiang Kai-shek's campaign for a "new life", against the Kuomintang regulation that young men and women must not study together, against the teaching of Confucian literature in educational institutions, and against the Kuomintang system of examinations. One of the characteristic features of the growth of the anti-imperialist movement in China is the expression of profound solidarity with the Ethiopian people who are fighting for their independence.

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Red Army has issued an appeal to the Ethiopian people in a special manifesto, calling upon them to wage a determined armed struggle for their national independence.*

The Kwantung seamen's union, the Chinese mechanics' union, the Kwantung Chamber of Commerce, and other organizations, have also published their protests against the action of Italian fascism.

A mass demonstration took place in Shanghai outside the Italian Embassy, against the offensive of the Italians in Ethiopia, and against the hiring of Chinese workers for despatch to Africa.

* * *

The slogan of the national-revolutionary struggle put forward by our Party from the very first day of the occupation of Manchuria met

* See the Address of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Red Army of China to the Ethiopian People in this issue, p. 229.

with the support and sympathy of wide masses of the Chinese people. The organizing role of the Party in the anti-imperialist movement is still far from sufficient, but in spite of this, and of the mistakes made, the political influence of the Party is, without doubt, great.

The chief mistake in the work of our party on Kuomintang territory is, first and foremost, its sectarianism. In the struggle for a united anti-imperialist front, the Party has not been successful in rallying and utilizing all the anti-imperialist forces. It has not been able flexibly to link up the slogan of the struggle against imperialism with current events. It has not been able to link up the anti-imperialist struggle with the daily demands of the broad masses. It has not been able to use all the legal and semi-legal opportunities which present themselves. It has not been able to give organizational form to its political influence over the masses. It has not been able to re-organize its forces to correspond to the changing situation. It has not paid proper attention to safeguarding its cadres and putting them in their right places.

The resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, and the appeal of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Soviet government to all the people of China concerning the struggle against Japan to save the fatherland, are the chief fundamentals of the whole policy of our Party in Kuomintang territory. In our future work on Kuomintang territory we must, first of all, adopt the line which will collect together, strengthen, properly train and make use of all the revolutionary forces available, for a further, more tremendous, and more determined revolutionary struggle. Second, we must display wide initiative and the maximum activity in setting up a united front with all political groupings, all military units at the front, with mass organizations and individual politicians, and for an all-round struggle, beginning with the struggle for individual daily demands which at first may even be of a passive character, and ending with the struggle for the creation of a government of national defense and a united anti-Japanese army. Third, we must make the maximum effort to secure the lead of all spontaneous activities, by converting scattered, passive and isolated efforts into more organized, more powerful activities, and securing for them the support of the broad masses.

The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of China

(Notes of a Political Worker)

By LI HUAN

THE workers' and peasants' Red Army of China has an eight-year-old history of brilliant fighting. Its heroic struggle and especially its victories it has gained in battles against the sixth drive of the Kuomintang, as well as the mighty trek of the main forces of the Red Army from Kiangsi province into the West, have attracted the tremendous interest and attention of the whole world.

The Chinese Red Army, unlike the mercenary militarist Kuomintang army, is wholly built upon the principle of voluntary military service. From top to bottom it is one united whole, inspired with a single aim. Fighting unity, revolutionary class consciousness, mutual service, the spirit of solidarity are manifested everywhere and in everything. Genuine comradesly relations exist between the commanders and the men. Insults, bickering, arrogance, have no place in the Red Army. The Red Army is welded together in boundless loyalty to the struggle for Soviet Power and to save the Chinese people.

The following is the social composition of the Red Army forces of the Central Soviet region:* workers—30 per cent, peasants—68 per cent, clerks—1 per cent, others—1 per cent; under 16 years of age—1 per cent, between 16 and 24—51 per cent, between 24 and 40—44 per cent, over 40 years—4 per cent. Of the total, 77 per cent of the Red Army men are from the Soviet regions, 12 per cent from Kuomintang China, 4 per cent from soldiers of the White army who have mutinied and come over to our side, and 7 per cent—captured soldiers who have volunteered to join the Red Army.

All the new fighters get preliminary training in the recruits' division. Captured soldiers are trained in this division for six months, and only then are sent to the front as reinforcements to the regular troops. Usually, the entire local toiling population gather together to see the new fighters off to the front. To bring the older Red Army men closer to the young ones, and ensure that the experience of the former is passed on to the latter, the older men are made the patrons of the young ones: some train the young fighters to shoot at a target, others teach reading and writing, others still—how to throw hand-grenades, etc.

Of the total composition of the Red Army, 28 per cent are Communists and 10.6 per cent are Young Communists.

According to their rank the Communists and Young Communists in the Red Army are distributed as follows:

* Data of the Organizational and Statistical Sector of the Political Department of the Red Army of China, for April 1934.

	Commanders	Party workers	Rank and file (in percentages)	Medical staff, clerks, etc.
Communists	27	10	40	23
Young Communists	20	3	60	17

From the figures given above, it is clear that the Communist Party plays a leading role in so far as the leading workers are distributed throughout the Red Army.

Tremendous work is carried on in the Red Army as regards the training of cadres. In 1931, a central Red Army military-political school was organized, but later, as the Soviet movement developed and the Red Army became stronger, now educational institutions were established. These include the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Academy, which trains regimental commanders, chiefs of staff, regimental commissars, etc.; the "Huang Kung-lei" infantry school, the "Peng and Yang" infantry school, a special school to train machine-gunners, artillery men, sappers and others, a school of communications, a medical school, a supply service school, a school for the training of forces for local armed units, a school for training forces for the young guard. Moreover, in each military area there is an educational battalion; while each corps has an educational regiment, and each division has its educational detachment. They all train cadres to be middle and junior officers.

All the commanders—from the company commanders and political leaders to the highest ranks—are trained in the military schools, while squad and platoon commanders are trained in the military detachments. The social composition of the commanders of the Red Army is noticeably improving. Here are some figures on the social composition of the 1st and 6th groups of graduates from the infantry schools in the Red Army:

	First Group of Graduates	Sixth Group of Graduates
	(in percentages)	
Workers	7.5	24.4
Coolies	50.0	56.4
Poor peasants	.4	7.2
Middle peasants	19.0	4.5
Others (including intellectuals, teachers, clerks, students)...	23.1	7.5

Of every hundred Red commanders, beginning with squad commanders and ending with corps commanders, on the average, 60 are Party members and 11 Young Communists. Among the army corps political workers, 50 per cent are workers, while 90 per cent among the political workers are comrades who have undergone special advanced political education.

During the course of the civil war, the Chinese Red Army has forged numerous steeled commanders who are greatly loved by the Red Army men and enjoy the sympathy of the Chinese people. These cadres have covered themselves with glory throughout the world for their fighting qualities. Among them are leaders of the Soviets and of the Red Army like Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Peng te-huai, Ho Lung, Hsu Hsian-chien,

in Piao, and others. There are thousands of heroes in the Red Army from among the junior commanders and rank and file fighters.

Here are a few examples: during the battle waged by the First Red Army Corps in Wu Chiang, Comrade Chin Lung-shen with eight rank and file fighters annihilated two companies of the enemy, and Comrade Liu Shih-te alone captured ten rifles. Comrade Chow Wen-shan, though sick, went into the line of fire without a rifle and also captured five rifles. Comrade Chao Pu-kao, by throwing a hand grenade into one of the enemy's fortified points, wiped out an entire squad of the enemy's troops, and captured nine rifles and one Mauser.

When the enemy was attacking the 15th regiment of the Third Red Army corps which was defending its position in Hulotsa, the secretary of the Young Communist nucleus of the 4th company, Comrade Lu Jen-tu led his company into hand-to-hand fighting against the enemy, using his knife and hand grenades. As a result, there were over 40 killed and wounded on the enemy's side. When the company commander was seriously wounded, Comrade Lu Jen-tu took his place and declared to the men: "Our company commander is wounded. I will take his place. We shall not retreat as long as we still have a man, a rifle and cartridge. We shall die rather than give up our position." As a result the enemy was wiped out, but our fearless Lu Jen-tu perished heroically in action. During this battle, Comrade Lu Po-shen of the 5th company personally captured two machine-guns and two Mausers from the enemy.

During a battle near Huanpo, when the enemy was trying to launch a desperate counter-attack, Comrade Wang Fa-hai, assistant commander of the 2nd company of the Seventh Red Army corps hurled himself upon the enemy, sword in hand, and killed eight men. The enemy was thrown back. Comrade Wang, though wounded four times, did not leave the line of fire until the political leader of the company forced him to do so.

There are thousands and tens of thousands of heroes like this in the Chinese Red Army. Their names are widely known among the Red Army men and the population of the Soviet regions.

"Our army possesses the same sort of weapons as the Chiang Kai-shek troops have at their disposal", declared Comrade Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Red Army. These weapons have been captured from the enemy; they were secured at the price of the blood and lives of our courageous fighters. Not a single Red Army man can be found in the ranks of the First Red Army today using an old-fashioned rifle or rifles made locally. Every regiment, every division has infantry rifles of Japanese make, infantry rifles from the Mukden and Hanyan arsenals, artillery guns, light and heavy machine guns, hand-machine-guns, Mausers, etc.

In 1930, it was the custom in the 3rd corps to award five silver dollars to every Red Army man who captured a rifle in battle, and 50 dollars for the capture of a machine-gun, etc. There were such cases as that of Comrade Yang Ming-shen, a fearless fighter of the Red Army, who during one battle captured several rifles; he kept only part of the award he received, and presented the remainder to the mutual aid commission, established to aid the unemployed, to aid peasants suffering from the results of natural catastrophes, and wounded Red Army men

and their families. By the time Chansha was taken, the Red Army was capturing several thousand rifles in each battle, with the result that the men soon demanded that awards should be abolished.

Today the Red Army is technically on a much higher level, of course, than in 1930; at that time, for example when we captured Chansha, we were unable to make use of the wireless station which fell into our hands. Nevertheless, the Red Army has not sufficient equipment even today, and its fighters have not sufficiently mastered the technical side of their work.

* * *

The outfitting of the Chinese Red Army has considerably improved of recent years. Individual units of the army are dressed and shod as well as the choice units of Chiang Kai-shek's army.

In the spring and autumn each man wears a lined uniform, in the summer a uniform without lining, and in the winter—padded lining. Moreover, each squad possesses from four to ten quilted or woollen blankets. The type of uniform is similar to the summer uniform of the Red Army men in the Soviet Union; red, green, blue or black collar tips distinguish the different categories of troops; their caps bear the five-pointed star; they wear socks, straw sandals and puttees, and leather belts. But when a large number of new men are recruited, due to the shortage of uniforms some of the men remain in civilian clothes. When there have been prolonged marches and exhausting battles, there are cases when the Red Army men go into battle barefoot.

The pack carried by each man is as follows: on the left shoulder his flask, a sack of rice (usually two days' ration), two or three pairs of straw sandals, a woollen scarf, and a sack (containing tooth-brush, tooth-powder, soap, rifle oil, linen, needles and cotton, paint-brush, China ink, song-book, spoon, mug, elementary reading book, some silver money and food); on the right shoulder, a cartridge-belt (linen or leather containing 150 cartridges), blanket, rain-hat or umbrella, bag (containing provisions for dinner), gas-mask (in the majority of cases hand-made), knapsack or bag containing two or three changes of clothing, boots, books, etc., knife, spade, axe, one or two hand grenades and rifle. Every man carries about twenty kilograms.

The weight carried by a company commander is almost the same as that of the rank and file Red Army man with the addition of a field case (containing notebook, pencil, rubber, measure, compass, map, infantry rules, etc.) binoculars, Mauser, leather cartridge-belt containing two hundred cartridges.

The weight carried by battalion commanders and by those in charge of larger units is the same as that carried by company commanders. Many staff commanders have no horses as yet, and carry their things themselves. Formerly, the commanders, beginning with company commanders, had their own orderlies, but this system has been abolished throughout.

During the sixth drive, the Central Soviet government with a view to mobilizing funds for military expenditures, called on the masses of

the workers and peasants in the Soviet regions and Red Army men to economize, and the following ration of food was fixed for the Red Army man: 600 grams of rice, 40 cents for pork or butter, 35-40 cents for other foodstuffs. Thus, the Red Army men receive better supplies than those engaged in Soviet and Party organizations in the rear, and considerably better than do the soldiers in the Kuomintang army, although worse than the small partisan detachments and individual small units of the Red Army did. The latter, who carried on most of their operations independently and frequently on Kuomintang territory, would confiscate the property of the *tukhao** and counter-revolutionary leaders, and while distributing the confiscated property among the local population of workers and peasants, would keep a certain portion of it for themselves.

The masses of workers and peasants in the Soviet regions take good care of the Red Army, and supply them with fresh and dried vegetables, pork, fowl, eggs, smoked meat, straw sandals, linen shoes, tooth brushes and tooth powder, hoods, etc. If, during battles, the Red Army succeeds in capturing the enemy quarter-master's supplies but is unable to carry them away owing to transport difficulties, these supplies are usually distributed among the local population.

The order of the day for the Red Army man is as follows: reveille at five o'clock in the morning; then cleaning up and washing, morning roll-call, exercises (free movements, gymnastics, sometimes rifle-drill, walks, singing); every morning military drill and mountain climbing are obligatory; breakfast at 7:30 and at 8 o'clock studies (military or political); at 12 o'clock studies and then dinner follows, newspapers are read, and rest; from 2 to 6 o'clock—gymnastics or field studies (if there are gymnastics in the morning, then studies after midday, and vice-versa). After this they return home, have supper, rest and set out for evening roll-call. The Red Army men eat three times a day. Collective talks are often arranged, the men meet the local population, there are Red Army evenings of questions and answers on political subjects, and other meetings.

Every Saturday after dinner, the Red Army men clean their rifles and hold physical culture contests. Some help the families of the local Red Army men in tilling the fields, harvesting, or gathering fuel. The Political Department of the unit, together with those working in the local Soviet bodies and Commissions for providing special facilities for the families of Red Army men, ascertain the number of families of Red Army men in the given locality, the size of the land they hold, the labor power required to assist them, the amount of agricultural implements and cattle at their disposal, the situation of the various land plots, and make investigation regarding families who have no fuel, whose supply of drinking water is inadequate, and whose houses need repairing. After all these points have been investigated in detail, the Political Department explains to the men the importance of the work of granting facilities to families of Red Army men, and invites the men to sign on voluntarily to do this work. After which, the Red Army men take with them a supply of food, gather together at the headquarters of the Commission

* *Tukhao*—big peasants, the capitalists of the countryside.

for special facilities to families of Red Army men, and then set out accompanied by children or old people, to the addresses indicated: there they cultivate the gardens of the families of Red Army men, others go into the fields to till the soil, to do weeding, or to harvest. Some of the Red Army men repair the houses. Generally, the Red Army men enter into socialist competition to see who can perform the work best and quickest. The work is done to the accompaniment of singing folk or revolutionary songs. Here is a verse from one of the favorite songs of the Young Communists: *The Song of the Young Communist Subbotnik*.*

We, Young Communists, are out for a subbotnik,
The farms of the Red Army men to help cultivate.
In severe fighting in the revolutionary war,
We give of our best at the front and in the rear,
Felling our enemies with bullets well-aimed.
That our fighters be not troubled at the thought of native heath,
Plow ye, and hoe—in the service of the Soviets!
Alive, then, to work, let no one lag behind!

In the fields, the men work with the same energy with which they hurl themselves into an attack on the enemy on the firing line. While the men work spiritedly to the strains of their songs, the women from the families of the Red Army men bring tea and nuts. Here is one of the popular songs of the women:

Listen here, brother Red Army man,
Come to the river bank and talk.
Let us drink tea and eat our nuts,
Your wearied muscles will gain new strength.
'Tis true, you fight the enemy fearlessly,
Brother Red Army man!
Victory to the Revolution, speed on!

When their work is finished, the Red Army men have to report to their political leaders about the work they have done (frequently, political workers, including even divisional commissars, themselves take part in the work). The names of the men who show the best results are placed on the Red board of honor, and this stimulates activity among the men as regards helping the families of Red Army men.

On Sundays some of the old fighters help the Young Guards' detachments by engaging in field operations with them, teaching them to shoot, to undertake patrol duty and scouting, and show them how to build anti-gas shelters or to undertake sanitary and hygienic measures (cleaning the streets, etc.).

* * *

The political and cultural work in the Red Army is conducted exclusively under the leadership of the political departments.

There is a Lenin corner in each of the primary units (company, detachment, staff), where the most varied circles are organized.

* Subbotnik—a day of voluntary labor—Ed.

According to the rules, the weight of the equipment of the Lenin corner for each company must not exceed twenty-five kilograms. After prolonged marches or battles, frequently only half of the property of the Red corner is left, and sometimes it all has had to be left behind, since everything has to be carried on the backs of the men. Usually the following books are to be found in the Red corner: *The Communist Manifesto*, Lenin's "*Left-Wing*" *Communism; an Infantile Disorder; State and Revolution; Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*; Stalin: *On the Opposition, and Problems of Leninism*; the most important decisions of the Communist Party of China; the *Fundamental Laws and Decisions of the Soviets*, the *Five-Year Plan of Socialist Construction in the U.S.S.R.*; the most important reports and resolutions of the C.P.S.U.; the infantry rules of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of the U.S.S.R., and a number of other books and newspapers as well as portraits of Lenin, Stalin, Voroshilov, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh. Various musical instruments, etc., are also to be found there.

Every Red Army man is required to take part in at least one circle. The majority of the Lenin corners have achieved this. Choir circles are particularly popular in the Red Army. Even when in action, songs are sung, provided they are not detrimental to the needs of camouflage. These songs make a great impression upon the soldiers of the White army. Here are two songs of this kind.

RED ARMY SONG:

Comrades, hasten to battle! Worker and Peasant fighters
are we!

Boldly, to the storm, the Kuomintang to overthrow,
Away too with the yoke of the foul imperialists,
So we a union of Soviet lands may build.
Death holds no terrors for Red fighters, all one are we.
Victory awaits us.
Victory shall be ours,
In the final battle of the world revolution!

SONG OF THOSE OFF TO THE FRONT

Rumble of cannon, the watchword of struggle. . . . In the morn-
ing, decisive battle.

Armed for the battle, the young guard is off to the front
In the self-sacrificing struggle we will lay down our heads,
and shed warm blood!

Every illiterate man has first of all to learn three hieroglyphics:
"Ta-chun-feng" (to the attack!).

The Red Army men inscribe, or paste up this battle-cry everywhere,
even when they are on the march or in trenches.

It is characteristic that among the young men who came into the
army for the first time in January, 1934, and who joined with the next
detachments of recruits, each of them knew an average of twenty
hieroglyphics. A month later they all knew over fifty.

Sometimes there are not enough brushes, paper or China ink. But
each man then takes a stick and writes the hieroglyphics on the ground.

Every literate Red Army man must write three posters or slogans daily. Chalk or charcoal is used for this. The posters are drawn on the walls or on boards or bamboo tablets. While on the march, bamboo boards, bearing posters and slogans are fixed on both sides of the road, at a distance of not more than 100 meters apart; slogans are also written on trees, or laid out with small stones. If the units of the Red Army are situated on the banks of a river, and the units of the White army are situated lower down, the slogans are written in large numbers on wooden boards and sent floating downstream. The enemy soldiers draw in the wood for fuel, and so read these slogans, despite the fact that their officers prohibit and punish anyone caught reading these slogans. This is one of the most widespread forms of agitation.

The Red Army teaches its men to read and write, steels them in the struggle against the White armies, educates the Red Army men in the spirit of loyalty to the Soviet government and the Communist Party. Dozens of important army commanders and political workers grew up and have received their training in the ranks of the Red Army. For example, Comrade Hsueh Hua-chow, Chief-of-Staff of the Seventh Red Army Corps, was a pioneer when he joined the Red Army and knew very few hieroglyphics. During his eight years in the Red Army Comrade Hsueh Hua-chow advanced from assistant squad commander to squadron commander, then to the position of company commander, battalion, regimental and divisional commander, and is now chief-of-staff of the army corps. He has displayed a great deal of courage, wisdom and energy in battle, acquired a wealth of fighting experience, and grew up and became strong politically. The Central Revolutionary Military Council entrusted him with the leadership of the valiant fighters of the Seventh Red Army Corps in the northward march for purposes of defense against the Japanese. In August, 1934, he surrounded the provincial town of Fukien and then marched into the heart of the country, to the regions of Szechwan and Anhwei, where he perished heroically in battle against troops of Chiang Kai-shek. Then there is Comrade Shao Hua, who is a divisional commander. He also came to the Red Army from a pioneer detachment, and hardly knew any hieroglyphics. Now he is a leading Red Army worker.

A number of newspapers are published by the Red Army, including *Red China*, *The Red Star*, *The Young Truth*, *Struggle* and *The Soviet Worker*. There are, in addition, corps newspapers and divisional bulletins. The newspapers are read in circles arranged in the units. Almost all the Red Army men who have been in the Red Army for three months or more, can read the newspapers independently. There is one newspaper correspondent to every company, who sends items concerning the life of the company when in action, its work among the local population, etc., to the corps newspaper or the *Red Star*.

There is a pretty wide network of dramatic circles and physical culture circles in the Army. Special training in climbing mountains, throwing hand-grenades, crossing a log bridge, jumping barriers, ditches, etc., is of great practical importance.

Hand grenades are thrown at a distance of up to forty meters, and by some men even up to fifty meters. Red Army units were successful

in one part of Juchen is surrounding over eight hundred men from Hu Fan-chang's regiment. The enemy had taken its position in a temple with very thick walls, and defended it stubbornly. The battle lasted thirty-six hours (one day and two nights). Finally, Van, one of the squad commanders, was selected to stand at the edge of the moat and throw three hand grenades at the windows of the temple. Several dozen of the enemy troops were wounded, and the remainder threw down their arms. Another example was during the siege of the town of Lean by the Third Red Army Corps when Comrade Huang Hung-feng from company No. 1 took eight hand grenades with him, ran up to the wall of the enemy fortifications, tied the hand-grenades into a bundle and threw them into the embrasure. The enemy suffered many losses in killed and wounded, and Huang Hung-feng, using an automatic rifle, seized the fortifications with the help of a few other Red Army men.

* * *

It is truly impossible to describe the love which the toiling masses feel for the Red Army. When the Red Army marches across Soviet territory in the hot weather, men and women, old and young, line the roads and warmly greet the men, singing songs, dancing, and bringing them tea, warm food and fruit.

Groups of women, young and old, patch the clothes of the Red Army men, wash their linen, and prepare their food. When in action the local toiling population do much of the scouting for the Red Army, provide it with guides and bearers, help to discover the leaders of local counter-revolutionary groups, confiscate their property, etc. For example, immediately upon the arrival of the Red Army units in Juchen, South Honan, the local population set about capturing counter-revolutionary leaders whom they brought to the Red Army unit, at the same time confiscating their property and distributing it among themselves.

The local population take care of the sick men left behind by the Red Army units until they have completely recovered, or carry them on stretchers in the train of their units. In the Hupeh-Honan-Kiangsi region, and in many other parts, the local people themselves eat millet and put aside the white rice for the Red Army. When the Red Army units arrive, they bring the rice to the men.

* * *

How does the Red Army of China treat its prisoners?

All prisoners, rank and file and officers, are disarmed and their documents confiscated, and are marched away under convoy of armed Red Army men. The soldiers and junior officers are allowed to live freely within definite boundaries. The Red Army men conduct political work among the prisoners. In April, 1933, the 2nd, 54th and 59th divisions of the enemy's troops were routed, and over 20,000 men were taken prisoners. It was essential at the same time to prepare a blow against another group of enemy troops. We therefore selected one man to manage supplies and another to be responsible for the military and

political leadership of each 200 prisoners, and despatched them to the Soviet regions to study in the recruits' division. Every prisoner taken with a rifle was at the same time given five dollars, and every wounded prisoner eight dollars. Every prisoner was given the choice of joining the Red Army or returning home, money being set aside for the journey. The commander of the 59th enemy division, Chen Shih-Yi and the Brigade Commander Chow Shih-ta, Peng Pen-jen and Kuo Yang-tsun, who had been taken prisoner, remained in the Red Army as teachers. Many White army soldiers did not want to return home and asked to be left in the Red Army. In spite of all the systematic demagoguery carried on by the militarists, who call the Red Army men bandits and spread foul calumnies about how the Red Army men cut out the hearts of every White army soldier who hands over his weapons, these soldiers are becoming more and more convinced by actual experience that the Red Army is their real liberator.

* * *

Leagues for the struggle against imperialism and in defense of the Soviet Union exist in the Red Army units, all the men being members of this League.

Every member of the League must fulfil certain duties; he must carry on propaganda among the masses, and extend the organization of the League; help the masses living in non-Soviet regions, organize anti-Japanese committees and anti-Japanese volunteer detachments, collect money to help those who take part in anti-imperialist strikes. The members of the League pay a monthly subscription into the fund for anti-imperialist work. The task of the League is to muster all armed forces and fight against Japanese imperialism in order to win territorial integrity for China and freedom and independence for the Chinese people.

Under the strong leadership of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese Red Army has become a great and invincible force which enjoys the sympathy and support of the whole of the Chinese people—and has at its disposal courageous, fearless fighters who will fulfil the task which the Party has entrusted to them.

The Anti-Imperialist United Front in Manchuria

THE OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

By YAN SUN

FOR a period of four years of occupation, the masses of the Chinese people who inhabit Manchuria have been subjected to unheard-of colonial oppression. The Chinese people are waging a just national defensive struggle. The Japanese invaders stigmatize the struggle of the Chinese for their national independence as a *hunkuz* movement, and under this pretext cruelly suppress the defensive struggle of the masses. The Japanese robbers use tanks and heavy guns against the partisan detachments and the peaceful population, and bombard towns and villages from the air. The system of collective responsibility is practiced on all sides, and peaceful citizens are deprived of the right to move freely from place to place.

The working class is subjected to two-fold oppression, exploitation at the hands of the capitalists and national-colonial oppression at the hands of the invaders.

The Chinese soldiers in the Manchukuo army are in constant terror of being executed.

Not infrequently the Japanese invaders rape Chinese girls and women, and the victims of such barbarian violence are compelled in most cases to remain silent for fear that their relatives would be cruelly punished.

Children are buried alive before the eyes of their parents for being connected with the *hunkuz*. At crossroads and on fences hang the heads of the best fighters for the cause of national liberation—victims of the Japanese occupation.

The ferocious acts of Japanese imperialism in Manchuria have called forth tremendous indignation and resistance among the Chinese masses. Very wide masses are directly and indirectly brought into the anti-Japanese struggle. In spite of the fact that the Japanese imperialists maintain an army of occupation in Manchuria of over 100,000 men, armed according to the last word of modern military technique (aviation, tanks and armored cars) and possessing modern means of transport, they have not only not succeeded in wiping out the anti-Japanese partisan movement, but they are not even able to check the growth of the movement.

New anti-Japanese partisan detachments are constantly being formed, relations between the partisans and the population are improving, and the military and political leadership of the partisans is becoming stronger. There are over 100,000 men today in the different anti-Japanese

partisan detachments. The social composition and organizational forms adopted by these partisan detachments are very varied. Anti-Japanese societies and political departments have already been organized in some detachments. Many thousands of partisans are now under the influence of the Communist Party of China.

The chief weakness of the anti-Japanese national-liberation movement is that no wide anti-Japanese united people's front has yet been organized. The detachments are extremely scattered, there is no united military-political leadership, the discontent of the masses has not yet developed into anti-Japanese action on a wide scale, and the existing anti-Japanese forces are still not in a position to drive the imperialists out of Manchuria.

Under these circumstances, therefore, the tactics of the Communist Party of China in Manchuria are to *set up a broad anti-Japanese united people's front to give better training to the masses, to accumulate forces, to maintain and extend the anti-Japanese detachments, and to train military-political cadres for the coming struggle.*

THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT IN MANCHURIA

The anti-Japanese united front comprises not only the working class, the peasantry and the urban petty-bourgeoisie, but includes also a considerable section of the national bourgeoisie and part of the landlords.

How are we to explain the fact that a considerable section of the national bourgeoisie and part of the landlords are today participating in the anti-Japanese liberation movement? By the fact that Chinese trade and industry in Manchuria are being squeezed out on all sides by Japanese finance capital, and that Chinese national capital is threatened with being completely seized by Japanese imperialism. A section of the landlords are expressing the discontent they feel towards the Japanese invaders because the latter deprive them of the deeds to their land, which they transfer to Japanese military settlers, and because they force the landlords to surrender their weapons. For example, the Japanese invaders have deprived the landlords and peasants of their land deeds in seven counties in the Northeast province of Kirin and in the counties close to Harbin. Before the Manchurian events, 1 *san** of land cost \$150 to \$200, and today the Japanese invaders are forcing its sale at \$28 per *san*, and fallow lands, suitable for sowing, at \$3 a *san*. This rapacious policy is causing tremendous discontent both among the peasants and the landlords. This, in particular, explains the armed anti-Japanese uprising which broken out in the spring of 1934, under the leadership of Shih Wen-tung in the Yinan, Poli, and other counties.

At present the Chinese bourgeoisie and landlords do not want to become the colonial slaves of Japan, and are striving to win back all that they have lost as a result of the Japanese occupation of Chinese territory. And so, in spite of the fact that they are untrustworthy and always wavering allies—for the Chinese national bourgeoisie and the landlords** will of course try to restore their positions and obtain the

* 1 *san* = 1.5 acres.

** The Chinese compradore bourgeoisie and part of the landowners, estate officials and militarists are even now on the side of the Japanese invaders, since their interests coincide.

monopoly to exploit the masses of workers and peasants as soon as the army of occupation has been driven out of Manchuria—the Communists are prepared at the present time to conclude an agreement with them for joint resistance to the Japanese invaders.

A spontaneous anti-Japanese national movement has been developing for several years in Manchuria. As far back as the time of the armed defense of Shanghai, in the spring of 1932, an anti-Japanese national-liberation movement broke out in Manchuria. Even then General Ma Chan-san had raised the banner of struggle against Japan in the province of Heilungchiang and his call to arms against Japan mustered tens of thousands of students and workers, peasants and petty-bourgeoisaders, who joined the volunteer anti-Japanese detachments. In December, 1932, Wang Te-ling raised the banner of the struggle against Japan and organized an "army to save the fatherland" in Eastern Manchuria. At that time he had only one battalion at his disposal, but six months later his army numbered over 80,000 men and occupied over thirteen counties in the Eastern part of Kirin province. General Teng Chi-wu raised the banner of the struggle against Japan in South Manchuria; six months later he already had an army of several thousand men, and his detachments were in occupation of over twenty counties in the Eastern part of Mukden province. At the same time the peasants, workers, traders, sons of landlords and even peasant women and children joined the anti-Japanese detachments en masse. This was indeed an anti-Japanese national-liberation movement on a truly national scale, and was a spontaneous character. Despite the fact that in the beginning of the Manchurian events, the Central Committee pointed to the necessity of launching a national-revolutionary war to drive out the Japanese imperialists, the leading organs of the Communist Party in Manchuria prematurely issued the slogan of the establishment of Soviets and the organization of a Red Army, denied the need for establishing a common anti-Japanese united front, and did not fight to convert the spontaneous movement of the masses into a conscious anti-Japanese national movement having its own clear political program. As a result, a section of Party organizations became circumscribed propagandist groups, isolated from the masses. The partisan detachment (numbering over a thousand men) in the county of Bayan, Heilungchiang province, under the leadership of the "Left" sectarians, suffered defeat.

It was only after the receipt of the letter dated January 26, 1933, containing instructions from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, that the Party organizations began to correct their "Left" sectarian mistakes and to build up a broad anti-Japanese united front.

THE PARTISAN DETACHMENTS IN SOUTH MANCHURIA

In the county of Panshin, South Manchuria, before the receipt of the letter from the Central Committee, partisan detachments were in existence which called themselves "the Red Partisan Detachments of the 2nd Corps of the Chinese Red Army". But these detachments did not set up a united anti-Japanese front with other anti-Japanese volunteer detachments which were led by the Kuomintang, or with the anti-Jap-

anese *hunnuz*. In fact the relations existing between these detachments and ours were very strained: they even went as far as armed conflicts and a number of detachments were wiped out. When the Japanese army and the Manchukuo troops attacked our detachments, the anti-Japanese volunteer detachments and the *hunnuz* gave us no support. Consequently our detachments were isolated and the operations they undertook were extremely difficult.

However, from the moment that the letter was received from the Central Committee, and Peiyang and Yang Tsin-yuei arrived from Inner China in the summer of 1933, and explained the Party's new line of tactics, the partisan detachments began to build up a common front with the volunteer detachments and the *hunnuz*, and also to undertake the formation of a general staff of the anti-Japanese united army. Thanks to the partial realization of the united front, our detachments not only repulsed the punitive expedition sent against them in the winter of 1933 and 1934, but also increased in numerical strength. New partisan detachments grew up, and our detachments became the First Corps of the People's Revolutionary Army of Manchuria. Today this army has two divisions, and carries on partisan operations in over twenty counties in the Eastern part of the Mukden province. The Commander of the First Corps is our beloved comrade and national hero, Yang Tsin-yuei.

THE PARTISAN DETACHMENTS TO THE EAST OF HARBIN

Because of the sectarian mistakes committed by Comrade Chang Shan-shi and other leaders, the partisan detachments in the county of Payan suffered defeat in 1932. After this Comrade Chang Shan-shi joined the anti-Japanese detachment of Sun Chao-yang in the county of Juhe. First he was a rank-and-file partisan, but after the death of Sun' Chao-yang, Comrade Chang Shan-shi took over the leadership of the detachment. At first there were only eleven men in the detachment, but as a result of the fact that Chang Shan-shi made contacts with the local Party organization and pursued the line of the Central Committee, his detachment grew to 6,000 in the course of a year, and in the summer of 1934 it captured the county town of Pinsan, the town of Fanchi and other towns in the Kirin province.

How are we to explain the defeat of Chang Shan-shi in Payan and his victory in Juhe? The only explanation is that in Payan he did not fight to set up a united anti-Japanese front, while in Juhe he succeeded in forming a united anti-Japanese front, fought together with the masses, took over the leadership of the masses, and in the course of the struggle against the Japanese showed himself to be a real national hero; this is the explanation of his victory in Juhe. All the anti-Japanese partisan detachments in the regions to the east of Harbin have now been formed into the Third Corps of the People's Revolutionary Army, the Commander of which is Comrade Chang Shan-shi, who enjoys great popularity.

THE PARTISAN DISTRICTS IN THE EASTERN PARTS OF THE KIRIN PROVINCE

Ever since the Manchurian events in January, 1933, the eastern

part of Kirin province has been the base of the self-defense army under General Li Tu, and of Wang Te-lin's "Army for the Salvation of the Fatherland". In this region favorable conditions had been created for extending the anti-Japanese partisan movement. But actually it had not been possible to set up the anti-Japanese united front there, and a number of local Party organizations and individual leading comrades even hindered the united front. Our comrade, Commander Chang Pao-chun, joined the "Army for the Salvation of the Fatherland" and very rapidly won great prestige for himself. There was not a single soldier in this army who did not know him personally. Comrade Chang Pao-chun led more than 5,000 men. Was it right for him to join the "Army for the Salvation of the Fatherland"? There can be no doubt that it was right. It was the line of the Central Committee of our Party. We must form the united front with the troops of Wang Te-lin, from the top and from below. However, "wiseacres" were to be found in the ranks of our Party who accused Chang Pao-chun of Right opportunism and bureaucratism. Chang Pao-chun left the "Army for the Salvation of the Fatherland" and as a result a split occurred between our detachments and those under the command of Wu Ni-chen and Kung Pao-chun. The "Left" sectarians considered the existence of a general staff of the united anti-Japanese army as superfluous, regarding it as a "combination from above". The united anti-Japanese front which had already been established was broken down. It was only in the summer of 1934 that the leading Party bodies corrected these Leftist mistakes and once more restored the anti-Japanese united front, and a few months later our anti-Japanese partisan detachments increased tenfold and more. The struggle against the Japanese punitive expedition in the winter of 1934 and the spring of 1935 has shown that the anti-Japanese volunteer detachments and the anti-Japanese *hunkuz* as reorganized by us act in a united anti-Japanese front, not in mere words, but on the field of battle, that they fight shoulder to shoulder with us against the Japanese invaders. The hostility and misunderstanding which previously existed between our detachments and other anti-Japanese detachments are completely eliminated today. All the anti-Japanese partisan detachments (the volunteer army, the "Army for the Salvation of the Fatherland", the anti-Japanese *hunkuz* and our own detachments) have all united on the common basis of the anti-Japanese united front, and have thus formed the Fifth Corps of the anti-Japanese army, the commander of which is Comrade Chang Pao-chun.

It was in approximately the same way that the Fourth Corps of the anti-Japanese united army was formed in East Kirin, but here also serious sectarian mistakes were made.

Regulations governing admission to the army were too strict: All persons who were not workers or peasants were excluded from the army. Instead of using methods of persuasion and education, administrative measures alone were adopted towards partisan opium-smokers. Instead of taking steps to solve the most difficult, most complicated tasks of the present stage of the anti-Japanese national movement, attempts were made to jump over the present stage of the development of the revolutionary movement. Instead of building up an anti-Japanese people's revo-

lutionary army, an attempt was made to form the army on the same principle as the Red Army.

It was only after the "Left" sectarian mistakes had been corrected in December 1934, that the anti-Japanese united front began to be restored here. In the winter of 1934 and spring of 1935 all the anti-Japanese partisan detachments were reorganized into the Fourth Corps of the anti-Japanese united army, a general staff for the Fourth corps was set up, and Comrade Li Yang-lau appointed to the post of commander of the corps. In September 1935, units of the Fourth Corps together with units of the Fifth Corps of the anti-Japanese army by their joint efforts captured Linkow—one of the military bases of the Japanese army in East Kirin. This fact shows that in less than one year that it existed, the Fourth Corps not only grew numerically (six to seven times) but also raised its fighting efficiency.

Besides the Fourth and Fifth Corps, the newly formed Sixth Corps of the anti-Japanese army operates in the Eastern part of the Kirin province, led by Commander Shih Wen-tung, leader of the peasant uprising in the region of the lower waters of the river Sungari.

THE PARTISAN DETACHMENTS IN EASTERN MANCHURIA, TSANDAO

The Party organizations in Eastern Manchuria pursued a "Left" sectarian line, mechanically applying the experiences of work in the Soviet regions of China to Eastern Manchuria, and formed soviets and Red partisan detachments, and even organized "collective farms" on the principle of "joint labor and equal distribution". This Leftist line put a check upon the development of the partisan movement in 1932 and in the spring of 1933. However, after the receipt of the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China dated January 26, 1933, the Red partisan detachments began to be reorganized into a people's revolutionary army, and the anti-Japanese united front was partially established. As a result, the anti-Japanese partisan detachments increased in numbers, their fighting power increased, and the region over which they carried on their operations increased. However, in the autumn of 1934, the anti-Japanese detachments in Eastern Manchuria split once more into two camps: one camp was the people's revolutionary army (consisting chiefly of Koreans), the units of the anti-Japanese volunteer army and the anti-Japanese *hunkuz* who were under the influence of the Communist Party; the other camp consisted of volunteer detachments and the anti-Japanese *hunkuz* (the detachments of Wu Ni-chen, Kung San-yun, Pin Er-Chuen, Chung Ho, Lao Tsin-chang, and others), who were under the influence of the Kuomintang. Hostility existed between these two camps, which even went as far as armed clashes. This objectively helped Japanese imperialism and isolated our detachments.

In the spring of 1935 the Party organizations in Eastern Manchuria began to correct their Leftist mistakes and to restore the anti-Japanese united front. As a result, the Japanese punitive expedition in the spring and summer of 1935 was repulsed, and the region over which partisans carried on their operations was extended. The Second Corps

of the People's Revolutionary Army under the command of Comrade Wang Te-tai is operating in this region.

FOR THE CONSOLIDATION AND EXTENSION OF THE PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT

The new line of tactics indicated in the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is being resisted by the "Left" sectarians. They reject the united front from above, they object to the formation of a united general staff with other anti-Japanese detachments, on the ground that only after the united front has been formed from below can the united front from above be created. They set the united front from above against the united front from below, failing to understand that there must be a combination of the united front both from below and from above.

Instead of bringing to the forefront slogans directed against Japanese imperialism, the "Left" sectarians advance before the time is ripe or the slogan of "confiscation of the lands of the landlords", and in the partisan regions of the Chuchow county the slogan of "equal distribution of the land". The relations existing between our People's Revolutionary Army and a section of the volunteer detachments and the anti-Japanese *hunkuz* (the detachments under Wang Fen-kuo, Lao Chan-kuen, which are under the influence of the Kuomintang) have not been regulated in the partisan regions of South Manchuria, and an armed conflict is even possible between them.

Our Party must exert itself to the utmost at once to consolidate and extend the anti-Japanese united front which has already partially been set up, and to overcome the resistance of the "Left" sectarians, and at the same time to forestall the danger of Right opportunism.

The already existing First, Second, and Third Corps of the People's Revolutionary Army must, on the basis of the new line of tactics of the Central Committee of our Party, unite all anti-Japanese partisan detachments (such as, for instance, the volunteer detachments, the "Army for the Salvation of the Fatherland", the self-defense army, the detachments of the anti-Japanese *hunkuz*, and others), irrespective of what parties the members of these detachments belong to, or their convictions, place of birth, nationalities, etc.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT IN THE CITIES

During the four years of the occupation by the Japanese we have acquired greater experience in the establishment of the armed anti-Japanese united front among the partisan detachments than in the establishment of the united front in the industrial centers. The work of our Party in the cities is our weak spot.

We must carry on work in all the legal and semi-legal organizations, and use these organizations to defend the economic and political interests of the masses and as a covering for our illegal anti-Japanese work.

In the industrial centers, the Party must, on the one hand, muster

its forces to establish the united front of the working class and trade union unity, and, on the other hand, must carry on work among the urban petty-bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and the national bourgeoisie, striving to bring them into the united anti-Japanese front. With this end in view, the Party must put forward demands which correspond to the interests of these sections of the population (the struggle against the compulsory study of the Japanese language, against the prohibition of the teaching of the history and geography of China, against the restrictions put upon Chinese trade and industry and in defense of the right to trade for Chinese merchants).

What characterizes the sentiments of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and the merchants is that, on the one hand, these people hate Japanese domination, and on the other hand, they are very much afraid of the *hunkuz*, and tremble for the safety of their lives and property. We must show these sections of the population that it is the Japanese invaders who are a menace to their lives and property, while the anti-Japanese armies are defending them and guarantee immunity to their property and their lives. If the anti-Japanese partisans behave in precisely this way when they capture towns, it will help us to build up the anti-Japanese front in the urban centers.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT IN THE VILLAGES, AND OUR TACTICS AS REGARDS THE SYSTEM OF ALL-ROUND RESPONSIBILITY

The Japanese invaders, as is known, resort to the system of all-round responsibility (*bactsia*)* in the village of Manchuria. Why is this done? First, in order to create local armed detachments in every *tsia* and every region, which on the pretext of combating the *hunkuz* kill their own compatriots; second, to deprive the village population of freedom of movement and of choice of dwelling place, thus establishing an exact record of the population, rendering it difficult for the local inhabitants to make contacts with the anti-Japanese partisans and to join the partisan detachments, and help to isolate the anti-Japanese partisans from the population; third, to concentrate the population of mountainous and forest regions in big villages, and thus try to make it difficult for the partisans to obtain food supplies.

What tactics do the Communists advance to counter these tactics of the Japanese robbers? Our tactics are to establish the anti-Japanese united front and *isolate* the Japanese invaders in the rural regions. With this end in view, we must adhere to the tactics of neutrality or alliance with the local armed detachments, and on no account regard them as our enemies as we do the Japanese army. It must not be forgotten that the local armed detachments were set up by force by the Japanese invaders after the Manchurian events. The soldiers in these detachments and even some of the commanders are not people who are loyal to the Japanese. They are loyal peasants and sons of kulaks who have no desire at all to

* This system divides the population of the villages into groups headed by chiefs, appointed by the police. The *tsia* is the most elementary group, composed of ten families headed by a *Tsiachau* who is appointed by the district or county police office. A *hao* is composed of ten *tsias* headed by a similarly appointed *boachen*.

come the colonial slaves of Japan, and consequently display extremely active activity in the struggle against the anti-Japanese partisans. The slogan we offer to them should be: "Chinese must not kill Chinese but should get together to resist the Japanese invaders", or "The anti-Japanese army fights only the Japanese invaders, it does not fight the local armed detachments". If some local armed detachment refuses to enter into an alliance with us or even to observe neutrality but, on the contrary, fights against us or fights side by side with the Japanese troops against us, we must enter into an alliance or maintain neutrality towards the other part of the local armed detachments, in order to concentrate our forces and destroy this reactionary detachment. Tactics of this kind will undoubtedly meet with sympathy and support among the broad masses.

THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED PEOPLE'S FRONT AND THE MANCHUKUO ARMY

Can we regard the Manchukuo army as our mortal enemy as we regard the Japanese army? No, certainly not.

First, the Chinese soldiers in the Manchukuo army are subjected to two-fold oppression: on the one hand, the oppression of the Chinese officers, on the other, the oppression of the Japanese officers and military advisers. Moreover, in existing circumstances, the Japanese advisers often restrict the rights of the Chinese officers, and keep a check on all their actions. In consequence of this, not only the Chinese soldiers, but even some of the Chinese officers, develop a feeling of hatred for the Japanese invaders.

Second, a large part of the army of Manchukuo is composed of the former armies of Chang Hsue-liang and even of the former anti-Japanese self-defense armies, the "Army for the Salvation of the Fatherland", anti-Japanese detachments, *hunkuz*, etc.

Third, the development of the anti-Japanese national-liberation movement is evoking the sympathy and support of the Chinese soldiers and some of the officers in the Manchukuo army.

Hence our general tactics towards the Manchukuo army is as far as possible to draw the Chinese soldiers and some of the officers into the anti-Japanese united people's front. In this connection, the Communists put forward the following slogans for the Manchukuo army: "The anti-Japanese army is not composed of *hunkuz*, but represents a real army fighting against Japanese imperialism for the salvation of the Fatherland", "Chinese must not kill Chinese", "the anti-Japanese army is only fighting against the Japanese invaders, and is not fighting against Chinese soldiers".

THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED PEOPLE'S FRONT AND THE CHINESE YOUTH

The attitude of the Japanese invaders in Manchuria is one of special hatred towards the Chinese youth. The essence of their policy towards the Chinese youth in Manchuria amounts to the following. On the one hand, they mercilessly annihilate and kill the anti-Japanese national revolutionary youth; on the other, they do their utmost to try to split and demoralize the Chinese youth, in order to smash the anti-Japanese united

front of the youth. Thus, for example, the Japanese are forming "The Manchukuo Youth Alliance", a "Manchukuo Boy Scout" organization. They spread the fascist racial theory, the "pan-Asia" theory, etc. Besides this, they organize opium dens and brothels and do their utmost to try to draw the Chinese youth away from the struggle and to demoralize them.

During the four years of the occupation by the Japanese, the Chinese Young Communist League has taken an active part in the anti-Japanese national movement. Volunteer detachments of the Chinese youth have been formed in the partisan regions of South and East Manchuria, in Chuhow. The youth detachments, side by side with the adult partisans, have taken part in the battles against the Japanese invaders, have fought for national independence and the unification of the Chinese people. However, despite certain individual successes in Manchuria, it has not yet been possible *to form an anti-Japanese united front of the youth*. The Y.C.L. organizations, except in a number of partisan regions, represent narrow sectarian Communist groups which are still divorced from the masses. The Y.C.L. is an exact replica of the Party in its methods of work and in its structure.

The Chinese Young Communist League in Manchuria must be radically reconstructed on the basis of the new line of tactics of the Party and the decisions of the Sixth Congress of the Young Communist International.

The Y.C.L. must cease to be a narrow Communist group divorced from the masses, it must become an anti-Japanese, national-revolutionary non-Party mass organization of the youth. In other words, broad sections of the young workers and peasants, and also of the petty-bourgeois patriotic elements and all the anti-Japanese elements, must be drawn into the League.

A new program is already being drawn up on the basis of this new line, and the Manchurian Young Communists have already begun to form a broad anti-Japanese united front with all anti-Japanese youth organizations.

THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED PEOPLE'S FRONT AND THE CHINESE WOMEN

The Chinese women in Manchuria are subjected to two-fold oppression, namely, semi-feudal oppression and the national-colonial oppression by Japan. The Japanese invaders force the Chinese student girls in Harbin to arrange "liaisons" with the Japanese army, in spite of the protests of the girls themselves and of their parents. The women in this province are frequently violated by the Japanese troops. Moreover, the Chinese woman in Manchuria still suffers from the old marriage system, the system of purchase and sale of women into marriage.

Four years of experience of the struggle against the Japanese occupation has shown that the women have played, and still play, a great part in the anti-Japanese national-liberation movement. We must use all our efforts to bring the women into the anti-Japanese united people's front by fighting against the insults and violation practised by

Japanese invaders and the Manchukuo troops (the army of pacification), and on behalf of respect of human rights for Chinese women.

THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED PEOPLE'S FRONT AND THE NATIONAL MINORITIES IN MANCHURIA

The essence of the Japanese policy towards the national minorities (Koreans, Manchurians, Mongolians) is to break down the united anti-Japanese front between the Chinese people and the national minorities, to deprive the Chinese people and the national minorities of mutual support in their common struggle against Japanese imperialism. The Japanese invaders incite the national minorities to fight against the Chinese people.

In Tsintao, the Japanese invaders cynically declare that they are the defenders of the Koreans in Manchuria, that the aim which the Japanese army pursues in occupying Manchuria is to free the Koreans from the yoke of the Chinese militarist, Chang Hsueh-liang, and they put forward the slogan of "creating a Korean national autonomous region in Tsintao".

What should our Party's policy be in relation to the national minorities in Manchuria?

Two and a half years ago, the slogan was put forward in the letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, of "the formation of a united front of the oppressed Chinese, Korean, Manchurian and Mongolian nationalities in Manchuria, for joint resistance to the common enemy—Japanese imperialism". The correctness of this policy has been fully justified in practice. However, we cannot now limit ourselves to this slogan alone; today our policy must be more concrete.

Our Party organizations in Manchuria must work for the formation of a Korean national autonomous region in Handow. *But by what means will the domination of the Japanese invaders be overthrown in Manchuria and Tsintao?* Only by the formation of the united anti-Japanese front of the Korean and Chinese peoples. And so the Communists put forward the following slogan: "Unity between the Chinese and Korean peoples to overthrow the domination of the Japanese invaders in Manchukuo, and to establish a Korean national autonomous region in Tsintao."

Of course, we cannot limit ourselves to this general political slogan alone. On the basis of effecting a united front between the Chinese and Korean peoples, the Communist organizations are adopting a number of measures to reorganize the existing Second Corps of the People's Revolutionary Army and other anti-Japanese partisan detachments into a Chinese-Korean anti-Japanese united army the aim of which is to fight for the independence of Korea.

Besides the consolidation and broadening of the existing organizations of the Communist Party of China, the present situation in Handow demands the creation of a Korean anti-Japanese national-revolutionary party, and the drawing of still more revolutionary Korean and Chinese workers and peasants into the Party. The most important task facing the new party is to fight against Japanese imperialism *on behalf of the*

national independence of Korea. The initiators of this party can and must be Communists. This party will be a *party of the Korean anti-Japanese united front in Handow.* Its ranks must be open to all Koreans who do not want to be the colonial slaves of Japan and who want to fight for their own national independence.

Other national minorities (Mongolians, Manchurians, Moham-medans) must also be drawn into the anti-Japanese united front. In working among the masses of the national minorities, their national peculiarities, customs, language, etc., must particularly be taken into account. Experiences of work during the last four years have shown us that they also have no desire to be the colonial slaves of Japan, and that they are beginning to take part in the movement against Japanese imperialism and to save their fatherland.

THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT GOVERNMENT IN MANCHURIA

In a number of partisan regions today (South Manchuria, East Manchuria, the regions to the East of Harbin and the Eastern part of Kirin) the anti-Japanese societies or peasant committees have in fact become the local bodies of the anti-Japanese power and represent the embryo of the anti-Japanese government, fighting to save the fatherland.

But are there any opportunities or prospects of setting up a government of the anti-Japanese united front? Yes, there are. Such a government will not yet be the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants in the form of Soviets, but will be an anti-Japanese people's revolutionary government. The fundamental task of this government is to organize and guide the anti-Japanese national-revolutionary war of the Chinese people to drive the Japanese imperialists out of the country, to unite the four Northeastern provinces with China, and to fight for the national independence and unification of China. Not only the Communists, but other anti-Japanese political organizations and representatives of the army as well, can and must take part in the establishment of this government. This government is inseparable from the movement for the anti-Japanese united front, it arises out of this movement and constitutes its highest form.

This year our Party has already put forward a program for this government. In accordance with the actual state of affairs, new points can be included in this program, as, for instance, the fight against restrictions on Chinese trade and industry imposed by the Japanese, for the right to trade of Chinese merchants, for the participation by the Manchurian anti-Japanese government in the all-China united government of national defense and subordination to its leadership.

* * *

During the four years of the occupation, the Party organizations of the Communist Party of China in Manchuria have grown numerically and gathered strength ideologically and politically. However, we should not let things rest at that. Inside the Party we must *first of all over-*

me the "Left" sectarianism, which is hindering the establishment of the anti-Japanese united front, as well as mistakes of a Right opportunist character.

The Communist Party of China is not only the vanguard of the working class, it is also the leader of the Chinese people.

The Party organizations in Manchuria are an organic part of the Communist Party of the whole of China, and the national-revolutionary movement in Manchuria is part of the Chinese revolution. The anti-Japanese national-revolutionary movement in Manchuria is growing, it will flow into the revolutionary movement of the whole of China and will overthrow the domination of Japanese imperialism and its agents in China.

Imperialist Contradictions in the Far East

By WANG TEH

JAPANESE aggression against China has been developing incessantly and unhindered for over four years. It could not fail to lead to a colossal sharpening of the contradictions between Japan and its imperialist rivals.

In spite of this fact, the Japanese offensive in China, as we know, has not encountered any open and effective resistance from the other imperialist powers. During its *first* stages, the offensive called forth noisy verbal protests on the part of the United States, while England gave Japan a free hand and limited itself to playing upon the American-Japanese contradictions. When, in the spring of 1933, Japan openly defied the League of Nations (her exit from the League after the final resolution had been passed refusing to recognize the seizure of Manchuria), it did so backed by a virtual agreement with England concerning Manchuria.

During the *last* stages of this offensive, beginning with the invasion of North China by Japan in the spring of 1933, Britain's policy of non-interference remained unchanged in the main, while the United States, isolated by England's conciliatory maneuvers, also adopted a passive line.

Instead of the bellicose protests and declarations of Hoover's time, the Roosevelt government adopted a position of watchful waiting.

It is quite obvious that this new phase of American policy is in the nature of a maneuver, a means of bringing pressure to bear upon England with a view to putting a stop to American isolation in the Far East. For, firstly, it is accompanied by a fresh acceleration of the feverish armaments race by the United States in the Pacific Ocean; and, secondly, with all its newly-manifested quasi-"disinterestedness" in Chinese affairs, the United States still adheres, as hitherto, to the position of categorically refusing to recognize the Japanese conquests, and equally categorically blocks all the efforts of Japan to force it to make some sort of political concessions on the Far Eastern question (the Japanese proposals of non-aggression pacts, the proposals for the division of the spheres of influence in the Pacific, etc.). Nevertheless, it is a fact that since 1933, the United States, like England, has also been avoiding open anti-Japanese action in China. In addition, America's silver policy, which has drained silver out of China and helped to bring about a catastrophic intensification of the crisis in China, has dealt a blow to American political influence in that country, made the Chinese bourgeoisie still more dependent upon Japanese imperialism, and directly encouraged the offensive of the latter. But the factors which determined the passivity of British and American imperialism in the face of the Japanese offensive against China have been undergoing considerable changes of late. Let us consider a few of them.

1. *Anglo-American antagonism.* The Washington compromise, in final analysis, was determined to a certain degree by the existence of a united front of England and America against Japan at the Washington Conferences of 1921-22. The unhindered development of Japanese imperialist aggression in China during the last few years was determined by the breakdown of this united front as a result of Anglo-American contradictions, which grew especially sharp under the conditions of the world capitalist crisis.

However, during the course of the development of the Anglo-American antagonisms, a situation arose in which England could no longer defend its own interests, menaced as they were by Japan, by relying upon American-Japanese contradictions and refraining from independent action against Japan. This position, an extremely difficult one for British imperialism, led to a *crisis* in the British Far-Eastern policy, the one which had previously befallen the corresponding policy pursued by the U.S.A. The Japanese menace gradually assumed a more and more serious character for both Anglo-Saxon powers. Meanwhile, the position of England in the Far East was complicated to a tremendous degree by the arming of Germany in Europe and, more recently, by the African adventure undertaken by Italian imperialism. We can say that British imperialism sensed the need to activate its own Far Eastern policy just at a time when its freedom of action in China proved to be especially restricted. This position increased the tendency of British policy to come to an agreement with the United States in the Pacific, to an agreement which in the past was particularly and persistently sabotaged on the British side.

2. *The fact that both England and, especially the United States are unprepared for war in the Pacific, both from the military and political points of view.* This compels them to halt before the prospect of sharpening the conflict with Japan, which has rendered possible an armed clash with the latter.

But during recent years, feverish military preparations have been not only not designed, it is true, for a long period ahead but obviously directed against Japan. Thanks to the growth of its naval and especially air armaments, the United States has objectively strengthened its position in the Pacific during these years. As for England, although generally weakening her military position in the Far East has grown weaker as a result of the European-African situation (the forced withdrawal of the British Far Eastern flotilla to the Red Sea may serve to illustrate this point), nevertheless British imperialism has successfully exploited the Ethiopian conflict at home in such a manner as to ensure the adoption of a tremendous new program of war construction which in the future, and in respect of air armaments even in the near future, will strengthen England's strategic position in the Far East.

3. *The fear of the Chinese revolution experienced by the imperialists* during the course of the last decades been one of the most important foundations of their Chinese policy. By force of the fact that it is deeply interested in exploiting China, by force of its geographical proximity to China and of its military power on the Chinese scene, Japan is the most fitted to fulfil the function of gendarme in relation to China, and in

this capacity is a useful weapon of world imperialism. The desire not to weaken Japanese imperialism in its struggle against the Chinese revolution, and the fear of unleashing the revolutionary forces of China, have been, and still are, of great importance in the policy both of American and British imperialism towards Japan.

These motives are still in full force. However, the following must be taken into account as new, though secondary, factors: (a) that the front of the civil war against the Red armies of China has now been shifted to regions which are more removed from the most important centers and bases of imperialist domination in this country; (b) that the enthusiasm felt in connection with the role of Japan as gendarme is cooling down considerably in view of the fact that this role is an indissoluble part of the aggressive plans of Japanese imperialism in relation to the *whole of Chinese territory*.

4. Since the very beginning of Japan's invasion of China, Japanese propaganda has connected it up with the prospect of an attack on the U.S.S.R. For the purpose of weakening the U.S.S.R., the bourgeoisie in a number of countries (especially in England) were prepared to reward Japan by consenting to the latter strengthening her position somewhat in China.

This original view of the question about the anti-Soviet character of Japanese policy in China has now changed. First, the expectation that Japan would quickly launch the war against the Soviet Union—a war which would, at any rate temporarily, paralyze Japan's drive against China—has proved incorrect. The war with the Soviet Union has not yet come, but Japan already dominates almost half of the territory of China. Secondly, under the conditions which exist today, the very *character* of a possible Japanese-Soviet war has changed—as a result of the changed relations of forces between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world in general, and between the U.S.S.R. and Japan in the Far East in particular; and also in consequence of the colossal importance of all the changes in the international situation (the menace of German fascism which hangs over Europe). What in the past might have been considered an isolated conflict turning the forces of Japan in a direction "least dangerous" for the other imperialists, has today become indissolubly linked with the war plans of German fascism in Europe which are a threat not merely to the Soviet Union, but has become the possible and probable center of a *new world war*.

This does not alter the fact that, as hitherto, the imperialists are interested in Japan as a factor counterbalancing the U.S.S.R. in the Far East.

Added to these fundamental changes, it should be noted that in the process of the development of events in recent years a number of estimates have been undermined and overthrown which were originally widespread throughout the imperialist world, and which considerably helped to belittle the seriousness of the Japanese menace even among the best informed circles of the British and American bourgeoisie. We have in view the following two important points in particular:

First, during the early stages of Japanese aggression, the conviction was current that the financial and economic weakness of Japanese

imperialism would itself serve as a sufficient check to the successful drive of Japan, and would either lay down a natural boundary or force the Japanese capitalists, even within the confines of the Chinese territory captured, to act objectively as the agent of the more powerful British and American capital.

In actual fact Japan's financial weakness in no way alters the nearly monopolist character of its design in China. Japanese military and political aggression has met with considerable success in undermining the interests and the policy of the other imperialists, although as regards economic power Japan cannot even be compared with them.

Second, originally the conviction was current (especially on the British side) that, in view of this financial weakness and in general in view of the obvious disproportion between Japan's resources and her conquests in China, it would be easy in the long run to come to some compromise agreement which would limit Japanese acquisitions to Manchuria, perhaps to include the neighboring North Chinese regions, and that Japan would not seriously threaten the semi-colonial status of the rest of China. But the hopes entertained by British imperialism that the Japanese offensive would be localized have by no means been justified. The whole trend of events during the last few years has testified to the fact that every part of Chinese territory seized by Japan immediately becomes a base for the further development of the Japanese offensive and for new acquisitions; that no artificial boundaries can be thrown up inside China beyond which the Japanese offensive would not proceed; that Japanese imperialism has set itself the concrete aim of securing control of the whole of China in its entirety. Proof of this fact was provided by the famous Japanese declaration concerning a protectorate over China (April 1934); by Japan's preparations to preclaim the "independence" of North China (which is on the eve of being fulfilled today); by Japan's fierce pressure upon the Nanking government; by the active encroachments on the Shanghai International Settlement and the preparations to seize Shanghai; by Japan's intrigues in the South China; and, finally, by the whole tone of its public declarations, aims and demands.

It is precisely this fact that constitutes a most important *new feature* in the development of Japanese aggression in recent years. Today the entire imperialist world is brought face to face with the fundamental question of whether China is to be maintained as a *semi-colony* of imperialism or whether Japan is to be allowed to convert it into exclusively its own *colony*. The question arises in a situation which does not allow of any hope that any *territorial division* of China can be possible which would secure sufficient compensation to the other imperialist powers, and in particular to England—not to mention America—from their own point of view.

All this was bound to make itself felt concretely first and foremost in the policy of *British* imperialism. It should be emphasized that the conciliatory line of the latter towards Japan on no account signified either the possibility of stable agreement, or mitigation in general of the most acute and insoluble contradictions between England and Japan in the Far East. It must not be forgotten that it is England that

possesses the colonial monopoly in Asia, and that the extensive program of Japanese expansion with its "Monroe Doctrine for Asia" is consequently aimed directly against British imperialism. *It is clear that the trend of the latest events in the Far East has been highly instructive to the latter for the following reasons:*

1. As regards the extent of its capital investments and of all interests in China proper, England up to now is indeed ahead of the other imperialists and, in particular, ahead of the United States. The Japanese advance, not to mention the complete fulfilment of Japan's plans to dominate China, is taking place primarily at the expense of England.

2. The menace already created of naval expansion by Japanese imperialism (the breakdown of the Washington Naval Pact and Japan's demand for naval parity is tantamount to the assertion of Japan's domination over the largest part of the Pacific) is widening or threatens to widen the geographical sphere of the Far Eastern conflict to confines including the most important colonial possessions and "spheres of influence" of British imperialism which Japan is menacing today (Hong-kong, Straits Settlement, Dutch East Indies, the Pacific Dominions, and finally India itself, the political fate of which is closely connected with that of China).

3. Finally, let us remember that up to now the relations which existed between the positions of the leading imperialist powers in the Pacific were characterized by *precisely this conciliatory attitude of England, side by side with the irreconcilability in principle of the United States*, even though this irreconcilability was not expressed in action. Britain's conciliatory attitude was the chief prop of the whole of Japan's policy in China. Meanwhile in Washington account is taken of the fact that the more restrained the American attitude is towards Japan, the more energetically will England be forced to act. Therefore, American imperialism will be in no hurry at all to help its English partner in the game.

From the moment it became clear that Japan was openly encroaching upon the semi-colonial status of China in an attempt to replace it by its own undivided colonial rule, England was faced with the necessity of making a definite choice. It had to be one of two things: either England would remain passive—in which case it would have to reckon with the prospect of gradually losing all its most important positions in China and of its forced "exit" from that country, or it would have to, now, at the present stage, put up an active struggle for its positions and take such steps as would at any rate secure the re-establishment of conditions for a new Anglo-Japanese agreement acceptable to the British bourgeoisie. In spite of the fact that the British bourgeoisie have not at all entirely rejected the prospects of an agreement with Japan on the Far Eastern question (the influential group, for example, represented by *The Round Table* continues to point out "that the economic interests of England and Japan in the Far East at bottom coincide"), this question, in the way it has been raised, must actually be considered pre-determined, for the interests of England in China are of themselves great, and in addition are closely linked up with the fate of British rule

India. We must make our starting point the fact that neither England or the United States can "withdraw" from the Chinese market, which is the most important reserve market of world capitalism, without undermining their role on a world scale, but will continue to fight for China as long as they remain monopolist capitalist countries. It is for precisely this reason *that the Japanese plan for the exclusive colonial enslavement of China is in the long run incapable of fulfilment except at the price of a new world war.* But in a situation where British policy in the Far East is more than ever before connected with the situation in Europe and North Africa, England obviously will not at the moment openly risk changing its policy and sharpening it against Japan. This is to be explained by the fact that (1) England as hitherto is striving to avoid an open conflict with Japan; (2) the immediate task of British policy is to strengthen British positions in China on the basis of defending the semi-colonial status of that country; and (3) the action of England is proceeding not so much along the lines of offering direct political resistance to Japan as along the lines of "indirectly" counteracting it with the help of pressure upon Nanking and the South-West grouping of the Kuomintang, of using all kinds of Chinese militaristic forces against Japan and, what is more important, by adopting corresponding economic and financial measures. This is why the action of England against Japanese aggression has taken the form of a *plan of international financial intervention in China.*

Utilizing the very grave economic and financial situation in China, the British government, already in the beginning of 1935, offered a plan to the United States and Japan for a joint loan to China, in particular aiming at improving its currency credit and financial situation. This plan pursued definite political aims. Its fulfilment would have produced the following results: (1) *It would have strengthened the Nanking government in relation to other militarist groupings in China and in relation to Japan; the loan would have made Nanking more able to resist Japanese pressure than before.* (2) *It would have led to the increase of international control over China as a counterpart to the efforts of Japan to subordinate China to its own individual control.* The British proposal was welcomed by influential organs of the American press (particularly by the *New York Times*) as testifying to the success of Roosevelt's "new tactics" which aim precisely at putting a stop to the isolation of the U.S.A. and at activizing Great Britain's own anti-Japanese policy. However, while striving to maintain the advantage gained from these tactics, Washington did not believe that the change in British policy was a serious one, and did not rush to the assistance of the English initiative, while Japanese imperialism naturally adopted, and persists in, a *sharply negative position on this question.*

Thus, the diplomatic negotiations did not lead to the desired results. When in the autumn of 1935 the British government despatched its chief economic adviser, Leith Ross, to the Far East. As far as can be judged, his task was to come to an agreement with the Japanese government concerning Anglo-Japanese "collaboration" in China on the basis of the English plan for an international loan with the participation of Japan. But Leith Ross met with an extremely unfavorable reception in Tokyo.

Judging by the officially inspired, stereotyped commentaries published in the Japanese press, one of the essential conditions for any form of agreement with England put forward in the negotiations with Leith Ross was, *not only recognition by England of Japan's supremacy in China, but also England's agreement to the "open door" for Japanese trade and Japanese capital within the boundaries of the whole of the British Empire.*

Having received this rebuff from Japan, Leith Ross took independent steps in China, the result of which was the currency reform decreed by the Nanking government at the beginning of November, the essence of which is the following: China abandons the silver standard and passes to unredeemable paper currency; all the silver in the country to be "nationalized" in exchange for banknotes, the emission of which is controlled by the Nanking government, at first through the three existing semi-governmental Chinese banks and later through one, single, Central Bank; the rate of exchange of Chinese currency is considerably reduced, approximately to 1s 2½d as against two shillings previously, which at the present price of silver represents the value of the silver in the Chinese dollar. Actually, if not formally, China is fixing this rate of exchange to correspond definitely with the pound sterling and, in consequence, is joining the sterling bloc.

The reform adopted by Nanking is *a measure taken by British imperialism in agreement with, and having the direct support of, the English banks which are still supreme in the sphere of currency and credit in China, and is directly aimed at Japan.* The reform was preceded by unequivocal comments in the English press, and also by the creation of a special influential committee by the Bank of England "to defend the interests of British holders of Chinese loans". The reform was immediately followed by unanimous approval in the British press and on the part of the so-called business circles, by a sharp rise of Chinese bonds on the London market, by direct support on the part of the British government in the form of immediate provisions for criminal prosecution of any violation of the new law by British nationals resident in China, and finally—side by side with the formal denial that Leith Ross was involved in the affair—by a significant reminder to Japan by England regarding the previously proposed plan of an international loan. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the Japanese imperialists are foaming at the mouth not only because of Nanking, but also of London.

The financial reform immediately makes Nanking much more dependent upon foreign financial "assistance", and first and foremost upon England, *i.e.*, it strengthens British political influence in comparison with Japanese. It can be affirmed, however—and this is clear from the utterances of the British press itself—that at the present stage at any rate the British bourgeoisie has no intention of risking large individual investments of capital in China, in particular because it would have the following effect: (a) It would create the danger of sharpening the isolated Anglo-Japanese conflict; and (b) it would not give the British imperialists sufficient economic and political guarantees. The task is to bring about international financial intervention with the participation of Japan. British imperialism, as stated before, is striving to counter

the individual military and political control of Japan by setting up international control in which London, as a result of its own initiative and thanks to its role as the world financial center, would play the most active part.

Nanking's currency reform is not only the continuation of the foregoing efforts of British imperialism in this direction, but is an important step forward along the road to the realization of British desires. It is clear that a violent struggle is raging around the enforcement of the reform.

The reform strengthens the position of England and weakens the position of Japan in the struggle to bring about this international financial intervention in China behind which lies the struggle to maintain the semi-colonial—as against colonial—status of China, the struggle for the joint possession, and division or re-division, of China by the imperialists as against Japan's efforts at individual supremacy. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the Japanese imperialists are exerting every effort to break down this reform and the British plans connected with it, and that as a result a considerable denuding and sharpening of the Anglo-Japanese conflict is taking place in the Far East.

Further factors in the sharpening of the conflict are the retaliatory measures of Japanese imperialism, in particular the fact that a menacing situation has been created in Shanghai and that the Japanese plans to cut off North China are being gradually realized. The North China question is important for England, not so much even in relation to the British interests in that region, as because the "manchurization" of this region would constitute a big step forward towards converting China into a Japanese colony. And indeed, the seizure of North China and the removal of the frontiers of Japanese supremacy to the Yellow River would result in the creation of a gigantic jumping-off ground for further Japanese aggression along the Yangtse valley and further into the South, would mean a colossal increase in the effect of Japanese pressure upon the Nanking government and, finally, would paralyze to a considerable degree the political effect of the currency reform and all England's efforts to support the Nanking government against Japan. Although up to now England has refrained from interfering *openly* in the North China question, there is no doubt that British diplomacy will, behind the scenes, take an active part in the struggle which is developing around the Japanese attempts to create an "independent" North China.

Thus, the changes that have taken place recently in the Far East may be reduced in the main to the following:

1. The most important of these is the very fact of the activization of British policy in the Far East, directed against Japan. In perspective this fact offers new possibilities of an anti-Japanese combination between British and American imperialism.

2. We must, however, make the following reservation that, though England has delivered a counter-blow *at the present moment*, it undoubtedly has no intention of changing the general conciliatory line of its policy towards Japan, and has no intention of forcing a conflict with

the latter. On the contrary, the tone of the British press is profoundly restrained and conciliatory. It emphasizes (even with regard to the acute question of Shanghai—see the leading article in the *Times* of November 9) that England recognizes the “justice” of Japanese claims to a certain preponderance in China and even to a guiding voice in Chinese affairs (though not to Japanese monopoly), and it points out that England will continue to maintain the line of *conciliation and collaboration* with Japan, on the indispensable condition, of course, that China remains a semi-colony in the common possession of the imperialists.

3. But although England for the time being has set itself only limited tasks, it may be compelled in the future to adopt more decisive changes in its Far Eastern policy. If Japan does not agree to make considerable concessions, if it carries its plans in North China to their culmination, and if it continues its expansion in the zone of British influence, then a further sharpening of British policy against Japan will fundamentally become inevitable, in spite of all the present wavering of the British government and the difficulties which await England on the way. In particular, it can be established even now that decisive action by Japan to seize Shanghai will, without doubt, cause British imperialism to adopt further anti-Japanese measures. The essential point is that the boundary to which British imperialism is prepared to retreat on the Chinese question is already marked out and that Japan will not be able to cross it with impunity.

4. To all appearances American imperialism has for the time being adopted a position of benevolent neutrality towards the currency reform. Later on, American policy will find itself under the influence of the following contradictory factors: (a) direct interest in the formation of a new consortium to establish financial control over China; (b) mistrust towards England and apprehensions as regards the understanding which the latter is preparing to reach with Japan; (c) the financial losses, as yet incalculable, in the event of the success of the currency reform, which in the general opinion of bourgeois economists is undermining America's silver policy.

The chief factor in the Far Eastern policy being pursued by the United States remains, of course, its complete irreconcilability towards the monopolist aspirations of Japan in China and the Pacific.

5. The recent developments, in the final analysis, signify that preparations are being made for new efforts at dividing and redividing China among the imperialists. Quite independent of their concrete outcome, they signify a new serious sharpening of imperialist contradictions in the Far East. The following general conclusion is of the greatest importance: The creation in China of a united anti-imperialist people's front on the basis of a decisive struggle against Japan is favored not only by the situation which has arisen within the country, but also by the serious change in the international situation. The sharpening of the contradictions between the imperialists and the prospects of a further intensification of the conflict among them can and must be utilized by the Chinese Communist Party in the interests of the revolutionary struggle, the immediate aim of which is to save the existence of China as a nation, directly menaced as it is by Japanese aggression.

Mao Tse-tung—Leader of the Toiling People of China

"Revolution is not a ceremony where you invite guests to dinner, nor is it the writing of literature, the painting of pictures, or embroidering on satin. It cannot be achieved with such finesse, so easily, and without spoiling all kinds of beautiful decorations. It cannot be achieved gradually, with tenderness and solicitude, through deference and compromise. . . ." (Mao Tse-tung *Peasant Movement in Hunan*, 1927.)

SHANGHAI, 1921. The First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is in session. Ardent, spirited speeches. A few dozen people are assembled in the small hall: workers, peasants, coolies, intellectuals. A passionate appeal to struggle, to build up Communist organizations in the towns, in the factories and workshops, in the armies, in the villages. A tall, slim young man takes the floor. Outwardly he is a typical student, a modest village teacher. His face calm and stern, with eyes deep-set and mocking. He is sharply distinguished from all the others by the sickly pallor of his face. He raises his hand, asks for the floor, stands up and begins:

"Comrades! I am the delegate from Hunan. I have formed a Communist organization in Hunan. We have organized the revolutionary workers, peasants and students. We are developing our work without losing a single day. . . ."

The man lets himself down carefully into his chair, draws a long notebook from his inside pocket and makes notes in it with a stump of pencil, fixed into a black iron tube. Other delegates approach him—old workers and a respectable professor*. They ask him questions. He replies. The workers amicably shake him by the hand and pat him on the back. The professor shakes hands somewhat coldly and says:

"Very interesting, your experience in Hunan deserves much attention, and, without doubt, study."

"It is not a question of interest", he replies. "The point is that the masses are beginning to rise up to the fight. These masses need a real revolutionary organization. The Party must go to the masses now and organize them. This is the main thing now."

"Quite right, the delegate from Hunan is right," exclaim the worker delegates.

The delegate from Hunan province is unanimously elected a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. He returns to Changsha, the capital of Hunan, where he leads the provincial committee of the Communist Party, and edits the *New Hunan*, a weekly revolutionary paper.

Usually a man of few words, he was completely transformed when

* Professor Chen Tu-hsin.

making speeches at meetings of the Party organization. He became a fiery orator, defining the ways and means of carrying on the struggle at the given stage with the skill of a marksman. His speeches fired his audience and inspired them. He welded together his Party organization with an iron hand. He found the road to the human heart, and skilfully and opportunely corrected mistakes and trained true Communists—real revolutionary fighters.

"To be a Communist," he said to one comrade, "is not merely to belong to a political party. We are not political intriguers. We are the Party of the toiling people who are cruelly oppressed. We are the Party of revolution which is sweeping all that is rotten from the face of the earth. Death is only the physical exit from life. And if a man, the more so a Communist, can bring some good by dying, by his brains and his courage, then he should not think twice about it. He must boldly and proudly fulfill the will of the Party and the people. A Party that lives for the interests of the people, which suffers with them and fights to make them happy, is an invincible force. There is no force that can conquer the Party of the Communists—the militant vanguard of the toiling masses."

These words, clear, simple and indomitable as the oath of an iron Bolshevik, bring to mind the figure of the legendary leader of the Chinese people—Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

* * *

Comrade Mao Tse-tung was born in a Hunan village in a poor peasant family. His hard, hungry childhood has left indelible marks upon him: it has undermined the health of Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the rest of his life. In the village he worked as a farm laborer for the landlords and kulaks. In this servitude he became thoroughly familiar with the entire system of the cruel, barbarous, landlord exploitation and of the overbearing oppression which ground down the people. This servitude developed in him an unconquerable spirit of hatred towards the parasites and exploiters. He fled from this bondage as farm laborer, and became a soldier in the army of one of the militarists. He patiently underwent all the military drills and the insults. His inflexible will and rebellious spirit could not be broken even by the barrack butchers.

As a result of tremendous exertion he learned to read and write the complicated Chinese language. The images and ideas, which he had perceived vaguely through the thick fog of ignorance, began to take definite shape and acquire definite meaning. His insatiable, unbounded curiosity widened his outlook, enriched his mind and steadily developed it. He fled from the barrack imprisonment, as once before he had fled from the servitude on the farm.

Life had no mercy upon this man. It tried to turn him aside and throw him back to the slavery of the landlord, to the bondage of the militarists. It tried to smother, to suppress the indignation that was growing up in him against the social system which generates barbarism, slavery, oppression and starvation. And out of this incredible, almost

unexampled struggle, this man came out on top—it did not break him. He never asked for mercy, he defended himself with tremendous obstinacy, and never surrendered.

In Changsha, a new man appeared among the crowds on the streets, the working class districts, in the heart of the poor and destitute of the town. Mao Tse-tung, thin and emaciated, wandered through the streets, talked with the workers, performed the heaviest kind of work, and carefully collected scraps of newspapers lying on the roads and pavements. He greedily read everything he could lay hands upon. He feasted on reading matter until his head spun round. New friends helped him to study. By incredible exertion he leapt ahead and became a student. A new world opened up before him. His hard and tremendous experience of life helped him in everything. In a short time he became an outstanding student in a teachers' training school. Revolutionary pamphlets fell into his hands, and he plunged headlong into the study of "rebel" literature.

He became enthusiastic about the formation of different circles and handicraft workshops. Hungry himself, he organized aid for his comrades among the students, his friends among the workers, and his brother peasants. He attended meetings of workers and mass meetings, unmasked the exploiters and spoke in a language remarkable for its simplicity and clarity. The "pale student Mao" became a "prominent figure" in the town. The police began to watch this homeless student. Mao became the best guest and friend in the working class districts. All the revolutionary elements among the town workers, students and intellectuals gathered around Mao. He found his way among the most complicated political and economic questions with unusual ease. When preparing for the first workers' strike, he formulated the chief demands as follows: less working hours, better working conditions, and higher wages.

Under the influence of the great October Revolution, the revolutionary movement quickly developed in China. All the revolutionary students' and workers' organizations used to meet in the "bookshop" organized by Mao Tse-tung, and it was here that Mao organized the first circle of worker-agitators. The police kept a vigilant watch over the "shop" which carried on a lively business which was very far from being of a commercial nature.

About this time a new strike broke out in the town. Mao Tse-tung was really the leader of it. He was a member of the workers' delegation which General Tan Yen-kai, the Governor of the province, was forced to receive. The Governor, to whom the servile police had submitted a report on the "case against the pale student", issued an order for his arrest. However, in a private interview, Mao Tse-tung persuaded him that he was "not a dangerous person". He so interested and fooled the governor that this general himself wrote out the sign for Mao Tse-tung's "bookshop", paying tribute to the "new ideas".

Shortly after this Mao Tse-tung organized the provincial committee of the Communist Party. A weekly newspaper, the *New Hunan*, was brought out. At first cautiously, but later more and more openly, Mao Tse-tung and his comrades began to flay the entire social system

which reigned throughout the country. The police received the order to arrest the "revolutionary chief". Mao Tse-tung fled from Changsha to North China. In Peiping he was arrested, but was not identified, and released. He again returned to Central China, at first to Hankow, and then to Yuchan.

The great revolutionary wave of 1925-27 was approaching. Mao Tse-tung was always in the center of the approaching events. He was to be seen everywhere, in the working class districts, in industrial towns, in the most far-flung villages of Hupeh, Kiangsi and Hunan. His name became famous among broad masses of the people. He was loved and well known, this bold and passionate agitator who called upon the people to fight. He was hunted by the secret service and the police. But he was protected by the workers and peasants and so remained elusive.

In Canton, Sun Yat-sen organized a national government which declared war upon imperialism and militarist reaction. The Communist Party joined the reorganized Kuomintang. Mao Tse-tung, popular leader of the working and peasant masses, was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. He devoted all his attention and time to the agrarian question, for he understood the tremendous importance of the role of the peasantry in the events which were unfolding. He established mass peasant organizations and led them. The national bourgeoisie, temporary allies in the anti-imperialist struggle, betrayed the revolution and went over to the camp of reaction. The working class movement was suppressed by bloody executions, and punitive expeditions were sent against the peasants. The leaders of the Communist Party, led by Chen Tu-hsiu, refused to carry out the instructions of the Comintern, and did nothing to prevent the counter-revolutionary drive of black reaction against the revolutionary workers and peasants.

Mao Tse-tung was one of the first to grasp the disastrous character of the treacherous policy pursued by Chen Tu-hsiu, and openly unmasked his position. He took his place at the head of the masses and led their struggle against reaction. In a pamphlet which he specially wrote on the subject, he once more stressed the tremendous importance of the peasantry, whose role the followers of Chen Tu-hsiu did not want to understand.

"The present upsurge of the peasant movement constitutes an extremely important problem, since in the near future it must bring about a movement among several hundred million peasants throughout the whole of the rest of China. . . . The peasants will break down all that stands in their way and will hasten along the road to emancipation. All revolutionary parties and revolutionaries will be put to the test by these masses."
(Mao Tse-tung, *The Peasant Movement in Hunan*, 1927.)

This profound prognosis made by Mao Tse-tung in 1927, which was brilliantly justified by the whole course of the development of later events, rang out like a sentence on the whole Chen Tu-hsiu leadership. Today, Chen Tu-hsiu, this miserable renegade, wears the counter-revolutionary epaulettes of Trotsky.

The revolution of 1925-27 was defeated. The Kuomintang became

the watchdog of imperialism. The unbridled bloody terror of the most atrocious reaction in the world swept over the country. The Communist Party was driven deep underground. Mao Tse-tung courageously continued the struggle. He led the peasant revolutionary organizations which were also driven underground, and maintained and developed connections with the secret soldiers' leagues working among the militarist troops. On August 1, 1927, a number of the units of the Nanchang garrison mutinied, and under the guidance of two Communists, Ye Ting and Ho Lung, they began an advance southwards to Kwangtung. Simultaneously, Mao Tse-tung carried on operations in the north of Kiangsi. With the aid of Communist soldiers, he carried on successful propaganda among an entire regiment, took the leadership of it, and led the men forward. On the road, detachments of farm laborers, poor peasants, and workers' guards from among the miners, flocked to the banner of Mao Tse-tung. After long and violent battles in Kiangsi, he led this revolutionary regiment into the Ninkang region. Here, close to the famous Tsinkanshan mountain, he met another tried Chinese revolutionary, the Bolshevik Chu Teh. Together with Chu Teh, Mao Tse-tung formed the Fourth Corps of the Chinese Red Army, which covered itself with glory in fierce victorious engagements with the enemy.

* * *

Mao Tse-tung has passed through a severe, cruel school of life. He has traversed the difficult road of a true son of the people with head bowed. The adversities of fortune, long years of privation and bitter suffering, the stubborn fight for knowledge, and the fire of revolution have steeled this fearless Chinese Bolshevik, and forged of him a great leader of the people. In bloody battles, face to face with the mortal enemy, there has been born not only a courageous, revolutionary military leader and talented strategist, but also a brilliant statesman.

The first Soviet region of the Kiangsi province was formed as a result of the tremendous, painstaking work of Mao Tse-tung. He mobilized all the forces of the Party for the struggle to build up Soviets. The Fourth Army Corps led by him and Comrade Chu Teh was his main field headquarters. Together with his army corps, Mao Tse-tung marched over the fields, the valleys and mountain paths of Kiangsi, Hunan, Kupeh and Fukien. Wherever the army corps passed, Soviets sprung up and Soviet regions were formed. Tireless agitator and organizer, Mao Tse-tung aroused millions of the people. And these masses followed him everywhere. He himself saw to the division of the lands of the landlords and did away with the boundaries in the fields. This feeble and trembling man has worked like a mighty machine, breaking down the structure of the old world and building up the new. He has showered all the hatred that has accumulated in him over many years upon the parasites, the bloodsuckers of the Chinese people. He has brought new ideas to the people, has drawn them to himself by his fine speeches permeated with sincere passion, and by his own fighting example. A constant stream of coolies and workers from Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, miners from Hunan, Fukien, Kiangsi, and farm laborers and peasants, students and

teachers, have always sought him out. All the oppressed and enslaved, all class-conscious, bold elements have made their way to him. It was his hands that built up the skeleton of the heroic Chinese Red Army. In the mountains of Tsinkanshan, he himself trained his fighters to shoot with rifles, and taught them to read and write. He armed them then with ideas and with hand-grenades.

In 1931, at the First Congress of the Soviets, at Juitsin, the capital of Soviet China, Mao Tse-tung was elected President of the Central Executive Committee and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, amid stormy applause from the delegates of the Chinese people. At this new post he displayed his extremely brilliant talent as an outstanding statesman. He penned the Constitution of the Soviet Republic of China and a number of other fundamental laws of the new state. In a number of excellent decrees issued by the Soviet government, he expressed the will of the mass of the people, for he is thoroughly familiar with their hopes and desires.

He is a resolute man, a true Bolshevik, a real friend of the people. Here is what Mao Tse-tung's close collaborators say of him:

"He works twenty hours a day, sleeps only four hours. When he is not at the front, he is always travelling over Soviet territory from town to town, from village to village. He is greeted everywhere as father, brother, son. He does everything to make the life of the people easier and happier."

With a splendid knowledge of the psychology of the people, himself one who has originated from the people, Mao Tse-tung puts into effect the decisions of the Party and Comintern brilliantly. The people know of the hard life through which Mao Tse-tung has passed, and they pay him back in boundless love and loyalty. At the front, Mao Tse-tung is always in the front lines. He goes into battle side by side with the Red Army fighters, inspiring them with his heroic feats. The rank-and-file Red Army fighters and commanders know him personally. He has taken part in all the decisive operations of the Red Army. He has trained the principal army commissars. Mao Tse-tung was the first Commissar in the Chinese Red Army.

The *Ta-Kum-Pao*, a leading Kuomintang newspaper, recently published a report of the interrogation of a Chinese Red Army man, a rank-and-file soldier who had been taken prisoner.

"The soldier looks about thirty-five", writes the paper. "He was taken prisoner in the central Red region, in Kiangsi. He was calm and confident during the interrogation. An officer asked him to give information about the forces of the Red Army. The soldier refused to reply. Persuasion had no effect upon him either. The whole of his reply boiled down to 'many'."

"In reply to all the remaining questions, he said: 'I don't know'."

"The only question he was willing to answer was that about the Red Army commanders. Here is his reply:

"'Yes, I know both Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh. And I know Pen Te-huei. Mao Tse-tung is our chief leader. He heads the government, the Party and the army. He is a very kind and

simple man. He always talks in a way that even the most backward people can understand. It is difficult to tell in words of his authority and popularity. At his call, the whole of the people will follow to the ends of the earth. He always cares for others and never thinks of himself. He is very ill, is always coughing and pale. However, during campaigns he sleeps on the ground alongside the Red Army fighters, and eats what they do.

"When clothes and boots are brought to him from the supplies he gives them away to the Red Army fighters or somebody else. When the fighting took place near the Yutu he lay on the ground, I saw it myself, and fired from his rifle. And then he stood up and was the first to go into the attacks. All the others followed him. That time we won the battle. Then, with the stretcher-bearers he helped to pick up the wounded men. When the prisoners were brought in he talked to them for several hours. Afterwards he gave orders for all prisoners to be released, except the officers. There were six hundred prisoners but not more than one hundred of them left him, and the others asked to join our units."

"The prisoner was once more asked to tell of the condition, the location and forces of the Reds. Again he refused to reply. The officer then said that he would be shot, and the prisoner replied:

"Well, what of it? I have heard the words of our leader, Mao Tse-tung, who said that a man who is afraid of death while fighting for the cause of the people is a contemptible coward. I am a Communist."

This document will be a bright page in the annals of the history of the Chinese Red Army. This nameless hero showed no cowardice in the face of death, he did not betray or retreat. This fearless fighter along with many others was trained by Mao Tse-tung.

In his report to the Second Congress of Soviets in January 1934, summing up the results of the successful construction of Soviet China, Mao Tse-tung formulated the conditions for victory in the following way:

"The victories we have achieved are by no means accidental. They have their basis in the correct political line of the Chinese Communist Party, in the concentrated leadership, the correct policy pursued and measures adopted by the Soviet government, in the courage and valor of the Red Army, and the self-sacrificing help of the broad masses of workers and peasants in the Soviet regions. Moreover, they have their basis in the daily struggles and ever developing movement of the workers and peasants of the White regions against the Kuomintang and the imperialists. And, finally, they are based upon the assistance and sympathy of the world proletariat and the oppressed population of the colonial countries. All this is the fundamental condition necessary for the victorious war against the enemy. Without these conditions, it would be absolutely impossible to achieve victory."

Before the march from Kiangsi northwestwards, Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh spent sleepless nights in the headquarters of the Red Army, drawing up strategic plans for the march. Mao Tse-tung's tremendous military and political experience and his knowledge of the country considerably facilitated the drawing up of the plans. The main forces of the Chinese Red Army escaped through the hostile ring in Kiangsi, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh. The sick leader marched at the head, guiding the iron torrent of the Soviet revolution. This great Chinese revolutionary, whose health had been eaten away by the heavy servitude of farm laboring, by his life in the military barracks, by years of hunger and privation, yet found within himself sufficient courage to lead the army of the Chinese Soviets fearlessly through battles, over mountains and streams, to the new revolutionary base.

An iron will, Bolshevik perseverance, unparalleled fearlessness, coupled with the tremendous, inexhaustible talent of a brilliant revolutionary military leader and statesman—these are the outstanding qualities of the leader of the Chinese people, Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

Chu Teh—Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Red Army

By Ch.

THE man is known throughout the world. Mention of his name in China—in Shanghai, Canton, Peiping, in the distant mountain villages of Kiangsi and Fukien, in the Honan valleys, in the vast stretches of Szechwan—calls forth amazement, joy, hatred and fear. It wreathes the faces of the toilers with smiles, and brings spasmodic grimaces of feigned animal horror to the faces of the landlords, the bourgeoisie, the Kuomintang generals, the imperialist robbers—all the parasites who live upon the sweat and blood of the great people of China.

Among the masses legends are current, full of rapturous love and heroism, about new people who are demolishing the old China and freeing it from thousands of years of oppression, slavery and violence, who are breaking the imperialist chains which fetter the people and the country. These legends acclaim the courage of the people who are building up a new country on the remains of the old, who are leading the masses forward to a new, bright life, forward to a government of the workers and peasants. In these legends, Chu Teh is the legendary military leader, the invincible knight, the healer of the people's sorrows, who rids them of oppression and suffering.

"He came from the farthest mountains," one of the legends runs. "He stands higher than the highest tree. His hands send forth floods of invincible flames, destroying the enemy. And his enemies are the enemies of the people. When he looks around him, he sees for a distance of a hundred *li* on all sides at once. Nothing can hide from his fearless gaze. His army is countless: the whole people follow him. Even the foreigners flee in terror from our country to save their lives. He is a simple, kindly man, although there is none to match his strength, courage and wisdom. He sleeps in the mountains and in the fields, and the whole of the people keep watch over him. He awakens and once more leads the people onward, ever onward. There is no force that can restrain him. He marches throughout the whole of our land, liberating all the poor, the destitute, the good people. He is loved in Fukien, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, he is loved everywhere. He was born of our people, and the people have given him a strong and simple name—Chu Teh."

This ingenuous, truthful legend of the people, reveals the clear vision of a great leader of the people, of a gifted revolutionary military leader, of the fearless Commander-in-Chief of the heroic Chinese Red Army, Comrade Chu Teh. This legend gives a true, never to be forgotten page of this modest, courageous leader and hero of the great Chinese people.

* * *

Chu Teh hails from Szechwan. A good part of his life was spent

in South China and Southwest China. Chu Teh gave many years of his life to arduous, exhausting labor as a coolie. His hands and shoulders are hardened and marked by proletarian labor. He saw the life of the long-suffering people of China at close quarters. His memory has become indelibly lined with awful pictures of the enslaved Chinese villages, fettered in chains of feudalism, pining away under barbarous exploitation and oppression, and of the poor working people in the towns, clasped by the two-fold grip of imperialism and the native bourgeoisie. With tremendous strength of will, he restrained the storm of indignation which surged in his brain. Stupendous courage was combined in him with a clear, analytical mind. He understood perfectly that one cannot battle single-handed against overwhelming forces. He knew that a spark which fell among these millions of the people would blaze forth into a great revolutionary conflagration.

He has experienced the severe school of life, full of unusual revolutionary feats, of deepest privation and of patient training of the will. *He took an active part in the 1911 revolution*, and participated in the movement which broke out in Yunnan against the restoration of the imperial house of Yuan Shih-kai in China. He sees an emancipated people in the mists of the future. The bright sun of revolution sheds generous shafts of golden rays upon the free land, the land where the real masters of life—the workers and peasants—stand at the helm of the state.

Chu Teh is a true son of the people. Springing from the very heart of the masses of the people, he has not only been able to maintain connection with the masses, but has deepened and strengthened the bond for all times, and has given his whole life to the service of the people. He has shared all his wonderful abilities with them. In all kinds of conditions, in every situation that has arisen, Chu Teh has always been distinguished for his remarkable intellect, and his most subtle understanding of the psychology and feelings of the masses. And at the same time, through the whole fifty years of his life, he has retained the great modesty of a real leader of the people. He feels the suffering of the masses as his own personal tragedy. And at the same time, he bears with unusual ease, unconcernedly, all the heavy blows that life has hurled at him in the course of gigantic events. Everywhere, at all points of the struggle, he has always first of all secured advantages for the people who are fighting for their national and social emancipation.

He first came into contact with military affairs in the military school of the Yunnan militarists, and immediately grasped the tremendous importance of military measures in the struggle of the people. From this time onwards he became such a capable student that the hard-boiled generals who were his teachers feebly shrugged their shoulders: they could not tell him what they themselves did not know. The student advanced far ahead of his teachers. And when, many years later, Chu Teh returned to the province of Yunnan, he went back to the same school, but as a teacher. He taught the dull-witted offspring of the generals, but the same time watching, studying these people to whom in the near future he was destined to give such astonishing practical lessons of revolutionary warfare.

In Chinese military circles he enjoyed fame as an excellent military specialist. The big militarists fought among themselves for the honor of having him in their armies. And the silent Chu Teh watched these quarrels and smiled: he had long ago chosen the road he intended to follow.

The roar of the waves of the great proletarian revolution of October 1917 met with a sharp echo in China. The masses of the people began to stir, the advanced and revolutionary section of the intellectuals took heart again. Soon the Chinese Communist Party was formed. Chu Teh became a Communist. The revolutionary movement in the country grew at a rapid pace. Broad masses of the toilers in the towns and villages established their revolutionary organizations.

Chu Teh became a regimental commander. His regiment distinguished itself among all the other troops of South China for its splendid organization, for its discipline and its excellent knowledge of military science. No one ever suspected that there was a revolutionary organization in this regiment, led by the Commander himself. The soldiers and the commanders were carefully selected by Chu Teh, and were people devoted to the revolution. Chu Teh was painstakingly hammering out cadres of revolutionary fighters.

At the will of the Party, Chu Teh left China. For a number of years he was in Europe, studying new lands, the art of war, and foreign languages. He displayed extraordinary capabilities. In a short time he mastered the French, German and English languages. His close friends called him a revolutionary linguist when he learned also the Russian language. But he paid most attention of all to the theory and practice of revolutionary wars, as elaborated by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. He plunged head-first into the study of the wealthy experiences of the great proletarian revolution in October, 1917.

On returning to China, he said to a close circle of comrades: "Now I have matured. I have acquired new knowledge. I shall devote it to our cause."

The Party once more sent him to South China, into the troops of the militarists. Chu Teh took command of his old regiment and was soon given charge of a brigade. General Fang Shih-shen, the famous Yunnan militarist, to whose army this brigade belonged, appointed Chu Teh his adviser and shared with him his dreams of conquering the provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kwantung, the whole of South China; Fan Shih-shen would be the master, and Chu Teh the military governor.

Smiling inwardly, Chu Teh gave his agreement to this plan, but did not lose a single day in organizing and preparing the first revolutionary detachments. Chu Teh enjoyed unquestionable authority among the Yunnan and Kwangsi generals. He is far superior in military knowledge to all these generals put together. And so, when rumors began to be spread that Chu Teh was a Communist and his brigade a Communist brigade, General Fan Shih-shen refused to believe it and decided that Chu Teh wanted to become an "independent general". It meant political and military death for Fan Shih-shen if he were to lose Chu Teh, so he asked Chu Teh not to leave him, although he saw that it was beyond his power to keep this brigade in his own hands.

The Chinese bourgeois press gave the following report at the time of the relations between Chu Teh and Fan Shih-shen:

"It has become universally known that Chu Teh is a Communist, and intends departing for the regions where peasant uprisings are taking place in the provinces of Kiangsi and Fukien. If Fan Shih-shen were to hinder Chu Teh from doing so, he would be immediately crushed, since Chu Teh is in command of the best fighting units. Having made use of Fan Shih-shen's arsenal, Chu Teh has left him. All Fan Shih-shen's friends demanded that Chu Teh be shot, but the General had too much respect for the latter and was too much afraid of him."

Chu Teh left with his detachment for Kiangsi, to meet the units of Ho Lung and Yeh Ting who had raised the banner of revolt in Nanchang, in August 1927. This date was the beginning of a new brilliant stage in the life and activity of Comrade Chu Teh.

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Chu Teh's detachment went through heavy battles in its march through the northern part of the Kwantung province into South Hunan. Detachments of peasant partisans, individual units of soldiers from the militarist troops who had heard of "Red Chu Teh", joined him on the way. In April 1928, the historic meeting took place in the province of Kiangsi, Ninkang county, in the region of the inaccessible mountains of Tsinkanshan, of the two main fighting detachments of the great Chinese revolution.

In Ninkang the detachments of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung came together and joined forces. Henceforth the ideological and militant friendship of two revolutionary leaders of the people, cemented with the blood shed in countless battles, serves as an example of human singleness of purpose, of iron collaboration. Mao Tse-tung brought the partisan detachment of Hunan miners and workers, of Kiangsi farm laborers and of revolutionary peasants to Ninkang. From all corners of Kiangsi and Hunan, Fukien and Kwantung, partisan detachments of peasants and workers flocked to Ninkang. With pikes and swords, knives and sticks, the national fighters collected together under the banner of the revolution. Here in Ninkang, the foundation was laid of the heroic Chinese Red Army. Under the leadership of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung the famous Fourth Corps of the Red Army was formed—the first big combination of troops of Soviet China. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China appointed Chu Teh Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Army Corps, and Mao Tse-tung its political commissar.

The corps commanders were given the task of developing the formation of new army units. This extremely complicated military and political task was fulfilled in incredibly difficult conditions. The regions occupied by the Fourth Corps were overrun with counter-revolutionary Kuomintang troops. The Third Nanking division, numbering about 35,000 soldiers, and armed with the latest military equipment, was sent into action against the Fourth Red Army corps, which consisted of 8,000 men, with

total of 2,000 rifles, a number of machine-guns, and an extremely limited supply of cartridges at their disposal.

This was the first, and one of the most serious tests for the young army of the Chinese Soviets. Chu Teh was called upon to display exceptional strategic skill, self-sacrificing courage, and true revolutionary heroism. By a brilliant maneuver, Chu Teh brought his corps out of the encirclement of the hostile troops and dealt them a blow in the rear, and, from an angle where they least expected to be attacked. One division of the enemy was completely crushed, and two others retreated in panic. This brilliant operation immediately brought 3,000 rifles and a tremendous amount of additional war munitions to the Fourth Corps.

This first big victory made it possible for Chu Teh to accelerate the work of forming new detachments of the Chinese Red Army. By the beginning of 1930, the Fourth Corps numbered about 20,000 men. Simultaneously other corps of the Red Army were formed and developed: those under the command of Comrades Ho Lung, Pen Te-huei, Fang Chin and others. However, the historic service of creating the present Chinese Red Army unquestionably belongs to the Fourth Corps led by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, who correctly fulfilled the line of the Communist Party on military questions.

The life of Chu Teh is indissolubly linked up with the origin and further growth of the heroic army of Soviet China. When we speak of Chu Teh we involuntarily speak of the Red Army, and vice versa, when we speak of this glorious army, we cannot but speak about Chu Teh, its militant leader. The enormous force which the Fourth Corps has now come under the leadership of Chu Teh can be clearly seen from one of the first orders of the Red Army, an excerpt from which we give below:

"Order No. 3, March 10, 1930.

"1. The Fourth Corps (Commander—Comrade Chu Teh) is ordered within three months from the receipt of this order to enter the confines of, to free from counter-revolutionary hostile forces and to capture, the following counties and border regions of the provinces Kiangsi-Fukien: Tsannan, Tsansan, Tsantu, Juiehin, Huichang, Nankan, Sinfeng, Anwan, Tunkow, Wuhua and Sinnin, and also the following regions: Pinyuan, Tsaolin and Tan-wu, Chanting and Ninhua. . . ."

In a short report dated May 5, 1930, we read:

"The Fourth Corps has completely fulfilled Point 1 of Order No. 3 dated March 10, 1930. In the regions indicated in the army order mentioned, the toiling population have been afforded full support in the organization of organs of Soviet power and in the annihilation of the enemies of the people. . . .

Commander of the Fourth Corps, Chu Teh,
Political Commissar, Mao Tse-tung."**

In 1930-1931 the Chinese Red Army was gradually reconstructed: the Fourth Corps became part of the First Army, and Chu Teh was appointed Commander of the Army. In November 1931, after the First

* See *Manmo Jijio* for January 1931, Dairen.

** *Ibid.*

Congress of Soviets, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Chinese Soviet Republic appointed Comrade Chu Teh Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army and President of the Revolutionary Military Council. Chu Teh has increased his strategic experience in constant battles, testing in actual practice the correctness of the complicated, lightning decisions taken in circumstances of hostile environment. Chu Teh has not met with a single serious defeat during the whole of his military experience. Only the overwhelming numerical superiority of the forces of the enemy has forced him sometimes to withdraw his units, in order to save his Red Army men.

Chu Teh is not only a talented commander of the army: he is a most courageous fighter, one who knows no fear. During moments of attack, the Red Army men see the tall, somewhat stooping figure of their fearless leader, far ahead in front of the first ranks. He is always the last to retreat, carefully safeguarding his men, and never forgetting to organize help for the wounded Red Army soldiers.

When a halt is made Chu Teh seats himself among the tired men, and tells them of the extraordinary, inspiring history of the land in which the Red Army has already been victorious, where the people are already free, and where the sun of a new world pours down floods of bright rays upon the land. When on the march, he sleeps and eats with the Red Army men. In hours of leisure he reads lectures to the commanders on the tactics and strategy of revolutionary warfare, saturating his lectures with the rich experience of the civil war in Russia. This usually silent man compels the audience to live through moments of high tension when delivering his speeches. His firm, somewhat husky voice is well known throughout the Red Army, to the toilers of Soviet China.

Former officers and colonels of the Nanking armies who have voluntarily transferred to the side of the Chinese Soviets, declare that this is the first time in their military lives that they have met with a Commander of an army who possesses such keen strategic acumen, a commander of an army who can so clearly solve the most complicated theoretical military tasks in practical battles against an enemy so excellently supplied with technical equipment. In 1933, Chu Teh who clearly understands the extreme need to train cadres of commanders for the Red Army formed a military academy attached to the general headquarters. He himself trained the instructors and read the first lectures on military art, the principles of revolutionary warfare and maneuvering, and the colossal experiences of the civil war in Soviet Russia.

We involuntarily call to mind the foul calumny of Chen Tu-hsiu, the renegade, who made the following assertion:

"The Chinese Red Army is not of great importance. When the ruling classes of China cease their internecine warfare, it will be crushed, or bought over, or, thanks to internal strife, it will crumble away itself and vanish. . . . It may also happen that it will become a White army. . . ."

The historic course of events has crushed these foul dreams of the man who has turned traitor to the Chinese people. The Chinese Red

army has grown into a powerful, menacing force. This army, created by the people, has hammered out wonderful fighters and talented commanders. Comrades Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, iron Chinese Bolsheviks, true leaders of the people, have molded this army.

* * *

At the end of 1934, the Chinese Red Army began its historic trek from Kiangsi to Szechwan. Vast hordes of White troops were located on the borders of the Central Soviet region of Kiangsi, Chiang Kai-shek's army of almost 600,000 men was sent against the main base of the Chinese Soviets. Over a hundred foreign military specialists attached to the general staff of Chiang Kai-shek drew up a "plan to liquidate the Red Army".

The overwhelming superiority of the enemy's forces compelled the Chinese Communist Party to save the main units of the Chinese Red Army, which was inferior in technical equipment to the armies of Chiang Kai-shek, by withdrawing them from the hostile encirclement they were in, into the open spaces where a war of maneuvers could be conducted.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Red Army and President of the Revolutionary Military Council, Comrade Chu Teh, drew up his plan for the trek and for the withdrawal of his units from the enemy that surrounded them. But this was not a retreat: having broken through the Nanking cordons, the army headed by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung came out into the open spaces where maneuvering was possible, on to the gigantic battle grounds of Southwest China. By a deeply conceived operation, they crushed the plans of the Kuomintang command and of its foreign advisers, headed by the German fascist general, von Seeckt. On the road to Szechwan, in the provinces of Honan, Kweichow and Yunnan, the Red Army crushed Chiang Kai-shek's "army in pursuit".

Chu Teh led his army across rivers and over mountains, through deserts, and through traps laid by its mortal enemies. He brought it to Szechwan, after an unexampled, historic trek, during which the men and their commanders covered the tremendous distance of 4,000 kilometers. The Red Army marched, an all-devastating iron flood, through Central and Southern China. And along the whole length of the road they traversed, they did not meet with a single defeat!

* * *

Even the mortal enemies of the Chinese Soviets are unable to remain silent about the fact that real popular leaders stand at the head of the millions of China. Of the countless comments in the press, we will cite only one, which gives a sufficient characterization of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung:

"Actually, the Red Army left Kiangsi without sustaining any losses. On the other hand, the Nanking troops suffered a number of cruel blows. Particularly was this the case when the

army of Chu Teh destroyed a number of choice divisions near Kweiyang. . . .*

"The fact must be recognized that Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, these 'Red Dragons', as they are called in China, possess wonderful strategic talents. The foreign military specialists fling up their arms. They were convinced that Chu Teh and his army had been caught in the trap in Kiangsi from which there was no way out. . . .

"The successes of the Red Army can also be explained by the fact that people like Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung possess immense magnetic force; the common people are drawn to them. Therein lies the greatest danger. . . ."

This is what the true blue organ of British imperialism in China—the *South China Morning Post*—has to say.

Chu Teh is now extending the front in Southwest China. He has returned to his native Szechwan, which he left so many years ago. Fifty million inhabitants of Szechwan awaited his return. He came. And the legend of the people, which outstripped him, says: "Chu Teh has come to us, Szechwan. He is ours." On the high hills, near the counter-revolutionary fortress of Chendu**, stand Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung. Chu Teh looks at the walls of the town through his field glasses, and, as the popular legend has it, can see "for a distance of a 100 li on all sides at once".

These walls will fall when the legendary commander of the army of the Chinese Soviets—Chu Teh—leads his fearless iron fighters to storm them.

Comrade Chu Teh is the national hero of the Chinese people, who, for nearly thirty years, beginning with the revolution of 1911 up to the present day, has been firmly and unwaveringly fighting against imperialist oppression for the national independence of the Chinese people, and for a better life for the workers and peasants. From the moment that Manchuria was occupied, he has constantly been calling upon all armies and the people to offer resistance to the Japanese offensive. Recently, on behalf of the Red Army, Comrade Chu Teh made the proposal to all the troops in China that all forces should unite immediately to fight the external enemy, to organize a united army for war against Japanese imperialism.

Comrade Chu Teh is a true national hero of the Chinese people, who enjoys the love of the broad toiling masses of the whole of China.

The broad masses of the people call him the Chinese Voroshilov.

* The chief town in the province of Kweichow.

** The chief town in the province of Szechwan.

Fang Chi-min—Hero of the Chinese People

EVERYONE in Nanchang knew this strongly built man. At meetings in the working class districts, his passionate speeches called upon the listeners to join in the fierce, stubborn fight against the bourgeoisie, the landlords, the militarists and imperialists, who are squeezing the blood out of the Chinese people. The inexhaustible energy of the revolutionary agitator tossed him from town to town, to the far-distant villages of mountainous Kiangsi, among the rank-and-file soldiers of the enemy's troops. He was to be found everywhere where revolutionary struggle was rife, where the people were stirring. He was always with the masses, at their head. Ten years ago, on instructions from the Communist Party, he organized a group of propagandists from among the workers for the first time, and lovingly reared them into courageous fighters for the revolution.

The people of Kiangsi loved this tireless, fearless Communist. In the workers' barracks in the towns, and in the village tea-shops, the people talked with great respect of the "wonderful life of our Fang".

Fang Chi-min was born and brought up in the countryside. Before his eyes there passed the awful life of the Chinese peasantry, crushed by feudal exploitation and the yoke of the landlords, oppressed by the arbitrary license of the generals, and by taxation and extortions. Fury and hatred seized young Fang Chi-min; he tried to change the situation in the village, to lighten the burden of the peasantry. But not knowing the fundamental laws of the class struggle, he met with bitter disappointment. Leaving the village and his family, Fang went to the town. His friends advised him to study, in order to learn about the structure of modern bourgeois society, built upon the cruel exploitation of the toilers by a handful of parasites.

A few years later, Fang was a graduate of a technological institute—an engineer. But not only did he study. While still a student, he joined the Communist Party of China. Only then did he apprehend the reasons why his own first attempts to tear the destitute peasantry from the clutching grasp of slavery and violence had met with failure. Revolutionary hatred combined with a splendid understanding of the needs and hopes of the oppressed village made him a fiery Communist agitator, a leader of the masses. The best representatives of the Chinese intelligentsia followed Fang Chi-min, the "revolutionary fanatic". The urban poor listened with delight to the fiery appeals of the young Communist for revolutionary struggles.

After the first mighty wave of the Chinese Revolution (1925-27), there followed a period of fierce, bloody reaction. The treacherous Kuomintang engaged in savage reprisals against all that was revolutionary, against all that was dear to the great, long-suffering people of China. Hundreds and thousands of the best representatives of the people were

thrown by reaction into gloomy dungeons, and were subjected to unbearable medieval tortures. For hundreds and thousands of Communists and Young Communists, the "mildest" sentence was to be shot!

In the night of August 1-2, 1927, the famous Nanchang uprising took place. The military units led by Ho Lung and Ye Ting raised the red flag of struggle against counter-revolution. Ho Lung's units moved towards the province of Shantung. Fang Chi-min, the most active participant in the Nanchang uprising, remained behind in Kiangsi at the most dangerous section of the revolutionary struggle, in the heart of millions of the people. During these days the workers and peasants of Kiangsi listened to the fiery voice and flaming speeches of Fang Chi-min. Everywhere Fang called upon the workers and peasants to undertake decisive action, to begin an armed struggle. In Yeean, Fang's birthplace, he organized one of the first revolutionary partisan detachments, led the work of seizing the lands of the landlords, and destroyed the rent agreements which enslaved the peasantry. He himself divided the stretch of land which belonged to his family equally among the village farm laborers. In the farthest villages, where rumors about the revolutionary events were already current, the name of Fang became a symbol of emancipation from the age-long yoke. Fang Chi-min was a true friend of the people.

From all corners of the province of Kiangsi, armed workers and peasants flocked to Fang's detachment. News of the organization of partisan detachments aroused the toilers of the neighboring provinces. Singly and in groups fighters from North Fukien, South Anhwei, and Western Szechwan made their way to him.

Then came the end of 1928. For the first time Soviets were set up on the territory of the frontier regions of the three provinces: Kiangsi, Szechwan, Fukien. Fang Chi-min was elected president of the Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies of the frontier region. A witness for many years of the barbarous exploitation and yoke of slavery which weighed down the broad masses of the peasantry, he had a splendid knowledge of the entire mechanism of the apparatus of bourgeois-landlord oppression and violence. Passionately and tirelessly Fang Chi-min broke down this robber apparatus of the parasites and idlers.

The freed lands were returned to their real owners—the toiling peasantry. But they had to be defended in a stubborn, violent struggle against mortal enemies. The ranks of the partisan detachments—defenders of the emancipated people—swelled rapidly. The toilers of Hunan, Kiangsu, Fukien and Hupeh marched side by side, shoulder to shoulder, and hurled themselves in a fierce devastating avalanche upon the counter-revolutionary hordes. The Soviet regions were arising and growing at a stormy pace in Central China. It was with fixed attention that the entire world watched the unfolding of a gigantic picture of the majestic struggle of millions.

Then the years 1929-30. Aided by the imperialists, the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang organized its first campaign against the Soviet regions in the provinces of Kiangsi, Honan and Hupeh. The numerous armies of the Nanking generals advanced against Soviet territory. The first partisan detachments and units of Chu Teh and Mao

se-tung formed the Chinese Red Army. Badly equipped and insufficiently armed, the units of the Red Army and the partisan detachments not only fought heroically but successfully beat off the attacks of the Kuomintang hordes. In this stubborn and severe struggle, the partisan detachments of Fang Chi-min guarded the borders of the Soviet regions, fearlessly and passionately defending every clod of Soviet soil. By its devastating counter-attacks and skillful strategic operations, the Red Army not only threw back the enemy, but armed itself at the expense of the Kuomintang army units which it routed. The heroic Red Army of the Chinese Soviets, and its glorious, courageous commanders were forged in the furnace of fierce civil war.

The year 1931. The scattered partisan detachments of Fang Chi-min were united into big regular units of the Chinese Red Army. A gigantic wave of revolution aroused millions of the Chinese people to the struggle for the Soviets. In Kiangsi, Hupeh, Shangsi, Honan, Kweichow and Anhwei, Fukien and Szechwan—in all parts of the country, Soviet regions grew at a stormy pace, partisan detachments were organized, and new regular units of the Chinese Red Army were formed. This year will go down forever in the history of Soviet China. The heroic, glorious battles for Tunku, Ningtu, Hsinkuo, and Soviet Kiangsi are bright, fiery pages, which tell of the struggle, of the new history of an emancipated people. This year, for the first time in the history of the Chinese people, its fully empowered and plenipotentiary delegates came together at the First Congress of Soviets in Juichin—a town hidden far away in the Kiangsi mountains. The best units of the Red Army stood guard over the whole of the Juichin region, where the Congress of Chinese Soviets was working. Fang Chi-min's detachments among others honorably fulfilled this extremely important task.

The counter-revolution, bestial with fear, organized constant drives against the Chinese Soviets. The Kuomintang general staff, Japanese, German and American military advisers drew up extensive strategic plans for the "destruction of the Red Army" and "the wiping out of the Red Government". The struggle between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution took on an all-China and international character.

The year 1933. The growth of Fang Chi-min's popularity among broad masses of the toilers was in direct proportion to the growth of the bestial hatred felt towards him by the Nanking generals. The reward offered for the delivery of Fang dead or alive, rose by leaps and bounds.

In Nanchang, Shuichou, Anchin*, the walls of the houses in the squares and streets were plastered with thousands of enormous placards with the following notice in thick black paint:

"\$50,000 will be paid to whomsoever will deliver the Red bandit Fang Chi-min, dead or alive, into the hands of the general staff."

Only a short while earlier, in 1932, similar placards announced the fact that Fang Chi-Min's head was valued by the Nanking general staff at \$30,000. But the general staff of the Kuomintang reaction waited in

* The chief towns of the Kiangsi, Fukien and Anhwei provinces.

vain for their attractive proposals to be fulfilled. Not a single foul traitor was to be found in the villages and towns through which Fang Chi-min's units passed, in the Soviet territories.

The year 1934. Six campaigns launched by the Kuomintang armies equipped out of the funds raised by foreign loans ended in severe defeat in the struggle against the Red Army and the people of Soviet China. The country groaned under the heel of the imperialist robbers. The Japanese army of occupation marched through the fields of Manchuria, Jehol and North China, bringing devastation to the towns and villages, and annihilating the population. Expressing the will of millions of the people, the government of the Chinese Soviet Republic in 1932 declared war upon imperialist Japan. The Tenth Corps of the Red Army under the command of Comrade Fang Chi-min was reorganized into the First Anti-Japanese People's Vanguard Army. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Revolutionary Military Council appointed Comrade Fang Chi-min as the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army.

By this time the Kuomintang generals were offering \$80,000 for Fang Chi-min's head. The Shanghai newspapers demanded "the immediate destruction of the Red leader". Chiang Kai-shek's best guard divisions were hurled against Fang Chi-min's troops. But Fang Chi-min dealt his blows boldly and with lightning speed, and remained elusive as hitherto. The units of the First People's Army were everywhere. The woe-begotten Nanking army leaders trembled with fear at the idea of meeting Fang's army. Moved by fear and the knowledge of their own impotence, they spread lies and foul calumny on all sides. Here are a few statements taken at random from the Shanghai newspapers:

"May 23, 1934. The detachments of the notorious Fang Chi-min have been discovered at a point 65 miles from Nanchan [the capital of Kiangsi province]. The governmental troops, in the absence of reinforcements, avoided a clash. However, Fang's detachments is surrounded on all sides."

"May 25, 1934. . . . The 41st brigade of the government troops are successfully attacking the remains of a big band under the command of Fang Chi-min, the Red General. Hurling back to the river Han, close to the town of Yungfeng [a few miles from Nanchang], the band has been routed, Fang Chi-min himself took his life, not wishing to be taken prisoner. . . ."

"May 28, 1934. . . . Numerous bands commanded by Fang Chi-min, known as the First People's Revolutionary Anti-Japanese Army, have been surrounded in a locality situated fifty miles south of Anchin [the capital of the Anhwei province, a few hundred miles from Yungfeng in Kiangsi]. It is reported from the General Headquarters [of Chiang Kai-shek] that this time Fang Chi-min and his troops will be finally wiped out."

In May of 1934, these and dozens of similar reports embellished the pages of the Kuomintang press. And in June, like a bolt from the blue, there came the telegram published in the Hongkong *South China Morning Post*, a reactionary British newspaper, which ran as follows:

"A large detachment of the Chinese Red Army headed by

Fang Chi-min unexpectedly attacked the government forces situated in the region of the frontiers of the Kiangsi and Anhwei provinces. The battle which lasted for twenty-four hours culminated in the complete rout of the government forces. Fang Chi-min personally led the raid and took part in the fighting. The reports published in various newspapers regarding the destruction of Fang Chi-min and his detachments are to be discounted. . . ."

At the end of 1934, there began the historic trek of the main forces of the Chinese Red Army from the province of Kiangsi to the new stronghold of Szechwan-Shansi. By holding off the onslaught of the Kuomintang hordes Fang Chi-min's units secured the concentration and departure of the main forces of the Chinese Red Army. It was in extremely difficult circumstances that Fang Chi-min led the military operations against the superior forces of the enemy. Over the course of several months—September 1934 to January 1935—Fang Chi-min's units conducted successful operations almost every day against the enemy forces. Actually the stubborn resistance of Fang Chi-min's troops together with other units of the Red Army was offered to the Nanking government which was 500,000 strong. Even this tremendous superiority of the armed forces of the enemy could not shake the iron ranks of the Chinese Red Army fighters.

Fang, the army Commander, never left his position in the vanguard of his units. Cheerful and overflowing with good spirits, beloved by his soldiers, the Commander of the Army not only led the fighting operations personally but took the most energetic part in the engagements with the enemy, infecting all the men, the whole army with his courageous behavior. There was no danger that could hold back Fang Chi-min, that could shake his courage.

On the night of January 29, 1935, Fang Chi-min, accompanied by a small detachment, undertook a scouting raid far into the territory occupied by the enemy. On the mountain of Huayu in the neighborhood of Tehsin, surrounded on all sides by officers' units, after being bombed from the air, and after violent engagement with the enemy, Fang Chi-min was taken prisoner.

Here is a description of the event written by the correspondent of a British newspaper *The North China Herald*:

"A large number of bombers appeared above the mountains. An enormous number of bombs were dropped over all suspicious-looking places. Fang Chi-min with a small detachment succeeded in getting away from the region being bombarded. However, in a short time he was surrounded on all sides near the mountain of Huayu. This small detachment defended itself for an incredibly long time, causing astounding losses to their enemies. The Nanking officers for a long time could not credit their success, so elusive was this famous Red general."

The joy of the Kuomintang generals knew no bounds. The "great-leader of the Reds" had fallen into the claws of the most ferocious action. In Nanking, Shanghai, and Nanchan official celebrations were organized on the occasion of the fall of the legendary Red Commander.

Fettered in chains, Fang Chi-min was cast into an iron cage and drawn through the streets of the Kuomintang towns, to demonstrate the "decisive victory over the Reds".

But the iron will of this revolutionary was not to be broken by the most refined moral and physical torture. A man of tremendous courage and fearlessness, he remained true to himself to the end. Scraps of information appeared in the Kuomintang newspapers concerning the interrogation of Fang Chi-min. "Interrogation" in Kuomintang prisons means a nightmare of medieval torture. And even the enemy press was forced to admit that "Fang Chi-min displayed his usual firmness during the interrogations".

On February 6, 1935, the Kuomintang leaders organized a "popular rejoicing on the occasion of the seizure alive of Fang" in the Yuchan park in Nanchan. The authorities issued a strict order that each institution in the town could send not more than ten representatives. But tens of thousands of peoples came to the park. All the streets adjoining the park were crowded with people. This is how an American correspondent described the "rejoicing":

"Cordons of police, gendarmes and troops surrounded the park. Machine-guns were drawn up on the pavements. Nobody dared to step off the pavement on to the road. Fang was brought in fettered on an armored car. Surrounded by a strong guard, he was displayed to the public. Not a sound of rejoicing was heard. Deep silence was maintained, even by the officers of Chiang Kai-shek's general staff. In the silence there was displayed all the respect and sympathy felt towards the man who stood upon the platform with head held high and fearless eyes. He was immediately driven away, for the silence of the crowd was too menacing for the authorities. As soon as the armored car moved away, the crowd began to show signs of agitation. The people were quieted by machine-guns, which were trained on them."

The correspondent of *The North China Herald*, already mentioned above, writes the following about his conversation with Fang Chi-min while confined in the cage:

"He is 37 years old. He is a man of exemplary behavior and a fine individuality. He said to me:

"'All people have the right to their own convictions, and I am glad that my life will be sacrificed to mine.' I was not surprised at this reply. I had expected that he would maintain his dignity and courage to the last minute. I had often admired his ability, his courage, his energy and strategic gifts. He told me that he has a father and mother, that he was married and had four sons and a daughter. The imminence of death could not shake this fearless man. In parting he declared with extreme self-possession:

"'There is one thing of which I am confident in my mind, that is the confidence of the need to fight, without sparing one's life, against imperialist aggression in China and for national independence, and for the emancipation of the entire oppressed Chinese people.'"

At subsequent "interrogations" Fang was promised his life in exchange . . . for the betrayal of the interests of the Chinese people. As his reply, we cite the statement of the official Kuomintang agency, *the Central News*:

"Fang has rejected all proposals. He is still incredibly adamant. He will presumably remain so until his death. He has given meager testimony, and has refused to reply to questions concerning the condition of the Red Army."

Fang Chi-min, the legendary hero of the Chinese people, was executed by the bloody reactionaries in Nanchang, in the town where every worker, every student, every poor man, every intellectual knew this courageous revolutionary fighter personally. The death of Fang Chi-min is a tremendous loss to the closely welded fighting family of rank-and-file men and commanders of the Red Army and the Chinese Soviets. But the rejoicings of the cowardly butchers have been overshadowed by the new victories of the Chinese Red Army in Kweichow, Szechwan, Kansu and Honan. Miracles of courage and fearlessness are being displayed by thousands of legendary Fang Chi-mins in the advance posts of the revolutionary front.

The man who was exhibited in an iron cage had a frank countenance that was both clever and bold. He was a real revolutionary, an iron Bolshevik of the great Chinese Revolution.

The Last Testament of Comrade Fang Chi-min

*(Written in Secret Before his Execution, in the Prison Cell of the
Military Tribunal in Nanchang, June 29, 1935.)*

IN consequence of mistakes made by its political leaders and of the indecision of its military command, the Tenth Corps of the Red Army was caught in the region fortified by the enemy's blockhouses. In the locality of Hueishan, we were surrounded by enemy forces seven times stronger than our own. Our last supplies of food and ammunition were spent, our men were extremely exhausted, and we suffered a tremendous defeat. We were hurrying to return to the Soviet region of Northeast Kiangsi, in order to obtain an appraisal of our work in the Southern part of Anhwei province, to receive instructions from the Central Committee, and to put our detachments into good shape. Despite the danger, the cold and hunger (we had no food for seven days and nights), we made constant efforts day and night to break through the line of the enemy's military blockade, but owing to the treachery of renegades and to our own lack of caution, we were captured by the 43rd brigade of the White army at 1 p.m. on January 24, 1935.

Upon capturing us, the enemy dispatched us to Nanchang, where we were thrown into the prison of the military tribunal, after first putting us in chains. Among the prisoners we found 35 of our comrades, including Chou Tsi-en, Li Shui-pin, Chang Hu-tan and others. These first three comrades were shot about a month later. Lin Tao-hsi, Wang Ju-chi and Chao Yang-shan were imprisoned in the same cell as I was, and had all been wounded before being taken prisoners. They were ill for over a month in prison. Their sickness so wasted them that they began to look like skeletons. In general, about ninety per cent of the prisoners are sick. I myself was ill for over ten days. I wrote during all the time that I was sick. I knew that we would be shot, regardless of our being sick.

We, Communists, die without fear for the revolution. We have made some mistakes in our time, but we have always tried to correct them immediately in accordance with the line of the Party. We are the true defenders and executors of the correct line of the Party, and are convinced that the time is not far off when the revolution, under Marxist-Leninist leadership, will be brought about in China and throughout the world. We are convinced that the Kuomintang system will be replaced by the Soviet system, which will save China from final ruin. We are further convinced that the capitalist system will give way to the Communist system, which will save the proletariat and all mankind from ruin. With the establishment of Communism, freedom and happiness will reign throughout the whole world.

We go to our death with the hope that all members of our Party will rally still more determinedly around our Central Committee, and that under its leadership they will intensify their Bolshevik energy, determination and initiative, as our comrade, the genius Lenin, did

uring his lifetime, that they will devote all their strength and abilities to the cause of revolution.

Today the working class movement in the cities is one of the weak links in our work. We must exert ourselves to the utmost to develop this movement. We must work untiringly among the soldiers of the Kuomintang army (unrest is growing in the ranks of the White army), and intensively develop the peasant movement in order to win the masses in their millions. We must immediately put into practice the Party's slogan: "Hammer out an iron Red Army a million strong"; we must launch peasant, partisan warfare throughout the whole of China, and render it impossible for the Kuomintang army to concentrate its troops with a view to crushing the main forces of the Red Army. We must also work energetically to build new Soviet regions where the main forces of the Red Army will find the assistance and support they require to smash the enemy. We must launch a counter-offensive by the Red Army throughout the whole of China, and merge all the forces of the Soviet movement into one whole so as to overthrow the bloody domination of the Kuomintang government and to set up an independent, free, workers' and peasants' Soviet government.

And if in our time we still meet with comrades whose attitude towards the decisions and instructions of the Party is passive, then we have the right to call these comrades, not revolutionaries, but pseudo-Communists. Only such people can forget that tens of thousands of Party members are languishing and suffering tortures under inhuman conditions in the Kuomintang prisons; only such people can forget the bloody horror of the execution of our comrades by the Kuomintang butchers, the fierce struggle that is being waged by the main forces of our Red Army; only such people can forget the millions of workers and peasants suffering perpetual want and dying of starvation.

Dear comrades! We met with defeat because of our own mistake, and we were taken prisoners. Sooner or later we shall be shot by the Kuomintang hangmen. Dear comrades, we are parting from you forever.

The fascist Kuomintang has done its utmost in attempts at bribery and intimidation to bring us over to the side of the enemy. But what is the Kuomintang? It is a band of the foulest robbers, of traitors to the national interests of China, the bloody butchers of the Chinese workers and peasants. We or they? The Kuomintang people may cut off our heads, but they cannot shake our Communist convictions. Our convictions are strong and firm as iron.

We are now trying to escape from prison. If we are successful, well and good. If not, we shall meet death without fear. And so we, who are perhaps at death's door, cry aloud with all the class hatred that is in us: Down with imperialism, and first and foremost with Japanese imperialism! Down with the treacherous Kuomintang! Long live the final victory of the Chinese Red Army! Long live the Chinese Soviet Republic! Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation! Long live the Chinese Communist Party! Long live the Communist International! Long live the Soviet Union! Long live the mighty leader of the world proletariat, comrade Stalin! Long live the victory of Communism throughout the world!"

Manifesto to the Whole People of China on Resistance to Japan and the Sal- vation of the Fatherland*

CITIZENS one and all! All sons and daughters of our fatherland: The new intensified encroachment by Japanese imperialism, and the continued unexampled capitulation of the Nanking government have led to a situation where many of the Northern provinces, in the train of Manchuria and Jehol, have now once again been amputated, in fact, from the living body of our country.

Peiping and Tientsin—cities with a history and culture thousands of years old; Hopei, Shantung and Shansi—provinces containing inexhaustible riches and natural resources; Chahar and Suiyuan—regions which are of tremendous strategic importance; the Peiping-Mukden, Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow and Peiping-Suiyuan railways, which link up all the political and economic centers of the country, are all now in fact under the iron heel of Japanese militarism. The General Staff of the robber Kwantung army is now the state, energetically putting into effect its previously drawn up plan of creating the so-called “Mongolkuo” and “Huapeikuo”.** Less than four years have passed since the events of September 18, 1931, but how far advanced are the dismemberment and seizure of the most important regions of China by the Japanese militarists! After Manchuria—Jehol; after Jehol—the zone around the Great Wall and Shanhaikwan; after Shanhaikwan and the strategic points of the Great Wall—the so-called “Luantung demilitarized regions”; after the “Luantung demilitarized region”—the virtual seizure by Japanese armed forces of Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan and others of the Northern provinces. Almost half of our country is in part occupied and in part virtually seized by Japanese imperialism. The plan for the complete destruction of China as a state, outlined in the Tanaka memorandum, is being systematically put into effect. If this state of affairs continues, then it is clear that all the provinces in the Yangtze and Pearl Valleys, and the other remaining provinces, will be gradually seized by the Japanese imperialist robbers. Thereby our fatherland, which possesses the oldest culture on earth, one which has a history 5,000 years old, would be finally converted into a colony, and the greatest people in the world, with its 400,000,000 population, would be completely reduced to condition of slaves.

During the last few years our country and our nation have been experiencing a growing, deepening crisis. We are face to face with the alternative: *either we resist the Japanese offensive—which means life; or we renounce resistance to the foreign invasion—which means death. In view of this the struggle to organize resistance to Japan and to save*

* Originally published in the *Trigobao*—issue No. 10, 1935.

** Japanese puppet states in Mongolia and North China.—Ed.

our fatherland has long since become the sacred duty of every citizen, of every son and daughter of our fatherland!

But to our misfortune, a handful of traitorous elements exists among our own great people, the shameless scum of society—individuals with human faces but with hearts of beasts. During the last few years, Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei, Chang Hsueh-liang and other national traitors, Huang Fu, Yang Yung-tai, Wang I-tang, Chang Chung and other Japanese agents, through the policy of “non-resistance” have surrendered one Chinese province after another. Pursuing the tactics of “patience”, they have acceded to one Japanese demand after another, hiding behind demagoguery about the “necessity of first creating calm internally and then resisting the external enemy”. They are conducting a bloody war against their own people, suppressing every kind of anti-imperialist movement, and behind their demagoguery about “waiting for a new world war” actually forbid the adoption of any sort of national action directed towards resisting Japan and to saving our fatherland. And yet these people, traitors to our fatherland, have lately, under slogans of “Sino-Japanese collaboration” and “Pan-Asianism”, been pursuing a frankly predatory, disgraceful, capitulatory policy, one hitherto unknown in Chinese or world history.

The Japanese robbers demanded the withdrawal from the North of the troops of Yu Hsueh-chung, Sung Chih-yuan and others—and many of these troops were immediately withdrawn southwards and westwards, to engage in internecine warfare against their own people. The Japanese robbers demanded the removal of numerous Chinese political and military leaders—and all these persons were immediately removed from their posts. The Japanese robbers demanded the transfer of the Hebei provincial government from Tientsin, and the whole of its apparatus was immediately transferred to Paoting. The Japanese robbers demanded that all those Chinese newspapers and magazines which had displeased them be suspended and prohibited, and all these newspapers and magazines were immediately suspended and banned. The Japanese robbers demanded the arrest and punishment of the editors and correspondents of the *Sinshen* and other Chinese newspapers and magazines which they objected, and the editor of the *Sinshen* and a number of correspondents were immediately arrested and thrown into prison. The Japanese robbers demanded that slavish, Japanophile education be introduced into Chinese schools and universities, and all advanced, progressive Chinese literature was immediately burned, while numerous honest young men and women, who refused to be made the slaves of a foreign state, were arrested and many of them shot. The Japanese robbers demanded that Japanese advisers shall be attached to all Chinese state institutions and Japanese spies were immediately invited to take part in the military, political and financial institutions of the Nanking government. And even when the Japanese robbers demanded that organizations of the Kuomintang itself be disbanded, its local organizations in North China and Amoy were immediately dissolved. The Japanese robbers demanded that the Blue Shirts' Union be disbanded, and its leaders, Tsen Kwang-ching and Chiang Hsiao-hsien immediately fled from North China.

The Chinese Soviet government and the Communist Party of China

consider that all the above-mentioned deeds perpetrated by Japanese imperialism and by its Chiang Kai-shek agency constitute the greatest national disgrace of the Chinese people. The Soviet government and the Communist Party of China in all earnestness declare: We not only emphatically protest against any sort of forcible seizure of our lands whatsoever, and against all interference in our own Chinese affairs by the Japanese imperialists, but we just as emphatically protest against the Japanese demand that Kuomintang organizations and the Blueshirts be disbanded, since from the viewpoint of the Soviet government and the Communist Party of China, *all the affairs of the Chinese must be decided exclusively by the Chinese themselves*. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the Kuomintang and the Blueshirts' Union have committed innumerable crimes against our people and our country, the question as to whether these organizations shall continue to exist or be destroyed is our own Chinese affair, concerning which Japanese imperialism has no right to any say whatsoever.

Our provinces have been over-run by foreigners one after another; our people, scores upon scores of millions of them, have been enslaved by foreigners; while cities and villages, one after another, have been drowned in bloody warfare by foreigners; our emigrants, group after group, have been forcibly expelled from other countries; and every step in our home and foreign policy has been subjected to interference on the part of the imperialist powers. What sort of a state is this? What sort of people are we?

China is our native land!

We, all of us, sons and daughters of our native land, are the Chinese nation.

Can we tolerate this sort of enslavement of our people, of our nation? Can we do other than fight to save ourselves and our fatherland?

No, absolutely no! See how Ethiopia, a country with a population of 12,000,000, is ardently preparing to engage in an heroic armed struggle against Italian imperialism, in defense of its land and its people. Can, then, China with its population of 400,000,000, fold its hands and await its destruction? The Soviet government and the Communist Party of China are deeply convinced that—save for the very, very few national traitors and agents of Japanese imperialism who are willing to follow the disgraceful example of Li Wang-yun, Cheng Hsiao-shu, Chang Ching-Lwei, Pu Yi, and others—the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people can on no account agree to give themselves into slavery to the foreign murderers. The Soviet government of China has long ago declared a war of national defense against Japanese imperialism. The Red Army has on more than one occasion appealed to all army units and proposed a joint armed struggle to save our fatherland. The anti-Japanese vanguard detachments of the Red Army have long been conducting a stubborn, hard struggle to win the roads to Northern China. The Nineteenth Army and the masses of the people carried out the heroic defense of Shanghai against the Japanese. Together with the masses our troops offered self-sacrificing armed resistance to prevent the Japanese penetrating into Chahar, into the region of the Great Wall and Luantung. The Fukien people's government at no time accepted

the proposal of the Red Army for joint struggle against the Japanese imperialists and their agent—Chiang Kai-shek.

Lo Tung-hsien, Hsu Ming-hung, Chi Hung-Chang, Jen Yin-chi, Teng Hieh mei, Tung Chang-yung, Chu Chin-pei, Pei Yang, Pan Hung-sen, Tze Tsan-tang, Sun Yun-ching, Fang Chih-min and other national heroes have sacrificed their young lives for the sake of their fatherland. Tu Chung-wu, Tien Han, Tu Chung-yuan and other heroic fighters have suffered imprisonment and torture for their indomitable loyalty to the struggle for the liberation of their own people. The military units of Tsai Tin-kai, Chiang Kuan-wei, Wong Chao-yuan, Fang Chen-mu, Chen Yin-shu and other anti-Japanese leaders continue to wage the struggle. Tsong Chins-lin, Ho San-yin, Li Tu, Ma Hsian-po and other prominent political leaders have issued "A fundamental program for the organization of a national war of the Chinese people against Japanese imperialism" bearing thousands of signatures of the best people in our country. For several years our workers, peasants, students and many merchants have been constantly waging, and are still waging, a heroic struggle in the form of a boycott of Japanese goods, in the form of anti-Japanese strikes, demonstrations, etc. And, finally, the particularly important fact that under the guidance of national heroes Yang Shing-shan, Chao Shang-tze, Wang Te-kung, Li Yean-lo, Chow Pao-chung, Hsia Wen-yung, Wu Yi-cheng, Li Hwa-tang, and others, our anti-Japanese partisan detachments, numbering hundreds of thousands of fighters in Manchuria and Jehol, in spite of all difficulties and at the cost of tremendous sacrifices, are carrying on an uninterrupted, stubborn and heroic armed struggle against the Japanese occupants, for the national liberation of our people. All the facts enumerated not only clearly illustrate the enthusiasm and energy of our people in the struggle for their national existence, but also the inevitable victory in this sacred struggle for national-liberation, over their enemies.

If our national-liberation struggle has as yet not achieved satisfactory successes, it is because on the one hand the anti-Japanese forces have been subjected to joint attacks by Japanese imperialism and the ranking government of Chiang Kai-shek, while on the other hand all the forces hostile to the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek have not yet united for common action.

In view of the present most grave situation, with the very existence of the Chinese people as a nation imperiled, the Soviet government and the Communist Party of China once again earnestly appeal to all our people: regardless of the differences in political opinions and interests of the various parties and groupings, regardless of the differences in the opinions, aspirations and interests which exist between the various classes and sections of the population, and regardless of the hostile actions which have taken place between the various military units in the past and today—all must act, in view of Japanese aggression, as one man, and recognize the great truth of our most popular national slogan: "Fight jointly against the enemy from without, in spite of all the strife within". First and foremost, we must all put an end to the treacherous armed struggle, and in particular to the war which Chiang Kai-shek is waging against his own people, thereby rendering it pos-

sible to concentrate all our national forces for the sacred cause of resisting Japan and saving our fatherland. The Soviet government and the Communist Party of China once more most earnestly declare: if the Kuomintang troops will cease their offensive against our Soviet regions, if they will conduct a struggle against Japanese imperialism, then, notwithstanding the hostilities of many years duration between the Red Army and the Kuomintang units, and the diametrically opposed views held by them on questions of the internal structure of China, the Red Army will not only immediately cease its military operations against them but will be the first to extend its hand to them for a joint armed struggle to save our fatherland. What is more, the Soviet government and the Communist Party of China further sincerely call upon:

All sons and daughters of our great people who do not want to become colonial slaves; all commanders and soldiers who have any national consciousness; all parties, groups and organizations which desire to take part in the sacred struggle for the national liberation of our people; all the honest young people among the members of the Kuomintang and the Blueshirts; all Chinese emigrants who wish to save their fatherland, all our brothers from among the oppressed national minorities (Mongols, Moslems, Koreans, Tibetans, Miaos, Yaos, Lolos, Fans and others) regardless of the terror and the acts of repression of the Japanese imperialists and the Nanking government of Chiang Kai-shek, let us rise up like one man to fight:

For the establishment of an all-China united people's government of national defense, together with the Soviet government and the Manchurian anti-Japanese local authorities!

For the organization of an all-China united anti-Japanese army, together with the Red Army and the Manchurian anti-Japanese partisan detachments!

The Soviet government is prepared to take upon itself the initiative for the formation of an all-China government of national defense. It is prepared immediately to enter into negotiations for the organization of a government of national defense and to take part in its along with all political parties and groups in China, with all prominent political and civic leaders, with all mass organizations, with all local military and political authorities who wish to participate in the struggle to resist Japan and save our fatherland.

The government of national defense organized as a result of these negotiations must be regarded as a provisional central organ for the struggle to save China, and it must take measures to convene a really representative body of all the Chinese people, elected on the basis of democratic liberties, which will determine the further road of the struggle for the integrity and independence of China. The Soviet government and the Communist Party of China will support the convening of such a representative body and its decisions with all the means at their disposal, since the Soviet government of China sincerely and fervently respects the opinion and the will of its people.

The main task facing this people's government will be to organize resistance to Japanese imperialism and the salvation of our fatherland. Therefore the following must be the main points in its program.

1. Armed resistance to Japanese expansion and the recovery of all occupied territories.
2. Aid to the starving, reclamation works on river beds and dams to combat floods and droughts.
3. Confiscation of all the property of Japanese imperialists in China and its transfer to a fund to cover the cost of the war against Japan.
4. Confiscation of all the land, rice, grain and other property of all national traitors and Japanese agents, and their transfer to a fund to help the unemployed, the poor and those participating in the anti-Japanese struggle.
5. Abolition of all onerous taxes and levies, regulation of financial policy, the monetary system and the whole of our national economy.
6. Increase in wages and salaries, and improvement in the living conditions of the workers, peasants, army men and intellectuals.
7. Democratic liberties, and the release of all political prisoners.
8. Universal free education, and the provision of work to young people upon completion of their studies.
9. Equal rights for all nationalities inhabiting China, and the safeguarding of the freedom of the person, property, and of the right of free choice of domicile and occupation of every inhabitant in China itself and of Chinese emigrants abroad.
10. The establishment of contacts with the masses of all peoples who are in opposition to Japanese imperialism (with the Japanese toiling people, with the Koreans, with the people of Formosa, etc.), for the purpose of joint struggle against the common enemy. The establishment of an alliance with all nations and states who support or sympathize with the national-liberation struggle of the Chinese people, and of friendly relations with all powers and nations who maintain benevolent neutrality towards the hostilities between Japanese imperialism and the Chinese people.

The united anti-Japanese army must include all troops and armed detachments who desire to fight against Japanese imperialism and its agents. A general staff for this joint army must be established under the guidance of the government of national defense. This general staff shall be set up either by means of electing representatives from the commanders and the rank and file of all anti-Japanese military units, or by some other democratic means. This question must also be decided by a majority of the representatives of all sides and by the will of the people. The Red Army is prepared to be the first to enter into this anti-Japanese united army for the purpose of fulfilling its sacred duty of saving our fatherland.

In order that the people's government may really fulfill its serious task of national defense, and in order that the anti-Japanese united army may really carry out its great duty of conducting a national war of liberation, the Soviet government and the Communist Party of China appeal to the whole of the people:

Arise for the national salvation of our people! Those of you who have much money—donate your money; those of you who have a large supply of arms—donate your arms; those who have much grain and

rice—donate your rice and grain; those of you who are in good health—do not begrudge your strength and energy; those who have specialized knowledge—give your knowledge. Let thus the whole of the people be mobilized, let millions and scores of millions of the people arm themselves with all kinds of weapons.

The Soviet government and the Communist Party of China are firmly convinced that if our people, numbering 400,000,000, is given a united political leadership in the form of an all-China people's government of national defense and its solid fighting vanguard in the shape of an all-China united anti-Japanese army, moreover, with the millions-strong forces of the armed people at its disposal, and having the support of the proletariat and the peoples of the entire East and throughout the world, it will inevitably defeat Japanese imperialism, hated by its own Japanese people and isolated on an international scale!

Brothers, rise up to the struggle!

For the salvation of our fatherland!

For the life of the nation!

For independence as a state!

For the integrity of our territory!

For human rights and liberties!

Long live the all-embracing unity of all the forces of our Chinese nation for resistance to Japan and for the salvation of our fatherland!

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.

Manifesto to the Manchurian People on the Events in North China*

TO the forty million inhabitants of the four Northeastern provinces: Four years ago, on September 18 [1931—*Ed.*], the Japanese cut-throats occupied Manchuria. Three years ago, on January 28 [1932—*Ed.*], they marched their troops into Shanghai, but suffered defeat, as a result of the fierce resistance by the 19th Army and the workers and population of Shanghai. They were unable to seize Shanghai. Two years ago, in the spring, the Japanese robbers once more led their troops into the province of Jehol and seized it. On June 6 of this year, the Japanese again, using the excuse that China had violated the Tangu agreement,** demanded that the Chinese government withdraw its troops from Peiping and Tientsin, that Sung Cheh-yuan evacuate his troops from Chahar, that anti-Japanese organizations be disbanded throughout China, and that the anti-Japanese movement be outlawed. They also put forward a number of other arbitrary demands.

The leaders of the Kuomintang government—Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, traitors to their fatherland, accepted in full the demands advanced by the Japanese bandits. On orders from Chiang Kai-shek, Yu Hsueh-chung troops have been withdrawn from Peiping and Tientsin: Sung Cheh-yuan has been removed from his post, and his troops have been withdrawn from Chahar; movements of any kind against Japan to save China are prohibited, and those who take the lead in anti-Japanese actions are arrested and killed.

The traitors Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Chin-wei are striving to keep the government in their own hands at the cost of betraying the Chinese people and the existence of China as a nation. Following in the footsteps of the traitor Chang Hsue-liang, under the pressure merely of bare threats, and without firing a single shot, they handed over Hupeh and Chahar to the Japanese imperialists, and put the provinces of Shansi, Shantung and Suiyun under their control. All Chinese territory to the north of the river Hwanghei has become a sphere of Japanese influence.

This is an unprecedented event in the five thousand years of Chinese history. Chiang Kai-shek, the traitor, has outstripped Chin Kui*** and Wu San-kei**** in betraying the interests of China. By selling Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Chin-wei tried to satisfy the demands of the Japanese robbers and gain a temporary breathing-space. Today

* Published in the newspaper *Tsibao*, No. 10, 1935.

** An agreement providing for the cessation of military action, the establishment of a demilitarized zone and the withdrawal of Chinese troops beyond the bounds of this zone.—*Ed.*

*** Chin Kui, who lived in the twelfth century, gained notoriety by helping the enemies of China to seize North China.—*Ed.*

**** Wu San-kei was a Chinese military chief who lived in the seventeenth century, notorious as a traitor to his native land, by the fact of his helping the Manchurians to conquer China.—*Ed.*

they are prepared to sell the North of China and Peking*, the famous historic capital of China, in order to maintain their power in the Southern provinces.

Can anything be achieved in this way? No, absolutely impossible.

Yesterday the Japanese robbers occupied Manchuria, today they have occupied North China, and tomorrow, very likely, they will want to seize Shantung, Honan, and then Central and South China. The Japanese robbers are unswervingly putting into effect their colonial policy, and will not be satisfied until they have converted the whole of China into a Japanese colony.

Can we allow China to be converted into a Japanese colony? No, on no account.

What must be done? Where is the way out?

There is one single means, one single way out:

We must immediately establish an anti-Japanese, anti-Manchukuo, anti-Chiang Kai-shek united front throughout the whole of China, mobilize all the anti-Japanese, anti-Manchukuo, anti-Chiang Kai-shek military forces on sea, land and in the air, and organize an anti-Japanese, anti-Manchukuo, anti-Chiang Kai-shek united army.

We must immediately organize armed resistance to the Japanese imperialists. We must immediately arm and mobilize the population of China for war against Japan. We must immediately confiscate the property of the Japanese robbers and of those who are traitors to our fatherland, so as to cover the cost of war against Japan.

We must immediately establish an anti-Japanese, anti-Manchukuo, and anti-Chiang Kai-shek government.

A united anti-Japanese front must be formed jointly with all states and peoples in the world who sympathize with the Chinese people, and with those also who observe benevolent neutrality towards its national-revolutionary struggle against Japan.

The Soviet government of China, together with the Chinese Red Army, has declared a national war of defense against Japanese imperialism. The commanders of the former 19th Army, Tsai Tin-kai and others, are striving to form an anti-Japanese, anti-Chiang Kai-shek government. The commander of the former Army for the Salvation of the Fatherland, Wang Te-lin, the commander of the Self-Defense Army, Li Tu, and others are also rising up to fight. *All the necessary conditions exist for the crystallization of a new political situation in China in the near future.*

Brothers in Manchuria!

Do you want to remain eternal slaves of Japan, or will you strive to obtain your freedom by fighting as national heroes and soldiers?

Brothers!

For four years we have been distressed by the knowledge that our native land is perishing. We have suffered enough. Arise! Join the relentless battle against the Japanese robbers!

There is an old proverb which says: "Each and all are responsible for the prosperity or ruin of a nation." Can we stand aside and not

* Now called Peiping.—Ed.

use up to save our native land at a time when it is in extreme danger, when the nation is perishing? The memory of our forefathers will not allow it, our sons and grandsons will not forgive us for this after our deaths.

Brothers in Manchuria! What must we do in Manchuria itself? We must convene an anti-Japanese congress of representatives of the people and establish a people's government in Manchuria to lead the Manchurian people to the overthrow of the Japanese puppet government of Manchukuo. We must unite with all governments, all anti-Japanese troops and organizations inside China.

Six anti-Japanese united armies have now been formed in Manchuria under the leadership of the "united anti-Japanese committee" and there are a number of partisan detachments numbering many tens of thousands. This does not include the detachments which are not under our guidance. The anti-Japanese armies are not *hunchus*, but are troops conducting a struggle against Japan for the salvation of their fatherland. Their aims are as follows:

1. Resistance to Japan, struggle against Manchukuo, the return of lost territories, and defense of our fatherland, China.
2. Confiscation of the property of the Japanese robbers and their lockkeys.

3. Unification of the people to resist Japan and save China.

Anti-Japanese societies are to be found throughout the whole of Manchuria, and throughout the whole of China. They represent a great force and are organizations which are really conducting a struggle against Japan to save the fatherland.

Brother commanders and soldiers of the volunteer army and partisan detachments in Manchuria! Join our united anti-Japanese armies and anti-Japanese societies for joint struggle against the robbers!

Brother commanders and soldiers of the Manchurian army! Turn your bayonets against your Japanese officers and join with us against the Japanese to save our fatherland!

Brother workers! Throw down your hammers! Go to the front, annihilate the Japanese robbers! Win the eight-hour working day! Fight for your national and social emancipation!

Brother peasants! Throw down your scythes! Go to the front! Settle accounts with the Japanese barbarians! Defend your own fields and fatherland!

Brother merchants! Collect financial support for the anti-Japanese army! Fight against all taxation imposed by Japan and Manchukuo! Demand freedom of trading for Chinese merchants and do not submit to the Japanese restrictions!

Brother students! Put aside your textbooks! Follow the example of Pan Chao,* of old and join in the struggle in defense of your fatherland!

Sisters! Throw off the yoke of the dark forces of semi-feudal slavery!

* Pan Chao, who lived in the second century, was famous as a fighter against the foreign enemies of China.—Ed.

Learn from the legendary Mu Lan* not to lag behind the men in defending your fatherland!

All who are against Japan, rise up for the sacred cause and fight against Japan, Manchukuo and Chiang Kai-shek! Organize a people's anti-Japanese and anti-Manchurian government! Win back the lost lands in Manchuria and China! Fight for the integrity of Chinese territory and the independence of the Chinese nation!

Long live the united front against Japanese imperialism, Manchukuo and Chiang Kai-shek!

Long live the great Chinese Republic!

Long live the sacred anti-Japanese national-revolutionary war!

THE UNITED FRONT COMMITTEE FOR WAR AGAINST JAPAN

COMMANDER OF THE FIRST ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED ARMY,
YANG TSIN-YUEI.

COMMANDER OF THE SECOND ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED ARMY,
WANG TE-KUNG.

COMMANDER OF THE THIRD ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED ARMY,
CHAO SHAN-TSI.

COMMANDER OF THE FOURTH ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED ARMY,
LI YANG-LU.

COMMANDER OF THE FIFTH ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED ARMY,
CHOU PAO-CHUN.

COMMANDER OF THE SIXTH ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED ARMY,
SHIH WEN-TUNG.

TANYUAN ANTI-JAPANESE PARTISAN DETACHMENT.

HEILUANG ANTI-JAPANESE PARTISAN DETACHMENT.

THE GREAT CHINESE REPUBLIC, 24TH YEAR, 6TH MONTH,
20TH DAY. [June 20, 1935.]

* Mu Lan, as the stories go, lived in the fourth century and was famous because she saved the life of her father, a military leader who was too sick to go to the front, by taking up arms herself and fighting against the foreign enemy for twelve years, disguising herself as a man and fighting in her father's place.—Ed.

Address of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Red Army of China to the Ethiopian People

ON behalf of the Red Army of China, on behalf of the Chinese people, fighting for their national independence, we send our fraternal greetings to the heroic Ethiopian people.

We are separated by thousands of miles, by rivers, oceans and mountains. But in all our thoughts and feelings we are with you in our fearless struggle against the imperialist barbarians. Nobody knows better than we what intolerable suffering, what incalculable, cruel tortures, what persecution, the imperialists inflict upon the peoples they enslave. Nobody understands better than we the moral danger which threatens your people at the hands of the Italian imperialists. These imperialist robbers want, by fire and sword, to deprive you of your national independence and to convert you into abject slaves. They want to drive you out of your own homes, and to doom you to be at their complete mercy, and to the darkest poverty and starvation. All that would be left to you would be to beg at the threshold of the homes in which you were born and which once belonged to you.

The rainclouds had not yet dispersed when leaden clouds once more gathered menacingly over your country. Perhaps by the time these greetings reach you, the Italian imperialists will already be setting in motion the machine of destruction, and will have begun their rapacious war against your people. The only road to the salvation of your people is the self-sacrificing armed defense of your national independence. The entire people must rise like one man, under the slogan of a sacred war against the imperialist robbers. We have no doubt that your people who victoriously resisted the attack of the Italian imperialists forty years ago, will today again force the imperialist robbers to take flight.

The fate of our land is also in danger. A calamity has befallen our four hundred million people, such as has never occurred before in the whole long course of its five thousand years of history. For four years, the Japanese imperialists have been conducting a robber war against our people. Their troops have occupied a tremendous part of our territory. Their design is to convert the whole of our people into colonial slaves. But they will not be successful!

We have always fought, are fighting and will continue to fight against the imperialists, whatever the difficulties and sacrifices, until we have won complete independence for our country, until we have driven every single imperialist, Japanese and others, out of our native land.

We also have to fight against the Italian imperialists. The Italian fascists—military pilots—help the enemies of our people, are in their

service, and bombard us from military airplanes. This still further strengthens our bonds with the Ethiopian people in the struggle against our common enemy—the imperialist robbers.

We are inspired with indomitable faith in the victory of the Ethiopian and Chinese peoples. Fight like lions for the vital interests of your people! Know that you have on your side all that is best, honest, and advanced in the whole of mankind!

Long live the independent Ethiopian people!

REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY

CHU TEH

CHOU EN-LAI

WANG CHIA-HSIAN

Japan and the Pacific

By L. I.

MUST we Fight in Asia,* by Nathaniel Pfeffer, a well-known American writer on Pacific problems, is one of the most interesting bourgeois studies on the subject which have appeared recently.

This bourgeois writer does not, of course, realize sufficiently the mass nature of the developments taking place in the various countries of the Far East, in Japan in particular. Nevertheless, the very rich actual material and interesting conclusions on individual concrete questions make this book deserving of attention.

Pfeffer asserts, in the first chapter, that, due to Japan's striving to annex China outright, to squeeze out the other imperialist powers, and convert this enslaved country into a jumping-off ground for further annexations, a new world war is maturing in the Pacific for a revision of the world. According to Pfeffer, no peaceful solution of this international conflict is possible.

"Japan will absorb China or it will be stopped by war. If it successfully absorbs China—and inevitably later Northeastern Asia and Southeastern Asia as well—it will wield power second to no other nation on earth. . . . That it will be permitted to absorb China unresisted is therefore hardly likely. War, then, with whom? The question lies at the focal point of international relations in this generation" (p. 10).

The author give a historical sketch of the evolution of Japan in the nineteenth century and of the development of Japanese imperialism. He also recalls the history of the invasion of China by foreign imperialisms, its enslavement and partial partition. He draws a clear picture of how the imperialist powers, one after the other, seized the best parts of Chinese territory, competing with each other over extending their "concessions", and how the imperialists forced compulsory "loans" upon the Chinese government, to secure which these powers placed whole branches of national economy under their control.

"When England insisted upon and won China's consent to English supervision over the Chinese customs, France demanded and obtained supervision over the Chinese postoffice. Spheres of influence were staked out by England, Germany, France and Russia. . . . Thus also Chinese sovereignty was being whittled away and China was becoming a subject nation, with the added disadvantage of having several quarreling masters to serve. . . . The government was cowed, its officials supinely doing the bidding of foreign military and diplomatic representatives. . . . Its people had to step out of the foreigner's way, literally and figuratively. . . ." (pp. 33-34).

* *Must We Fight in Asia*, by Nathaniel Pfeffer. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1935.

The author describes the Boxer rebellion, speaks of the crushing of this rebellion, the indemnities imposed upon China, the barbarous devastation of the country by the foreign oppressors. The author writes:

"It is a malodorous story, a story of bullying, greed and rapacity. . . . But it is not unique in its time. It was duplicated in the Middle East, Near East, Africa and everywhere else in the world where the combination of the existence of raw materials, a potential market and military weakness invited first to open depredations and then to veneered chicaneries. The entire career of Western Europe, and more recently, of the United States in the distant parts is best forgotten" (p. 45).

Such an acknowledgment from a bourgeois publicist is particularly significant. Characterizing, further, the strengthening of Japanese imperialism, its victory in the Russo-Japanese war, the author dwells in detail on how Japan utilized the situation produced by the imperialist war of 1914-18 to further strengthen its positions in China. It not only seized Kiaochow, but tried to force upon China the notorious 21 demands, striving to place a virtual protectorate over the country. After that, utilizing the military intervention of the Entente against Soviet Russia, Japan made an attempt to effect the seizure of the Maritime Province and Eastern Siberia. Forced to make a temporary and partial retreat at the Washington Conference in 1921-22 and to recognize the integrity of China, Japan made use of a favorable moment to renew its intervention and attempt to seize various parts of the country. In 1931, utilizing the difficulties of the European imperialist powers and the United States, who were in the grip of the world economic crisis, Japan carried through the previously prepared annexation of Manchuria and adjacent Chinese provinces. Not satisfied with the creation of "independent Manchukuo", supported by the bayonets of the Japanese forces of occupation, Japan vigorously commenced to prepare the seizure of the Northern provinces of Inner China.

The author comes to the conclusion that "by all the laws of probability, North China will fall to Japan as Manchuria did, failing the interjection of some impediment from without" (p. 103).

"North China now has reached the status of Manchuria before 1931 [on the eve of its occupation] . . . North China remains Chinese at Japan's pleasure . . ." (p. 83).

The realization at the present time of the annexation of the five provinces of North China by Japan and their conversion into a "new", "independent state", confirms Peffer's opinion.

In the chapter "Samurai in a Factory World", the author draws a picture of present-day Japan where the survivals of feudalism in social relations, in the life and consciousness of the ruling class, have become fused with the specific features of present-day monopoly capitalism. He does not foresee any serious political opposition in Japan which could hinder the realization of the annexationist plans of Japanese imperialism.

"If Japan is to be checked by any internal force within a

measurable period, that can only be the threat of imminent financial disaster" (p. 108).

The author does not understand and consequently underrates the significance of the maturing of the revolutionary movement in Japan as a force endangering the expansionist plans of Japanese imperialism. He soberly evaluates the illusory nature of those hopes which in American circles are placed upon the "pacifist" influence of the so-called moderate elements in Japan.

"All talk of Japanese liberalism as a check on Japan's military aggression is therefore hollow. It has not even the merit of reality. It is a phantasm of well-meaning American tourists making hasty deductions from superficial travelers' observations or drinking in the amiable sentiments of banquet speeches" (p. 114).

The author points out how the mass of the people in Japan are systematically educated in a chauvinist and militarist spirit, based upon religious and race mythology of a medieval nature. He says:

"Patriotism in Japan is not a sentiment but a religion with the passion of Islam, a religion also, inculcated, spread and sustained by the most skillful artifices of modern propaganda. . . . This cult is the moral support of Japanese militarism and imperialism . . ." (p. 111).

The peculiarities of the social system of Japanese imperialism, with its feudal survivals, determine the exceptional political influence of the military castes in Japan:

"By provisions of the constitution the army and navy are responsible to the Emperor alone and not to the cabinet and the Diet. They are therefore practically autonomous and in effect are in a position to overturn the cabinet if the civilian officials should by chance become untractable" (p. 113).

The author asserts that Japanese annexations in China foreshadow inevitable forcing out of all foreign competitors of Japan from the spheres of commerce and capital investments in China. At the same time Japan is carrying out unscrupulous dumping, capturing the most important Eastern markets from other capitalist countries, above all Great Britain.

"If Japan consummates its political designs in the Far East there will be closed to Europe and the United States half of the only continent on which they can find escape from the pressure which already threatens to become unbearable. . . . The western powers cannot permit Japan to take possession of the Far East without accepting the risk of national insolvency" (pp. 134-35).

Hence, the author concludes, war in the Far East is inevitable.

The author further dwells upon an estimate of the possibilities and aspects of war, and of Japan warring against the U.S.S.R. and the United States. As far as Great Britain is concerned, it is his opinion that:

"Great Britain can be excluded at this stage. It has too many hostages in the East. . . . Hongkong, Singapore and the whole of British Malaya would fall at once with the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Japan. Even India would be gravely menaced, and British trade routes to the East would be precarious if not actually severed. . ." (p. 136).

The author underestimates the growing Anglo-Japanese antagonisms as well as the forces of British imperialism on the Pacific Ocean, which potentially are still immense. Particularly in connection with the increase of Japanese aggression in the Far East, the preparation to annex North China and the attempt to make Nanking into its virtual protectorate, leading political circles in Great Britain feel growing concern. The recent Leith-Ross mission and the currency reform in China are undoubtedly connected with the efforts of London to fortify its positions in China along the line of financial connection with the Nanking government. Japanese military circles openly express their hostility with regard to these English measures, and reply to them by forcing their annexation of the five provinces in North China. The reinforcement of the strategic position of Great Britain in the Pacific, especially the hasty opening of an airline connecting Great Britain with Australia and the completion of the construction of the Singapore base, is connected with the accentuation of the Anglo-Japanese antagonisms. We do not think that British imperialism would have spent vast sums to equip this base for the main naval forces, if it counted on the inevitability of losing it in case of war with Japan, as Pfeffer asserts. The latter, in our opinion, exaggerates the military and naval power of Japan which, in any case, could not so easily carry out offensive operations against the main bases of the powerful British navy. It is true, this question is becoming more complicated owing to the situation developing now in the Mediterranean as a result of the Italo-Ethiopian war. In the future, however, Great Britain will inevitably more and more turn "its face to the East". Another remark made by Pfeffer is more substantial, namely:

"There is an active party in England that favors coming to terms with Japan, that regrets, in fact, the dissolution of the alliance with Japan in deference to American pressure. While this party is definitely a minority, it is an influential minority" (*ibid*).

In consequence of this, according to Pfeffer, Great Britain prefers to wait for the maturing, or the outcome, of the conflict between Japan and the U.S.S.R. or the U.S.A. The utterance of this bourgeois writer regarding Japan's possibilities is of particular interest:

"Time works against Japan. Every year it waits the tasks will be more difficult. With every year that passes Soviet Russia can be expected to become stronger economically and technologically and, therefore, stronger for military purposes. With more railroads across the continent, more industrial centers in Siberia and more factories capable of turning out munitions and supplies, Soviet Russia will be well-nigh impregnable

against Japan, for the weight of larger population and greater natural wealth will then tell. It may be, indeed, that if the Japanese militarists are ever to realize their dreams of enclosing the Japan Sea in Japanese territory and making a solid Japanese bloc on the Asiatic continent, they must do so now" (pp. 142-43).

Hence, in the opinion of the author, it is necessary for Japanese imperialism to force the issue of armed conflict in the near future. At the most favorable moment in this respect, which existed between 1931 and 1933, has already been allowed to slip.

According to Peffer, China would inevitably be drawn into a Soviet-Japanese war:

"The Chinese irregulars and guerilla bands, which the Japanese describe as bandits, would make raids to embarrass the Japanese, blowing up railways, bridges and supply depots. Officially China would be neutral, at least at the beginning, and individual Chinese would even sell supplies to Japan. But in reality the Chinese would give such aid to Russia as they could.

"Large numbers would do so even against the orders of their government. . . .

"The outbreak of war would release a wave of hope and of pro-Russian sentiment throughout the country" (pp. 144-45).

On the other hand, the Western imperialist powers could not remain neutral if a Soviet-Japanese war were to take place. British imperialism in particular would regard the victory of the U.S.S.R. as a direct menace to its rule in India and other colonial countries of the East.

"Great Britain would also not remain aloof. . . . It would not stand by and watch Japan being decisively defeated. . . . Great Britain cannot permit a decisive Russian victory in the Far East" (p. 147).

As for the United States, this American author considers that it could prefer the victory of the U.S.S.R.

"Forced to the choice, Great Britain would prefer a Japanese victory as the lesser of the two evils. . . . Forced to the choice, the United States would prefer a Russian victory as the lesser of the two evils" (p. 152).

As to the prospects of war between the United States and Japan, the author believes that American imperialism, in case of the defeat of the Japanese will claim a share in the partition of China:

"America might go into the war to safeguard peace, but it would come out with the Manchurian plains. It would not return Manchuria to China. . . . Instead it would keep hegemony over Manchuria itself, not in name, perhaps, but in fact" (p. 182).

While giving interesting facts and quite a successful appraisal of

various international political questions, the author is unable to see the correct historical perspectives. He absolutely ignores the forces of the Chinese people who are mobilizing a wide anti-imperialist front for the revolutionary struggle against the Japanese invaders. While he speaks of the imperialist contradictions in the Pacific, which have become particularly acute under the influence of Japanese aggression, he fails to see, however, how the Chinese people, on the basis of the people's united anti-imperialist front, and with the support of the revolutionary movement in Japan, may utilize these contradictions in the camp of the imperialists to safeguard the national emancipation movement in China.

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